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ABSTRACT 
In Somaliland, the prevalence rate for female genital mutilation/cutting 
(FGM/C) renders it nearly universal. An overwhelming majority of girls 
undergo the most radical type of FGM/C, locally referred to as pharaonic 
cutting. Yet, there is some evidence on a shift towards less radical types, locally 
labelled sunnah cutting. Amongst international institutions, researchers and 
activists engaged in preventing FGM/C, the practice is increasingly 
conceptualised as a human rights violation and as a form of gender 
discrimination. It is now argued that challenging stereotypes about gender 
power structures will pave the way for abandoning the practice. 
Simultaneously, researchers and activists urge men to voice their opinions 
about the practice.  
This research provides a deeper understanding of the engagement of young 
men in the prevention of FGM/C, but it also critically examines men’s 
engagement. Focusing on discursive practices, I examine how young men 
engaged in preventing FGM/C in Somaliland discursively negotiate violence 
against women, gender norms, and the gender order. I also explore whether 
these negotiations are on the one hand, consistent with those goals related to 
deconstructing the patriarchal gender regime and, on the other hand, 
consistent with locally prevailing masculinities.  
My study is guided by critical studies on men and masculinities and by a 
critical discourse analysis, through which I address the complex and often 
hidden workings of power and ideology in discourse. To do so, I collected data 
via semi-structured individual interviews with 19 university students (15 men, 
4 women) who volunteered in a project to advocate against FGM/C in 
Somaliland. The interviewees employed four interlinked discourses: the 
righteousness discourse, the health discourse, the hierarchical difference 
discourse, and the masculine responsibility discourse. These discourses 
challenge some forms of violence against women, while legitimating others. 
They (re)produce prevailing masculinities and hierarchical gender order in 
many ways, but there are also discursive elements that renegotiate prevailing 
gender norms, particularly idealised womanhood. 
The findings of this study contribute to theories associated with female 
genital cutting as patriarchal violence, feminist theories on the workings of 
power and ideology within a discourse, and theories on men and masculinities. 
More practically, these findings can inform the design of programmes to 
prevent FGM/C, which should remain consistent with the deconstruction of 
patriarchal structures and practices that uphold FGM/C.  
Key words: discourse, female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), 
gender-based violence, masculinities, men, patriarchal gender regime, gender 
norms, gender order, Somaliland 
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1. INTRODUCTION
On 6 February 2016, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 
declared that ‘[n]ow is |the time for men all over the world to take up the fight 
to end FGM2 with real dedication’, marking the International Day of Zero 
Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation (O’Kane, 2016). According to 
UNICEF (2016), in 2015, at least 200 million girls and women were subjected 
to female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) in the 30 countries comprising 
Africa and the Middle East, the region where FGM/C most often occurs. 
FGM/C as a practice is almost universal in, for example, Somalia, Guinea, and 
Djibouti, with prevalence levels exceeding 90% (UNICEF, 2016).  
In recent decades, efforts to address FGM/C have intensified with support 
from governments, international institutions, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), religious and civil society groups, and local 
communities (UNICEF, 2013, p. 2). Initially, these efforts focused on the 
adverse health consequences of FGM/C, but by the early 1990s, the health 
approach fell from favour because campaigns failed to significantly reduce 
prevalence and inadvertently promoted the medicalisation3 of the practice. 
Subsequently, at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, FGM/C was 
reconceptualised as a human rights violation, and many countries established 
national legislation on FGM/C (UNICEF, 2013, pp. 6–8). Furthermore, it is 
now argued that framing FGM/C as a form of gender discrimination and 
challenging stereotypes about gender relationships and power structures will 
pave the way for abandoning the practice (see, for example, Berg, Denison, & 
Fretheim, 2010; UNICEF, 2010; WHO, 2008). 
Whilst FGM/C prevention efforts have extensively considered and 
addressed women’s perceptions associated with the practice (Kaplan et al., 
2013), a new line of academic research is emerging which addresses how men 
position themselves on FGM/C (see, for example, Abdalla, Omer, & 
Elmusharaf, 2012; Gage & Van Rossem, 2006; Kaplan et al., 2013; Sagna, 
2014; Sakeah, Beke, Doctor, & Hodgson, 2006). However, based on a review 
of 20 peer-reviewed publications from 15 countries, Varol et al. (2015) argue 
that existing research remains limited, and little knowledge exists regarding 
how FGM/C affects men. Practical efforts to involve men in preventing FGM/C 
have been initiated in, for example, Sudan, Senegal, Egypt, and Gambia, 
Kaufman (2003, p. 21) notes. He describes, for example, male religious leaders 
who were engaged to pressure local imams to issue a fatwa4 on the issue, and 
2FGM refers to female genital mutilation, whilst FGC refers to female genital cutting. Currently, a 
hybrid term, female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C), is often used by, for example, United Nations 
agencies. In Section 1.1 below, I discuss the debate on the terminology and the way I use the different 
terms in this study. 
3Parents turn to medical practitioners to cut their daughters or choose less severe types of cutting. 
4The technical term for a legal judgment or learned interpretation that a qualified jurist (mufti) gives 
on issues pertaining to shari’a (Islamic) law ('Fatwa,' n.d.). 
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male political leaders who were recruited to promote alternative coming-of-
age ceremonies and community declarations banning FGM/C. In fact, the 
practice was also opposed by (male) Muslim scholars also in historical times, 
as Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002, p. 57) points out, exemplified by imam an-
Numan ibn Thabit ibn Zuta Abu Hanifah in the eighth century (Anees, 1989, 
p. 111), and Sudanese Muslim leaders in the mid-nineteenth century 
(Abusharaf, 2000, p. 164). 
In 2013, struggling to specify my research aim related to preventing 
FGM/C, I found a fascinating notation in the 2011 Annual Report of the 
UNFPA–UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting 
(Diop et al., 2012). The report described an emerging phenomenon in Kenya, 
whereby young men were assuming an increasing role in preventing FGM/C 
by publicly declaring their preference to marry uncut girls. This phenomenon 
seemed promising, because guaranteeing a girl’s marriageability represents 
one of the root causes perpetuating FGM/C in several practicing communities 
(Gruenbaum, 2006; Mackie & LeJeune, 2009), and because statistics (from, 
for example, UNICEF, 2013) demonstrate that younger men in particular are 
increasingly more critical of FGM/C. However, most studies and reports (see, 
for example, Berg & Denison, 2012, 2013; UNFPA & UNICEF, 2015; WHO, 
2008) that address the engagement of men in FGM/C prevention focus on 
religious scholars, clan leaders, and village elders. Less attention is given to 
the engagement of young men. 
In this chapter, I discuss the terminology surrounding FGM/C and the role 
of men in both maintaining and preventing FGM/C. Lastly, I define my 
research aim and research questions, and outline the structure of this 
dissertation.  
1.1 FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION/CUTTING:
TERMINOLOGY, TYPES, AND PREVALENCE
Vigorous debate surrounds the terminology used to describe the cutting of the 
female genitalia. The term female genital mutilation (FGM), which is 
increasingly used by researchers in the social sciences, law, and criminology, 
by activists, and in policy documents in Western countries (Walby et al., 2017, 
p. 81), is ‘thought to imply excessive judgment by outsiders and insensitivity 
toward individuals who have undergone the practice’ (Eliah, 1996, p. 6). The 
less value-laden and less stigmatising term, female genital cutting (FGC), 
however, has been criticised for failing to sufficiently acknowledge the 
harmfulness of the practice (Shell-Duncan & Hernlund, 2000, p. 6). In 
addition, the term female circumcision (FC) appears to de-emphasise the 
severity of most types of practices by comparing it to the removal of the male 
foreskin (Obermeyer, 1999). The term female genital surgery (or a female 
genital operation), which attempts to neutrally describe the practice 
(Johsdotter & Essén, 2015; Obermeyer, 1999), has been criticised for 
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legitimising the practice and implying that it is safe or necessary as a medical 
procedure (Lewis, 1995). To highlight that the practice violates the rights of 
girls and women, whilst simultaneously recognising the importance of 
employing respectful terminology when working with practicing communities, 
United Nations institutions currently use a hybrid term, female genital 
mutilation/cutting (FGM/C). In this study, I follow the United Nations 
strategy and use the term female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) when 
talking about the practice in general—unless when directly quoting text or 
speech that employs different terms. Below, I describe how and when I refer 
to the main types of FGM/C practices in Somaliland, pharaonic cutting and 
sunnah cutting5. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO, 2017) defines female genital 
mutilation as ‘all procedures that involve the partial or total removal of the 
external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for 
nonmedical reasons.’ Whilst the variety of procedures used to alter the female 
genitalia cannot be clearly divided into separate categories, WHO (2017) 
recognises four major types of FGM/C. The least extensive (type 1) is often 
referred to as clitoridectomy and involves the partial or total removal of the 
clitoris, and in rare cases, only the prepuce. Excision (type II) involves the 
partial or complete removal of the clitoris and the labia minora (the inner folds 
of the vulva), with or without excision of the labia majora (the outer folds of 
skin of the vulva). The most radical type (type III), known as infibulation, 
involves narrowing the vaginal opening by creating a covering seal. This seal 
is formed by cutting and repositioning the labia minora, or labia majora, 
sometimes through stitching, with or without removal of the clitoris. This 
closure must be re-opened for intercourse and childbirth, a procedure known 
as de-infibulation (or defibulation), generally followed by re-infibulation after 
each birth and often when a woman becomes a widow or divorces (Shell–
Duncan & Hernlund, 2000, p. 4). Shell-Duncan and Hernlund (2000, p. 9) 
wrote that infibulation is largely confined to Sudan, Somalia, north-eastern 
Kenya, Eritrea, parts of Mali, and a small area in Northern Nigeria. Type IV 
includes all other harmful procedures performed on the female genitalia for 
non-medical purposes, including, for example, pricking, piercing, incising, 
scraping, and cauterising the genital area (WHO, 2017).  
Each society, however, develops its own language and ways of classifying 
the types of cutting known to its members, which may not necessarily 
correspond to WHO’s classification. Establishing equivalence between such 
locally defined types of cutting and those proposed by WHO remains 
complicated (UNICEF, 2013). Newell–Jones (2016), Crawford and Ali (2015), 
and Lunde (2012), for instance, note that while the English acronym FGM 
refers to all types of procedures amongst most English speakers, in Somaliland 
5‘Sunnah’ cutting is commonly spelled in two ways: ‘sunna’ and ‘sunnah’. This study uses ‘sunnah’ 
consistently, except in the cases were in-text quotations are used and the cited author uses the spelling 
‘sunna’. 
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it only refers to the more extensive type, also referred to as pharaonic6 
circumcision (gudnin pharaonic or just pharaoni) in Somaliland. Thus, 
Somalilanders see no contradiction in stating that they would under no 
circumstances let their daughters undergo FGM, whilst also considering it 
important that their daughters undergo the less extensive form of cutting, 
referred to as sunnah circumcision (gudnin sunna or just sunna) in 
Somaliland (Lunde & Sagbakken, 2014; Newell–Jones, 2016, p. 12).  
Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002) argues that Somalis consider sunnah 
circumcision a religiously recommended act. This stems from the meaning of 
the word ‘sunnah’ in Arabic as ‘recommended’. Furthermore, the same 
understanding of that term falls within one of the five categories to which all 
human actions can be classified according to Islamic law: 1) 
required/commanded; 2) recommended; 3) permitted; 4) disapproved; and 5) 
forbidden (Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002, p. 54; referring to B. Lewis, 1994, p. 
5). Accordingly, Crawford and Ali (2015) claim that the term ‘sunnah’ can refer 
to any type of FGM/C Somali people believe is required or sanctioned by Islam, 
and can thus refer to WHO type I, II, or even III. They also recognised the 
increasing use of the intermediate type of FGM/C, which involves less 
stitching than the pharaonic practice and likely emerged in response to 
government interventions to eliminate pharaonic cutting. To increase its 
acceptability in comparison to the pharaonic practice, this intermediate type 
is sometimes called ‘sunnah’ or ‘sunnah 2’, particularly amongst women 
(Newell–Jones, 2016, p. 12). However, sunnah cutting may be close or 
equivalent to pharaonic cutting in reality because traditional cutters primarily 
responsible for performing the practice in Somaliland are often unaware of the 
differences between specific practices (Akar & Tiilikainen, 2009; Lunde, 2012; 
Vestbøstad & Blystad, 2014). Table 1 draws upon Newell-Jones’ (2016) report 
and summarises how the FGM/C practices in Somaliland relate to the WHO’s 
classification. 
During my fieldwork, I attempted to emphasise that I refer to all types of 
FGM/C practices—not simply the most extensive types. Thus, I avoided the 
term female genital mutilation and the acronyms FGM and FGM/C during 
interviews. Instead, I employed the terms female genital cutting, sunnah 
cutting, and pharaonic cutting. Accordingly, in the text here, I use sunnah 
cutting and pharaonic cutting when referring to the primary types of FGM/C 
practices in Somaliland. When talking about the practice in general, I use the 
term female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), as discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
6The term pharaonic circumcision refers to a belief that the pharaohs of ancient Egypt performed 
similar operations on women (Talle, 1993, p. 105; referring to Widstrand, 1964). 
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Table 1. Types of FGM/C practiced in Somaliland and the equivalent World Health 
Organisation classification (adapted from Newell-Jones, 2016, Table 4A)7
Sunnah 
WHO type I
Partial or complete removal of the clitoris (clitoridectomy), 
requiring no stitching. Often described as removal of the 
tip of the clitoris in Somaliland.
 
Sunnah 2/intermediate 
WHO type II
Partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, 
with or without excision of the labia majora (excision), 
requiring two or three stitches to partially close the 
vaginal orifice. 
Pharaonic 
WHO type III
Narrowing of the vaginal orifice through the creation of a 
covering seal by cutting and re-stitching the labia minora 
and/or the labia majora, with or without excision of the 
clitoris (infibulation), requiring four to seven stitches and 
resulting in a very small vaginal orifice only.
 
In many countries, the systematic collection and analysis of data on FGM/C 
began quite recently (UNICEF, 2013). According to UNICEF (2013), over the 
last two decades, reliable data have been collected through two major 
household surveys: the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). Nationally representative data on 
the prevalence of FGM/C among girls and women ages 15 to 49 is now 
available for 29 countries: 27 countries in Africa, Yemen and Iraq (Shell–
Duncan et al., 2016). As the availability of representative data increases, there 
is more accurate figures on the number of girls and women who have 
undergone the practice. According to UNICEF (2016), at least 200 million girls 
and women alive in 2015 were subjected to FGM/C in the 30 countries in 
which concentrates. In addition to the challenges associated with the 
terminology and classification, collecting reliable data is, however, further 
complicated by the fact that many women may be unaware of the specific 
procedures performed on them (UNICEF, 2013).  
A UNICEF (2013) report showed that urban, wealthier, and educated 
people less frequently carried out FGM/C than their rural, poorer, and less 
educated fellow citizens. Rural communities are more likely to be kinship-
based with limited cultural diversity, whilst urban areas are often more 
culturally diverse. Urban residents may more often observe that uncut girls 
and women do not experience social sanctions. Economic development 
increases commerce and migration, weakens traditional family structures, 
draws women to enter the labour market, and, hence, changes their economic 
and social roles as well as their dependence on FGM/C as a means to secure 
their future through marriage. Wealthier households are also likely exposed to 
more information on FGM/C and may meet and engage with individuals who 
do not practice FGM/C. According to UNICEF (2013), in high and low 
prevalence countries alike, the prevalence of FGM/C is generally highest 
7WHO type IV, such as pricking and piercing, is not prevalent in Somaliland and is, thus, excluded 
from the table. 
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amongst the daughters of women with no education and decreases 
substantially as the mother’s educational level rises. Schools provide a social 
environment conducive to new ideas, and social ties with peers who oppose 
FGM/C. Furthermore, educated women are more often exposed to FGM/C 
intervention programmes, media messages, and international discourses.8  
1.2 MEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE PREVENTION OF 
FGM/C
Despite some geographical variation, men seldom directly participate in the 
decision-making surrounding and the execution of FGM/C (Kaplan et al., 
2013). As a practice, mothers, grandmothers, or other elderly community 
women perform FGM/C (see, for example, Mackie & LeJeune, 2009; UNICEF, 
2010). Hence, FGM/C represents a form of gender-based violence in which 
women comprise both the primary victims and main perpetrators. Whilst 
women appear to stand at the forefront of perpetuating FGM/C, men also play 
a significant role in its continuation as fathers, husbands, and community and 
religious leaders (Kaplan et al., 2013; Varol et al., 2015). Correspondingly, 
women who decide that their daughters will not undergo FGM/C often face 
both peer pressure and helplessness, particularly when not actively supported 
by their husbands or influential male leaders from their communities (Kaplan 
et al., 2013). The belief that men support FGM/C alone can represent an 
important motivating factor influencing women’s behaviour vis-à-vis cutting 
their daughters (UNICEF, 2013). As Kaplan (2013, p. 9) states, ‘In the secret 
world of women, avoiding discrimination is a powerful motif to perpetuate 
FGM/C, and this social force must be acknowledged. However, men’s power 
to influence it should also not be disregarded.’ 
Varol et al.’s (2015) systematic review of studies exploring men’s attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviours concerning FGM/C in 15 countries, as well as a 
UNICEF (2013) investigation conducted in 16 countries, revealed the 
ambiguity in men’s views regarding the continuation of FGM/C. In most 
countries analysed by UNICEF, both women and men expressed similar levels 
of support for FGM/C. In some countries, more men than women want to end 
FGM/C, whilst in other countries more women than men would like the 
practice to stop. In Senegal and Gambia, for example, Shell-Duncan et al. 
(2010) found that more men than women favoured ending FGM/C; 
furthermore, when men were involved in deciding whether their daughters 
should undergo FGM/C, daughters more often remained uncut. In 
8According to UNICEF (2013), Somalia serves as an exception to these trends: 48% of girls from the 
richest quintile, compared to 49% from the poorest quantile, have undergone FGM/C; and 56% of 
mothers with a secondary or higher education reported that their daughters had undergone FGM/C 
compared to 43% of mothers with no education. According to Ismail et al. (2016), in Somaliland, 
however, 11% of women with no education would not perform FGM/C on their daughters, whilst this 
share climbed to about 26% amongst women with a secondary education, and roughly 36% amongst 
women with a higher education. 
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Somaliland, too, young men more than older men or young women favoured 
not cutting their daughters (Newell–Jones, 2017, pp. 23, 27). 
Varol et al. (2015) claimed that notions of social obligation, religion, 
education, ethnicity, urban living, and migration, and an understanding of the 
negative consequences of the practice influenced men’s support for 
abandoning FGM/C. They found that education most strongly influenced 
support for ending cutting. Furthermore, UNICEF (2013) demonstrated that 
uneducated men were more likely to support FGM/C than men with a 
secondary or higher education, and household wealth associated with 
relatively lower levels of support for FGM/C. Both patterns mirror those from 
a UNICEF investigation amongst girls and women. For example, in Gambia, 
Kaplan et al. (2013) found that ethnic identity decisively shaped how men 
viewed FGM/C—that is, more traditional groups exhibited greater support for 
the practice.  
The role of migration influences thinking on FGM/C, as shown in studies 
amongst Somali men living in Norway (Gele, Johansen, & Sundby, 2012; Gele, 
Kumar, Hjelde, & Sundby, 2012). Migrant men no longer feel socially 
pressured to support FGM/C. Such men maintain that it is prestigious for a 
woman not to be cut. They claim that FGM/C continues in Somalia due to 
social obligations; that is, men dislike FGM/C, but agree to it so as not to upset 
their mothers. Mitike and Deressa (2009) found the same pattern in Ethiopia, 
where 89% of male Somali refugees valued anti-FGM/C interventions. Varol 
et al. (2015, p. 12) claim that this highlights the diminishing social pressure: 
‘When people are granted their basic human rights with stable and improved 
social and economic living options, the need to cut their daughter for 
marriageability and economic survival is removed.’  
Moreover, socio-demographic factors influence how men frame and value 
FGM/C, and the benefits and advantages they associate with the practice. In 8 
of 11 countries included in a UNICEF (2013 Table 6.3) investigation carried 
out amongst men aged 15 to 49, the most widely mentioned benefit of FGM/C 
for a girl was ‘no benefit’ (multiple responses allowed). Often mentioned 
benefits included social acceptance (mentioned by at least 10% of respondents 
in 7 out of 11 countries), preservation of virginity9 (mentioned by at least 10% 
in 5 out of 11 countries), and religious requirement10 (mentioned by at least 
10% in 4 out of 11 countries). Other reasons cited consisted of cleanliness or 
hygiene, marriage prospects, and sexual pleasure for the man. 
By contrast, the reasons men cite for abandoning the practice of FGM/C 
stem from an understanding that religion does not mandate it and that it may 
negatively impact sexual relationships, whilst few men conceptualise FGM/C 
as an act of violence or as an infringement of women’s rights (UNICEF, 2010, 
pp. 17–23). Men in northern Sudan (Berggren et al., 2006) and Egypt (Fahmy, 
El-Mouelhy, & Ragab, 2010) viewed themselves as victims of FGM/C, 
9Preserving virginity also includes categories such as ‘preventing premarital sex’ and ‘reducing 
sexual desire’.  
10Required by religion also includes categories such as ‘religious demand’ and ‘religious approval’. 
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describing complications such as sexual dissatisfaction resulting from it. In 
another study in Sudan (Almroth et al., 2001), men reported that FGM/C 
caused them difficulty during sexual penetration, resulting in wounds on or 
infections in the penis as well as psychological problems. In studies by 
Warsame and Talle (2011) and Vestbøstad and Blystad (2014), respondents in 
Somaliland reported men beginning to prefer entirely uncut or mildly cut 
wives given the diminished sexual drive of infibulated women. In addition, 
Bruchhaus (2013) found an emerging trend in the urban areas of Somaliland 
and amongst educated young men to marry ‘untouched’ (uncut) girls, girls also 
referred to  as ‘digital’ reflecting their modernity and sensitivity.  
Whilst younger men in particular are now becoming more critical of 
FGM/C, women typically underestimate the proportion of men wanting 
FGM/C to end. This results from many couples considering FGM/C an 
inappropriate topic for discussion between a husband and a wife, as well as 
because men hesitate to approach a topic often considered a ‘women’s issue’ 
(Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002, p. 143; Kaplan, Nuño Gómez, Thill, & Vitale, 
2017). Furthermore, organisations that deal with FGM/C are primarily 
women’s organisations, whose grassroots audiences consist of other women, 
whereby men often lack information on the practice of FGM/C (Gele, 
Johansen, et al., 2012).  
1.3 AIM, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND STRUCTURE 
OF THIS DISSERTATION
My research interest is to gain deeper understanding and problematising of 
the engagement of young men in the prevention of FGM/C. The research 
interest draws on three suggestions. First, framing FGM/C as gender 
discrimination and challenging gender power structures will pave the way for 
abandoning the practice (see, for example, Berg, Denison, & Fretheim, 2010; 
UNICEF, 2010; WHO, 2008). Second, men’s opinions on FGM/C should be 
heard, and more men be engaged in efforts to end FGM/C (see, for example, 
Abdalla et al., 2012; Gele, Bø, & Sundby, 2013; Ismail, Ali, Mohamed, 
Kraemer, & Winfield, 2016; Kaplan et al., 2013; Lunde & Sagbakken, 2014; 
Mölsä, 2008; Newell-Jones, 2016; Shell-Duncan et al., 2016; Varol et al., 
2015). Third, masculine norms do not include solidarity with women, and 
promoting gender equality is often viewed against men’s interests. Thus, men 
who advocate for gender equality may face ridicule, contempt, and anger 
(Adams & Coltrane, 2004; Connell, 1995; Flood, 2004; Ruxton & van der 
Gaag, 2013).  
Specifically, this study focuses on discursive practices, aiming to examine 
how young men engaged in preventing FGM/C discursively negotiate violence 
against women, gender norms, and the gender order. Furthermore, I explore 
whether these negotiations are consistent with, on the one hand, the goals 
related to deconstructing the patriarchal gender regime and, on the other 
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hand, with locally prevailing masculinities. To do so, I attempt to answer the 
following research questions:  
(1) How do young men engaged in preventing FGM/C, discursively 
negotiate the essence of FGM/C practices, gender norms, and the gender 
order?  
(2) How do these discourses (re)produce or challenge violence against 
women, prevailing gender norms, and hierarchical gender order? 
To answer these questions, I carried out fieldwork in Somaliland, a de facto 
state and the northern autonomous region of Somalia, where FGM/C 
prevalence is close to universal. My analysis focuses on university students 
who volunteered in an anti-FGM/C project implemented by a local civil society 
organisation (CSO). The data consist of semi-structured individual interviews 
with 15 male students, enriched by interviews with four male students and 
seven local CSO employees engaged in anti-FGM/C projects.  
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. In Chapter 2, I set the scene 
for exploring FGM/C and gender in Somaliland. I first discuss different 
understandings of violence and bodily integrity amongst international 
institutions, communities that practice FGM/C, and researchers. I then 
address gender norms and the status of women in Somaliland, as well as the 
prevailing FGM/C practices and the mechanisms that maintain those 
practices.  
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework, drawing upon the critical 
studies on men and masculinities (CSMM) framework, the centrality of which 
recognises gendered power in the context of men and masculinities. After 
describing the postmodern feminist critique of the CSMM framework, I 
proceed to a discussion of theories on patriarchy—the dialectical relationship 
between the patriarchal gender regime, and structures and practices that 
constitute it. I then outline how FGM/C relates to other patriarchal practices, 
such as women’s socio-economic subordination. I thereby justify the 
importance of exploring how different patriarchal structures and practices are 
discursively (re)produced. I also present the critical as well as intersectional 
views regarding the involvement of men in the prevention of violence against 
women.  
In Chapter 3, I also set up the theoretical framework for analysing the 
consistency of the discourses in my data with the prevailing masculinities in 
Somaliland. I present the theoretical conceptions of men and masculinities, 
including the poststructural critique (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, 2014; 
Whitehead, 2002) and the materialist critique (Hearn, 2004, 2014) of the 
concept of (hegemonic) masculinity. I discuss notions of Muslim 
masculinities, drawing from, for example, Arat and Hasan’s (2018) findings 
on the masculinities conveyed in the Qur’an. Drawing upon, for instance, El-
Bushra and Gardner (2016) and Hansen (2008), I also discuss the core ideals 
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of ‘Somali manhood’ as well as the socio-economic realities within which 
masculinities are negotiated in Somaliland.  
In Chapter 4, I describe the research methods and data. To overcome 
essentialism and ahistoricism, I draw upon Fairclough’s (1992, 1995, 2001) 
critical discourse analytical approach, which emphasises the interrelation 
between discourse and social change. In my analysis I also employ Lazar’s 
(2007) feminist critical discourse analysis, which aims to understand the 
complex workings of power and ideology in discourse to sustain gendered 
social arrangements. After describing the different phases of data collection 
and analyses, I address the research ethics, focusing on the risks my research 
poses to research participants and the Somali community in general. I also 
discuss how my position as a researcher and within the interview setting 
affected the data.  
In Chapters 5 and 6 I present, analyse, and discuss the data and the 
discourses that emerged in the interviews. In Chapter 7, I summarise the 
results and answer my research questions. Finally, I discuss the theoretical 
and practical contributions of this study as well as its limitations, and suggest 
avenues for further research. 
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2. SETTING THE SCENE FOR EXPLORING 
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION/CUTTING 
AND GENDER IN SOMALILAND
In this chapter, I describe the context of this study. In doing so, I begin by 
discussing specific understandings of violence and bodily integrity amongst 
international institutions, communities that practice FGM/C, and researchers 
who represent various viewpoints on these concepts. In Section 2.2, I shortly 
cover the geopolitical and socio-demographic realities in Somaliland and focus 
then on gender, which represents a fundamental structuring principle that 
influences almost all spheres of Somali society—the family, the household, 
politics, and the economy (Hansen, 2008). I discuss gendered rights and 
responsibilities, specifically women’s economic opportunities and political 
participation.11 In Section 2.3, I discuss the origins and prevalence of FGM/C 
in Somaliland, as well as the mechanisms that perpetuate the practice and 
efforts aimed at preventing it.  
2.1 UNIVERSALIST AND RELATIVIST 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF FGM/C
FGM/C and efforts to eradicate it have resulted in emotionally charged debates 
around cultural relativism, international human rights, racism and Western 
imperialism, the medicalisation of the practice, sexuality, and the patriarchal 
oppression of women, Shell–Duncan and Hernlund (2001, p. 1) write. They 
argue that identifying the most effective strategies for eradicating FGM/C 
stands as one of the most contested issues surrounding the practice, forcing 
scholars and activists to confront questions about who possesses the moral 
authority to condemn the practice, under what circumstances, and based upon 
which arguments (Shell–Duncan & Hernlund, 2001, pp. 24-25). To justify my 
research, which aims to contribute to eradicating FGM/C, I draw upon the 
works of Susan Okin (1999) and Lisa Wade (2011), which I discuss below. First, 
however, I discuss the most significant human rights arguments against 
FGM/C and their counterarguments. 
Initially, programmes and interventions to abolish FGM/C initially focused 
on the associated health risks. However, FGM/C was reconceptualised as a 
human rights violation by the international community at the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (UNICEF, 2013). That 
reconceptualisation relied on an understanding that ‘certain individual rights 
are so fundamental to human kind that they should be upheld as universal 
11Prevailing masculinities in Somaliland are discussed in Chapter 3, after describing different 
approaches to men and masculinities. 
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rights, the breach of which is subject to condemnation and, in certain 
instances, punishment through legislative force’ (Shell–Duncan & Hernlund, 
2000, p. 27). In contrast to this universalist stand, cultural relativism holds 
that no value judgments exist which are objectively falsifiable independent of 
specific cultures, and as such, moral judgments and social institutions in any 
one society are exempt from legitimate criticism by outsiders (Renteln, 1988). 
Boulware–Miller (1985) broke down the human rights approach to FGM/C as 
claims based on the rights of the child, the rights of women, freedom from 
torture, and the right to bodily integrity.12 Below, I briefly present each claim 
and the relativist counterarguments.  
The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) advocates 
that each child must be given the opportunity to develop physically, mentally, 
morally, spiritually, and socially in a healthy and normal manner and under 
conditions of freedom and dignity (Principle 2, emphasis added). Children will 
be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty, and exploitation (Principle 
9). Boyden et al. (2012) pointed out that modern globalised norms emphasise 
bodily integrity; reproductive, infant, and maternal health; and the rights of 
girls to be protected from harm. Traditional values, they note, focus more on 
the collective good and the social acceptance of girls, and, in practicing 
communities, many believe that FGM/C and early marriage reduce health 
risks associated with extramarital sex. Above all, by safeguarding girls’ social 
standing and their transition to adulthood, these practices are often believed 
to protect girls and women against social and economic risks, such as 
abandonment, stigma, and destitution, Boyden et al. argue. In line with this 
understanding, Breitung (1996) and Boulware–Miller (1985) point out that in 
a cultural context where most or all girls are cut, the ‘normal manner’ required 
by the Declaration of the Rights of the Child can indeed include FGM/C.  
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1981) has often been invoked by 
anti-FGM/C efforts that focus on FGM/C as a violation of women’s rights 
(Shell–Duncan & Hernlund, 2000, p. 28). Article 5a requires states to ‘modify 
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to 
achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs, and all other practices which 
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes 
or on stereotyped roles for men and women.’ Opponents demonstrate that 
female initiation, including genital cutting, can be highly empowering to 
women, and thus remains unrelated to Western feminist ideas of patriarchal 
oppression (see, for example, Hernlund, 2000; Thomas, 2000). Ahmadu 
(1995, p. 45) argues that ‘mounting an international campaign to coerce 80 
12In addition to the international human rights conventions mentioned by Boulware-Miller (1985), 
FGM/C practices are also considered a violation of women’s human rights by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted and released for signatures in 1989, on the thirtieth anniversary of 
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (see Walby et al., 2017, p. 81).
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million adult African women to give up their tradition is unjustified.’ She also 
emphasises the ‘anti-culture’ or ‘anti-progress’ dilemma facing many African 
women when they decide to cut their daughters (Ahmadu, 2000).  
Furthermore, widely differing meanings are attached to women’s bodies 
and sexuality. For some Western feminists, the clitoris symbolises women’s 
emancipation and, hence, FGM/C symbolises patriarchal oppression (Shell–
Duncan & Hernlund, 2000, p. 21). Opponents have criticised the Western 
‘preoccupation with the clitoris’ and overemphasis on the effects of FGM/C on 
sexual pleasure (see, for example Abusharaf, 2000; Ahmadu, 2000; 
Obermeyer, 1999). Nussbaum (1999, p. 127) addresses this criticism drawing 
parallels to other bodily functions: ‘We all know that people who are blind or 
unable to walk can lead rich and meaningful lives; nonetheless, we would all 
deplore practices that deliberately disabled people in those respects, nor would 
we think that critics of those practices are giving walking or seeing undue 
importance in human life.’ 
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CATCID, 1984) defines 
torture as inflicted ‘by or with the acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.’ The escalating medicalisation of FGM/C 
practices extends to this definition, since parents increasingly turn to medical 
practitioners to cut their daughters. Shell–Duncan and Hernlund (2000, p. 
29), in turn, argue that this definition is weakened by the fact that most 
FGM/C procedures take place in unofficial settings. In terms of the cruelty of 
FGM/C, they claim that because health hazards form the cornerstones of 
opposition to FGM/C, medical facts based on case studies of infibulations have 
been generalised to describe the health risks of all types of FGM/C (Shell–
Duncan & Hernlund, 2000, pp. 15-17). They maintain that a bias in medical 
facts may exist, since women are also reluctant to seek medical assistance due 
to modesty or the inaccessibility of health services, thereby reporting only 
severe or prolonged complications.  
To sum up, international actors and programmes that employ the 
universalist perspective consider FGM/C a violation against children’s and 
women’s rights, against freedom from torture, and/or against the right to 
bodily integrity. Scholars and activists who lean on a more relativist position 
emphasise that communities that practice FGM/C do not view it as a violation 
to the body or to girls’ dignity. They point out that amongst practicing 
communities FGM/C serves to ensure culturally considered understandings of 
what is best for girls.  
In a well-known essay, Okin (1999) argues that a liberal egalitarian and 
feminist approach to multiculturalism must carefully analyse intragroup 
gender inequalities when examining the legitimacy of minority [cultural and 
religious] group rights within the context of a liberal state. She posits that 
group rights that enable minority cultures to preserve themselves seldom 
serve the best interests of girls and women living in these cultures. I suggest 
that the controversy between (Western liberal) feminism and multiculturalism 
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extends from liberal states to development interventions initiated by Western 
feminists or other actors from the global North or West. Typically, these 
interventions address cultural, religious, and social practices often highly 
valued by (many) people in practicing communities in the global South.  
Commenting on Okin’s work, Pollitt (1999, p. 27) summarises the 
controversy between multiculturalism and feminism thusly: ‘You could say 
that multiculturalism demands respect for all cultural traditions, while 
feminism interrogates and challenges all cultural traditions.’ Similarly, Kellner 
(1993), who explored FGM/C from the perspective of the rights of children, 
states that even if outlawing FGM/C appears to degrade some cultural 
traditions, the physical and psychological well-being of the affected children 
should be granted a higher concern, and FGM/C should, therefore, be 
criminalised in Western societies. Moreover, Pollitt (1999, p. 29) claims that 
the premise of the multiculturalist approach is false, since cultures are 
imagined as ‘stable, timeless, ancient, lacking in internal conflict, premodern’. 
Along similar lines, Tamir (1999, p. 52) states that ‘there is no reason to 
“freeze” a culture in order to preserve it’: 
[A] great deal of paternalism is embedded in the assumption that while 
‘we’ can survive change and innovation and endure the tensions 
created by modernity, ‘they’ cannot; that ‘we’ can repeatedly reinvent 
ourselves, our culture, our tradition, while ‘they’ must adhere to known 
cultural patterns. 
(Tamir, 1999, p. 51) 
Scholars arguing against cultural essentialism insist that cultures are dynamic, 
evolving, interpenetrated, and internally contested, and therefore, it is unfair 
to characterise a society as inherently patriarchal, or to reduce social patterns 
to culture alone (see Wade, 2011). ‘Other’ cultures are not less stable than 
‘ours’, and lack neither internal conflict nor the ability to reinvent themselves 
(Tamir, 1999). Hence, culture and its attendant values are open to 
examination, debate, and change resulting from interventions by the 
international community and by local communities engaged in an ongoing 
dialogue about their own local practices (Twum–Danso Imoh, 2012). 
Accordingly, ‘[n]o culture or comprehensive doctrine is “by nature”, or in any 
given or fixed way, either compatible or incompatible with human rights’ 
(Donnelly, 2007, p. 291). 
Examining the ‘acrimonious’ debate over FGM/C at the intersection of 
feminism and postcolonial theory, Wade (2011) aims to separate productive 
from destructive discursive strategies. Wade (2011, p. 27) claims that FGM/C 
amplifies the conflict between feminism and postcolonialism because, ‘unlike 
issues that are historical (foot binding), disturbing but rare (widow 
immolation), chosen by adults (cosmetic surgery), or impermanent (veiling), 
FGM/C practices are ongoing, frequent, performed on children, and can 
involve extensive and irreversible bodily modification’. According to Wade 
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(2011), FGM/C tests the anti-imperialist and feminist consensus and adoption 
of a ‘radical uncertainty’ (Boddy, 1998)—willingness to continually revise our 
knowledge about unfamiliar practices and to abandon preconceived notions 
about what liberation for women resembles. 
Based on her discourse analysis, Wade (2011) surmised that prior to the 
mid-1990s scholars employed both cultural inferiority and cultural difference 
frameworks13 related to FGM/C practices. She found that in the 1990s, 
postcolonial scholars contested the cultural inferiority framework, often 
arguing that Western feminist engagement with FGM/C is ‘imperialist’. In 
some cases, authors even conflated being ‘Western’ with opposing FGM/C and 
with cultural imperialism, ‘making a Western, nonimperialist, anti-FGC 
argument logically impossible’ (Wade, 2011, p. 35). In Wade’s view, this 
conflation is not representative of the academic engagement dominated by the 
postcolonial perspective since the mid-1990s (between 1996–2005, she 
identified only two documents applying the cultural inferiority framework). 
Furthermore, many of those criticising Westerners for their imperialist 
approach are themselves Western and oppose FGM/C. Thus, Wade contends 
that both accusations of African ‘barbarism’ and Western feminist 
‘imperialism’ are empirically false, erasing African opposition to FGM/C as 
well as Western feminists’ acknowledgement of transnational power 
asymmetry. 
The central premise guiding my research is the understanding of all FGM/C 
practices as problematic and as human rights violations, in keeping with 
several international and regional human rights treaties and declarations. 
Even if human rights premise is not completely devoid of problems, as 
discussed above, there is increased commitment by all countries to end 
FGM/C. For example, the United Nations General Assembly’s resolution 
Intensifying global efforts for the elimination of female genital mutilations 
was adopted through consensus in December 2012. The Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa was signed and ratified by 40 out of 55 African Union member-states 
(excluding Somalia). This so-called Maputo Protocol obliges states to 
implement legislation against FGM/C and implement other measures such as 
public awareness, support for survivors, and protecting women at risk.  
In order to support any culture’s efforts to reinforce human rights and the 
equality of women, Western feminists (or any other outsiders) must ‘hold their 
own practices up to the same critical scrutiny they apply to Others, to hear the 
plural voices of women everywhere and to learn from them, while also refusing 
to prejudge the merits of practices that are unfamiliar or threatening to those 
of us raised in bourgeois liberal societies’ (Honig, 1999, p. 40). Whilst a 
community’s faith must be entrusted to its individual members, as Tamir 
13The inferiority framework is reflected in the language that identifies FGM/Cs as something only a 
bad or uninformed person would practice. The difference framework is visible when a scholar explains 
that FGM/C practices are unfamiliar and distressing, and need to be understood as well as opposed, 
whilst resisting condemnation of those involved (Wade, 2011, pp. 31, 40). 
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(1999) posits, I suggest that outsiders can sometimes help render visible social 
norms that are often deeply internalised, normalised, and invisible, and 
maintain harmful traditional practices like FGM/C.  
In summary, this section focused on problematising the justification of 
Western feminists and the international community to promote abolishing 
FGM/C practices. In Chapter 4, I further elaborate upon my position as a 
Western feminist researcher who explores a community other than my own.  
2.2 GENDER AS A FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURING 
PRINCIPLE OF SOMALI SOCIETY
In this section, I first discuss the geopolitical and socio-demographic realities 
in Somaliland. I then turn to discuss gender as a fundamental structuring 
principle of Somali society, and the status of women in Somaliland. Because 
Somaliland lacks international recognition, few Somaliland-specific 
population statistics and datasets exist within reports from the United Nations 
and other international agencies. Furthermore, official national statistics 
produced by the Somaliland government are incomplete. Thus, in what 
follows, reports from local organisations, such as the Academy for Peace and 
Development (APD)14, NAGAAD15, and Strategic Initiative for Women in the 
Horn of Africa (SIHA)16 serve as crucial sources of information.  
The formerly British Somaliland Protectorate achieved full independence 
from the United Kingdom on 26 June 1960. A few days later on 1 July, 
Somaliland united with Somalia, a territory falling under the United Nations 
mandated Italian Trusteeship, establishing the Somali Republic. In 1988, the 
Siad Barre regime in Somalia launched a crackdown against the Hargeisa-
based Somali National Movement and other militant groups, part of a set 
events leading to the civil war (Metz, 1993). Ahmed (1999) wrote that the war 
against the Barre government caused massive displacement and casualties in 
Somaliland, with an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 deaths in the capital city of 
Hargeisa alone, destroying both the existing economic infrastructure and the 
traditional pastoral life. Following the collapse of Barre's government in 1991, 
local authorities in Somaliland, led by the Somali National Movement declared 
independence from Somalia on 18 May 1991, and reinstated the borders of the 
14The Academy for Peace and Development (APD) is a Hargeisa-based research institute established 
in 1998 in collaboration with Interpeace—an international organization that prevents violence and 
builds lasting peace. APD focuses on peacebuilding, promoting democracy and civic participation in 
decision-making (https://apd-somaliland.org/). The APD report that I refer to in this study is published 
by UNICEF. 
15NAGAAD is a network of 46 women’s organizations in Somaliland, founded in 1997 to serve as a 
collective voice for women wishing to see their rights as equal citizens respected in Somaliland 
(https://www.nagaad.org/). 
16Strategic Initiative for women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) is a network of civil society 
organizations from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Uganda, and 
the coastal area of Kenya, established in 1995 to strengthen the capacities of women’s rights 
organizations and to address women’s subordination and violence against women and girls in the Horn 
of Africa (https://sihanet.org/). Studies compiled by Luedke (2015; 2018) that I refer to in this study are 
also published by SIHA. 
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former independent State of Somaliland (Lewis & Sundström, 2014, pp. 80–
83). Since then, the territory has been governed by a democratically elected 
government that seeks international recognition as the Government of the 
Republic of Somaliland (Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland [English], 
2001). According to the latest data on the government’s website, the 
population in the region in 2014 stood at about 3.8 million ('Somaliland in 
Figures 2016', 2018).  
The ongoing war in southern Somalia between Islamist insurgents on one 
side, and the Federal Government of Somalia and its African Union allies on 
the other, has primarily left Somaliland unaffected, leaving it relatively stable 
(BBC News, 2017; see also Luedke, 2015). For a number of years, Hargeisa has 
been a melting pot and meeting place for Somali society and the Somali 
diaspora (Vestbøstad & Blystad, 2014). Yet, formal state institutions remain 
weak in Somaliland and the central government has faced constant challenges 
in delivering services to its citizens (Luedke, 2018, p. 9). According to the latest 
World Bank Group survey on Somaliland, more than half of the people in 
urban areas, and nearly two in three in rural areas live in poverty ('Somaliland 
Household Survey 2012–2013', 2014). Since Somaliland remains 
unrecognised, international donors face difficulty in providing aid, and the 
government relies primarily upon tax receipts and remittances from the 
extensive Somali diaspora, which significantly contributes to Somaliland's 
economy (Harris & Foresti, 2011).  
The private sector is dominated by the micro-level as well as small and 
medium enterprises, and few job opportunities exist within national and 
international NGOs, whilst government positions are often awarded on the 
basis of patronage and clan connections, Luedke (2018, p. 13) claims. 
Furthermore, she notes, the youth unemployment rate reaches 84%, whilst the 
overall unemployment rate is 70%, one of the highest in the world. Nimo-Ilhan 
(2016) wrote that frustrated with the high unemployment and scarce 
educational opportunities, increasing numbers of young people emigrate to 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as to Europe. He points to 
a specific word ‘tahriib’ which refers to the growing emigration of Somali 
youth to Europe, individuals who plan to return to their homeland after 
attaining an education, wealth and, thus, social and economic status abroad. 
With few exceptions, Somalis in Somaliland and elsewhere are Muslims, 
the majority of whom belong to the Sunni branch of Islam (Abdullahi, 2001, 
p. 1). Islam is the state religion of Somaliland, and no laws may violate the 
principles of sharia (Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland [English], 
2001). According to the constitution, the promotion of any religion other than 
Islam is illegal, and the state discourages behaviour which contradicts ‘Islamic 
morals’. Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002, p. 27) describes the Somali population 
as divided into a few large clan families. According to Luedke (2015, p. 11), the 
three major clan families in Somaliland are the Isaaq, the Darood/Harti and 
the Dir. Isaaq is the largest and most homogenous, representing 66% of the 
Somaliland population and controlling the social, political and economic order 
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(Bradbury, Abokor, & Yusuf, 2005). According to Talle (1993), subclans and 
their smaller segments function economically and politically as corporate 
groups and carry a more practical relevance to individuals than do clans. 
According to Luedke (2015, p. 11), below the clan family level, there is the clan 
itself, the primary lineage group, and the Dia (Arabic)/Mag (Somali). All 
(male) members of society are defined by belonging to the Dia/Mag group 
which has a collective obligation to pay and get blood compensation, based on 
acknowledged rules or a contract known as Xeer, customary law in Somaliland 
(Gundel, 2006). Luedke (2015) claims that outside of politics, however, clan 
structures appear to become weaker and more scattered. This happens 
especially in urban areas, where the initial responsibility of clan elders in 
resolving conflicts between pastoralists has reduced, whilst they have had 
difficulties adapting to non-clan based ‘modern’ issues such as sexual violence 
(Luedke, 2015, p. 12).  
Luedke (2015, p. 9; see also Ahmed, 1999) wrote that the absence of men 
during conflict times made women acquire new importance as merchants, 
traders and heads of house. The resolution of conflict and peace and 
reconciliation in Somaliland, however, relegated women back to the status of 
passive agents, she argues. ‘As the modern state structures of the Barre regime 
collapsed, traditional modes of social organization, in which men define and 
occupy the “public” sphere, took over’ (Luedke, 2015, p. 9). Furthermore, even 
if women are often responsible for income generation for their families, the 
majority of males still feel that it is a man’s sole responsibility and right to 
make decisions on behalf of the family, including the allocation of income 
made by the women, Luedke notes. 
Gender represents a fundamental structuring principle that influences 
almost all spheres of Somali society: the family, the household, politics, and 
the economy (Hansen, 2008). According to Talle (1993, p. 84), gender is ‘a 
metaphoric vehicle in the Somali culture; it provides images of how to think 
about and value other relations and distinctions.’ This scheme provides a 
hierarchical relationship, granting precedence to men and male ‘things’ (Talle, 
1993). According to the Academy for Peace and Development (APD, 2002), 
the clan system prescribes distinct paths of social and personal development 
for both men and women. In traditional nomadic settings, all family members 
have a specific, well-defined role. Women’s work includes, for example, 
making materials for the construction of the nomadic home, moving the family 
dwelling during the frequent nomadic movements, and procuring daily 
supplies of water and firewood. Furthermore, the patrilineal principle whereby 
communities are grounded on descent through a male line defines the identity 
and affinity of both men and women (APD, 2002).  
Luedke (2018, p. 10) maintains that the significance of the clan system 
represents a primary reason for the continued subordination of women in 
Somaliland. A woman’s loyalty to the clan is considered weaker than a man’s 
clan allegiance because a woman’s clan alliance often transfers following 
marriage. Thus, women are excluded from decision-making and clan-based 
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forums in which to voice their interests and concerns (Luedke, 2018). Regional 
and historical differences appear to exist in terms of marriage patterns among 
Somalis. Referring to Helander (1991), Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002) notes that 
in the northern parts of Somalia, individuals prefer to marry someone from 
another clan; in the south, however, a close relative appears to be the best 
choice. Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002, p. 27) goes on to argue that, since the start 
of the civil war, Somali women are increasingly expected to marry a man close 
to their own clan to avoid competing loyalties if a clan conflict arises. 
Traditionally, marriages involving individuals with distant clan fractions or 
even other clans were desirable, since such unions were expected to maintain 
peaceful relations and political stability (Johsndotter Carlbom, 2002). 
Somali culture is affected by the interaction between nomadic pastoral 
traditions and the norms of Islamic teaching. The position of women within 
an Islamic society is determined by the Qur’an, the tradition of the Prophet 
Mohammed, and the interpretations of Islamic law and traditions (APD, 
2002). According to APD (2002) who explored the compatibility of provisions 
in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1981)17 with Islam (more 
specifically, Islamic sharia law) and with Somali culture (more specifically, 
customary law or Xeer) in Somaliland, both Islam and the Somali culture view 
women's rights differently than CEDAW.18 Islamic law is more progressive 
than Somali customary law since ‘it grants women rights in inheritance and 
ownership, stipulates procedures for settling divorce, initiating marriage, and 
maintaining widows and orphans’ (APD, 2002, p. 27). The rights of women, 
however, have been incompletely implemented in accordance with Islamic 
principles, because knowledge of Islam remains limited within Somaliland, 
APD concludes. Thus, customary law is pervasive and undermines the 
application of Islamic law. The report further points out that the Somaliland 
Constitution acknowledges gender equality (Article 8 on the equality of 
citizens and Article 36 on women's rights), but defines women's rights within 
the Islamic context as strictly assigning different roles to men and women 
(APD, 2002). 
Whilst conflicts sometimes produce more progressive gender ideologies, in 
Somaliland radical versions of political Islam have gained ground since the 
civil war and precipitated a shift towards stricter interpretations of gender 
17Somalia is one of the few countries not a signatory to CEDAW. According to Legal Action 
Worldwide (LAW), the Somali government is committed to ratifying CEDAW, and LAW has provided 
technical advice to the relevant ministries in South Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland (“Legal 
Action Worldwide,” 2018). 
18According to Luedke (2015, p. 15; see also Bendana & Chopra, 2013; Le Sage, 2005), similar to 
other sub-Saharan African countries, Somaliland is a legally plural society. The three disparate, yet 
overlapping legal systems comprise of Xeer, which is the traditional law, governing clan relations at the 
Dia/Mag Paying Group level; statutory law, which applies to civil and criminal matters; and Islamic 
Shari’a Law, which applies to family matters, such as divorce and inheritance. Each legal system has its 
own purview and scope of jurisdiction, but they are extremely fluid, and clan elders typically have a final 
say in each system. According to Social Research and Development Institute (SORADI, 2011), most cases 
of sexual and gender-based violence are handled in the customary system with reference to collective 
responsibility as opposed to individual culpability. 
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roles (Luedke, 2018, pp. 11–12). Despite women’s entrance into the informal 
economy during the civil war, women are still denied inheritance in customary 
law, have limited access to financial assistance such as micro-credit (Luedke, 
2018, pp. 9–11). Women’s increased economic role has not increased their 
political power or status, and they continue to be excluded from most public 
and political activities, including open councils (shir) where adult men debate 
and make decisions (El–Bushra & Gardner, 2016). According to a NAGAAD 
(2019) study on the gender gap in Somaliland, the overall gender gap remains 
at 0.45 (whereby 0 indicates absolute inequality and 1 indicates absolute 
equality). Women lag behind men most prominently in terms of political 
empowerment (0.02), whilst the gender gap is narrower—yet still significant—
in terms of economic participation (0.58), economic opportunity (0.56), and 
educational attainment (0.68). Women’s political representation is low to 
non-existent: there is one female (82 male) members in the Lower House 
(Parliament); zero female (82 male) representatives in the Upper House 
(Guurti); two full and one deputy female (29 male) ministers; 9 female (365 
male) representatives in Local Councils; and zero female judges (NAGAAD, 
2019, p. 31). 
Furthermore, women are never considered the most respected, senior 
‘elders’ of the society, and in cases involving conflicts between women and 
men, male elders often protect the interests of men over those of the women 
(SIHA, 2013). Luedke (2018, pp. 9–11) notes that people continue to 
conceptualise gender roles along pre-war ideals: women as responsible for the 
household and men as responsible for activities outside the home including 
generating income. Thus, she argues, most women do not have the 
opportunity to work in the formal sector and remain trapped in petty trade 
and low-paying positions in the informal sector. Furthermore, due to the 
double burden of being responsible for both generating income and domestic 
duties, women seldom have time to expand their economic roles beyond 
subsistence-level employment at the margins of the economy (Luedke, 2018, 
pp. 23–24).  
In addition, strict interpretations of Islamic tradition, whereby men and 
women are not supposed to interact before marriage, have been interpreted in 
such a way that prevents unmarried young men and unmarried young women 
from speaking with one another openly (Luedke, 2015, p. 21). Influenced by 
trends in the Middle East, Wahhabism (also known as Salafism) has been 
increasing in Somaliland (Luedke, 2018). Wahhabis now control the economy 
and education through funding madrasas (schools for Islamic instruction), 
and radical mosques increasingly preach for more restrictive roles for women, 
Luedke (p. 11) claims. She found, for example, that there is a growing sense 
that women who work outside the home in the informal economy are ‘polluted’ 
or ‘sexually open’, particularly when the work entails interacting with men, for 
instance, when women work as tea sellers. At the same time, youth are being 
exposed to contradictory gender discourses: ‘the strict traditionalism, which 
scripts how men and women should behave according to patriarchal practices, 
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as well as regulates interaction between them, and the more progressive 
gender ideologies and changed gender roles produced by conflict and 
modernization’ (Luedke, 2015, p. 21).  
Turning to violence against women, official national statistics are 
unavailable for Somalia (UN Women, 2019). According to a United Nations 
Populations Fund (UNFPA, 2015) report on sexual gender-based violence 
against women in Somalia, the majority of reported cases stem from physical 
assaults, followed by rape and sexual assaults (no separate data for Somaliland 
appear in that report). According to a United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP, 2014) report on gender-based violence in Somalia, data 
from Somaliland shows a particularly disturbing increase in the numbers of 
reported gang rapes in the region in 2013. Luedke (2015, p. 6; see also Human 
Rights Watch, 2009) claims that ‘the safety and security attributed to 
Somaliland does not hold true for all of its residents, particularly women and 
girls, who are exposed to various forms of oppressions, including harmful 
traditional and cultural practices and cruel forms of sexual violence, such as 
multiple perpetrator rape.’ She argues that the uninterrupted conflict from the 
1980s through to the mid-1990s led to the breakdown of social norms and 
institutions. While inter-clan conflicts were traditionally bounded by codes 
and social conventions whereby the elderly, sick, women and children were 
secure from attack, and the customary clan law contained strict rules about 
compensation and revenge for acts such as rape and murder, women and 
children were suddenly targeted in a direct and systematic way (Luedke, 2015, 
p. 8; see also Gardner & El Bushra, 2004).  
The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA, 2013; see 
also Luedke, 2015) suggests that in Somaliland joblessness, idleness, and 
poverty amongst young men leads increasing numbers of young men into 
emasculation and drug dependence, thereby contributing to new forms of 
violence, such as gang rapes. Increasing numbers of gang rapes may, in turn, 
contribute to perpetuating more severe types of FGM/C, since such practices 
are believed to protect girls from rape and premarital sex (discussed in greater 
detail in Section 2.3). In terms of the legal framework, rape was not defined as 
a crime in Somaliland as of the end of 2016,19 although advocacy efforts aimed 
at adopting the Sexual Offences Bill were entering an advanced stage, 
according to UNFPA Somalia (2017). However, latest national criminal 
statistics ('Somaliland in Figures 2016', 2018) take into consideration rape 
offences, reporting that 91 offences occurred in 2016. In Somaliland, as 
elsewhere, men’s violence against women remains underreported, whereby 
the prevalence is likely significantly higher than what is reported to authorities 
(see Walby, 1990, p. 137). In the next section, I discuss the prevalence, legal 
and policy framework regarding FGM/C, as well as mechanisms that 
perpetuate the practice in Somaliland. 
19Chapter 2 describes legislation and policies both preceding and during my fieldwork in 2016. Some 
changes thereafter are described in Chapter 7.  
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2.3 FGM/C IN SOMALILAND
Members of specific ethnic groups—regardless of where they live—often 
adhere to the same set of social norms, including whether to practice FGM/C 
(UNICEF, 2016). In Somalia, where relatively little ethnic variation exists, 
FGM/C is almost universally practiced, and prevalence amongst ethnic 
Somalis living in neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya more greatly resembles the 
national prevalence in Somalia than that of either neighbouring country 
(UNICEF, 2016). According to Gele et al. (2012), however, infibulation 
(pharaonic cutting) remained nearly non-existent amongst southern clans in 
the early nineteenth century, whilst reaching almost 95% amongst northern 
clans. Southern clans later adopted infibulation by emulating northern clans 
in order to increase their status, they argue.  
According to the 2011 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), 99% of 
girls and women aged 15–49 in Somaliland underwent FGM/C. Also, two 
recent studies in Somaliland show that the practice of FGM/C is nearly 
universal. Based on a community survey, key informant interviews, and focus 
group discussions with 2060 community members (1128 women) and 209 
opinion leaders (46 women) in 25 communities, Newell–Jones (2016) 
concludes that the prevalence rate stands at 99% in urban and 100% in rural 
communities. Data in Ismail et al. (2016) study stem from two surveys 
conducted amongst women who attended the prenatal clinic at the Edna Adan 
Hospital in Hargeisa. The first cohort participated in research between 2002 
and 2006, whilst the second took place between 2006 and 2013. In the second 
cohort, data were drawn from a sample population (n = 6108 of 6172 
participants), the results of which rely on physical examinations from 
participating women receiving antenatal care. That survey revealed that 98.4% 
(or 6011 women) of the second cohort underwent FGM/C. A mere 1.6% (n = 
97) of participants bore no signs of FGM/C.  
Despite the consistently high prevalence rate, evidence points towards a 
change in the type of cutting. Whilst Newell–Jones (2016) found that 80% of 
the girls and women underwent pharaonic cutting, an increasing proportion 
of girls underwent intermediate and sunnah cutting in the younger age 
cohorts. Equal numbers of 12- to 14-year-old girls underwent each of the three 
types, whilst almost all women over 60 years old underwent pharaonic cutting. 
Ismail et al. (2016) studies also revealed a clear shift towards sunnah cutting: 
in the first cohort (2002-2006), 1% underwent sunnah cutting, whilst in the 
second cohort (2006-2013) the share reached 17.8% (the intermediate cut was 
not parsed into a separate category). Furthermore, 95% of respondents who 
provided an answer reported that they would perform sunnah cutting on their 
daughters, whilst less than 5% said they would perform pharaonic cutting. 
Given the confusion in terminology I discussed in Section 1.1, particularly 
related to the varied use of the term ‘sunnah’ in Somaliland, it is important to 
exercise caution when interpreting shifts in FGM/C practices reported in 
various studies.  
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The average age at which pharaonic cutting is performed in Somaliland lies 
between the ages of 7 and 9 years, whilst sunnah cutting is generally performed 
at a very young age, sometimes even soon after birth (Ismail et al., 2016). 
Decisions about whether a girl is cut and the type of cut she undergoes are 
made by the mother alone in a clear majority of cases, by grandmothers in 
approximately 10% of cases, and jointly by mothers and fathers in less than 
10% of cases (Newell–Jones, 2016, Chart 7.2.9A). Bruchhaus (2013), however, 
claims that men are increasingly participating in dialogues of FGM/C both in 
their own families and within the Somaliland community. In addition, 
Vestbøstad and Blystad (2014), who carried out research in Hargeisa in 2009, 
found that FGM/C is currently openly discussed, albeit more in public than in 
private contexts. They argue that in the private context, FGM/C is only talked 
about among girls who are about to become cut, their mothers, and the ones 
who carry out the practice. 
Almost 80% of respondents in Ismail et al.’s (2016) study had undergone 
FGM/C in Somaliland. Other countries highly represented included Ethiopia 
(about 10%) and Somalia (about 8%). FGM/C was mostly performed on 
respondents by traditional birth attendants and older women. Around 5% of 
respondents reported that trained medical personnel, including doctors and 
nurses, had performed FGM/C on them in hospitals (a phenomenon referred 
to as ‘medicalisation’). Newell-Jones’ (2017) study showed an increasing 
medicalisation of FGM/C in Somaliland. As such, 11% of young women (15-24 
years) were cut by a health professional (nurse, midwife, or doctor) and 16% 
of mothers reported that their daughters were cut by a health professional. 
Newell-Jones argues that this trend towards medicalisation is strongest in 
urban and semi-urban communities and amongst educated people. 
In a survey in Somalia, where 290 women’s motives for having their 
daughters cut were explored, nearly 70% stated that religion was the main 
reason; 20% stated that remaining a virgin and to get married were the main 
motivations; 10% pointed out tradition; and 1% listed hygiene as the primary 
motivation (Dirie & Lindmark, 1991). Yet, the strongest reason that 
participants in Newell-Jones’ (2016, p. 26) survey gave for supporting the 
continuation of FGM/C in Somaliland was that FGM/C remains a traditional 
practice. Purification was the second most-cited reason associated with 
reducing the sexual desire of girls, which again is thought to protect girls from 
premarital sex and the associated loss of virginity. Marriageability was listed 
by 20% of survey participants, and 22% cited religious reasons for supporting 
FGM/C. In the Ismail et al. (2016) study in Somaliland, 72% of female 
respondents reported that they would have their daughters cut for reasons 
stemming from tradition and 28% for religious reasons (25% of survey 
participants did not respond to this question). These varied reasons and 
results reflect Boddy’s (1986) notion that religion, tradition, and culture are 
often interconnected and mutually reinforcing—that is, valued traditions and 
cultural beliefs are incorrectly ascribed as mandated by religious doctrine. I 
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next discuss in greater detail the different motives applied to prescribe cutting 
Somali girls. 
Despite FGM/C predating the emergence of both Islam and Christianity 
and religious scriptures not mandating the practice, the belief that it is a 
religious requirement contributes to its continuation (Boddy, 1986). The 
Qur’an does not specifically require female circumcision, but it has been 
mentioned in the oral tradition (Hadiths, testimonies about the sayings and 
doings of the Prophet Mohammed20), the interpretation of which Islamic 
scholars disagree on (see, for example Akar & Tiilikainen, 2009). These 
testimonies are used both to promote and oppose the practice. Johnsdotter 
Carlbom (2002, p. 56) writes that Muslim scholars who argue against FGM/C 
often quote the following Qur’anic passages: ‘Verily, we create man in the best 
conformation’ (95:4 in the Qur’an), ’Let there be no alteration in Allah’s 
creation’ (30:30), and ‘He perfected everything he created’ (32:7).  
Referring to Giladi (1997, p. 266) and Abu-Sahlieh (1994), Johnsdotter 
Carlbom (2002, p. 59) argues that Islamic scholars today urge Muslims who 
practise FGM/C to adopt its most moderate forms. However, she continues, 
reflecting on Islamic sources is restricted to the religious elite, and the 
religious texts are often out of reach to the overwhelming majority of people 
who practise FGM/C. Thus, many lay Muslims understand clitoridectomy and 
infibulation as religious obligations. Moreover, whilst refraining from FGM/C 
is consistent with Islamic principles, it is practically impossible for a scholar 
to state that all forms of FGM/C are forbidden according to Islamic sources 
and the positions of the Islamic law schools (Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002, p. 
60). 
Somaliland is predominantly Sunni Muslim, relying on Shafi’i law school, 
one of the two Islamic law schools (out of five) that regard female circumcision 
as required, yet recommending a moderate type (Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002, 
p. 53). Clerics, however, disagree about Islamic guidance on female 
circumcision. For example, amongst 38 religious leaders interviewed in 
Newell–Jones’ (2016) study in Somaliland, a clear majority described 
pharaonic cutting as ‘not required21’ under Islamic law, and sunnah cutting as 
‘honourable’. The minority of religious leaders who considered pharaonic 
cutting as ‘honourable’ were mostly older men from rural communities, 
indicating that rural religious leaders are more traditional in their 
20The most frequently quoted—yet controversial—hadiths regarding female circumcision include 
one about how the Prophet talks to a circumciser on her way to perform the procedure (‘Do not overdo 
it, because it [the clitoris] is a good fortune for the spouse and a delight to her’), one about ritual 
purification (‘If the two circumcised parts have been in touch with each other, ritual purification [ghusl] 
is necessary’), and one suggesting circumcision is a religious duty for men and an honourable act for a 
woman (‘Circumcision is a way for men, but is merely ennobling for women’) (Johnsdotter Carlbom, 
2002, p. 55). 
21Newell-Jones (2016) refers to three categories according to which human actions are classified in 
Islamic law: ‘obligatory’, ‘honourable’, and ‘not required’. In this study, I mostly refer to the five 
categories described by Lewis (1994; see also Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002), and suggest that ‘obligatory’ 
parallels ‘required/commanded’; ‘honourable’ parallels ‘recommended’, and ‘not required’ disaggregates 
the remaining categories of ‘permitted’; ‘disapproved’, and ‘forbidden’.  
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interpretation of Islamic law than those from urban communities (Newell–
Jones, 2016, p. 42).  
According to Talle (1993), who explored the symbolic dimensions of 
FGM/C in Somalia, the primary reason Somali people to support infibulation 
(pharaonic cutting) lies in the belief that it protects girls against immorality. 
Infibulation is necessary because ‘women are held to be easily affected by 
visual impressions and emotions, and thus prone to be led astray by forces 
beyond their control’ (Talle, 1993, p. 91). Second, Somalis believe that women 
must be ‘created’ as females and as gendered persons. Thus, a Somali child can 
be understood as androgyne (the female genitalia containing a male part—the 
clitoris—and the male genitalia containing a female part—the foreskin of 
penis), and through circumcision, the child is ‘purified’. The clitoris is also 
considered harmful and disgraceful for a woman because it is viewed as 
upholding her sexual urge. Thus, an ‘uncut’ girl is considered ‘unclean’ 
(xaaraan from the Arabic xaraam, prohibited by religion). Simultaneously, a 
central aspect of personhood in Somali culture consists of belonging to an 
agnatic22 group. Ambivalently, then, the vertical scar resulting from 
infibulation (pharaonic cutting) can represent a fake penis, implying that the 
girls are symbolically transformed into ‘pure agnates’ (Talle, 1993, p. 97). That 
is, Talle (p. 104) argues, the natural organ is replaced by a constructed one, 
which ‘transforms girls into pseudo-males in kinship terms’.23 Third, the 
pudenda of an uncut girl is considered ugly and unnatural, whilst a 
smoothed/excised and then a tied/covered pudenda is considered more 
attractive and more feminine by Somali women as well as men (Talle, 1993).  
Beyond the culturally embedded meanings about ‘purifying’ the androgyne 
by removing body parts (such as the clitoris) considered masculine and/or 
disgraceful for a woman, purity in relation to FGM/C also entails religious 
purity ascribed to the category of virgins. The concepts of ‘religion’, ‘to remain 
a virgin in order to be married’, and ‘tradition’ are often intertwined: the 
pharaonic cutting (tradition) appears to create a barrier that preserves 
virginity, which Muslims consider the will of God (Dirie & Lindmark, 1991). In 
this study, therefore, I use the term ‘religious purity’24 to refer to virginity and 
22An agnate is a person related through patrilineal descent. 
23According to Talle (1993, pp. 99, 103), de-infibulation (or defibulation)—that is, the opening up of 
the woman’s vagina for the sexual intercourse—is the inversion of infibulation, in that it symbolises 
‘separating’ and ‘opening’ instead of ‘sewing’ and ‘closing’. At defibulation, Talle argues, the husband 
both makes the ‘woman’ anew in terms of gender, and also establishes himself as a ‘man’. That is, she 
becomes a woman (wife, non-virgin) and potential mother, and he may join the lineage assembly (shir) 
and become a full member of his society. According to Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002, p. 72-73), in the 
south of Somalia, men are expected to ‘open’ their wives as described by Talle (1993), whilst in the 
northern parts of Somalia (including Somaliland), it is common to turn to medically trained staff in 
clinics or to a traditional circumciser. According to Ismail et al. (2016), in Somaliland, defibulation 
occurs in the presence of female members of the bride and groom’s families to verify that the bride is a 
virgin. It is performed by a senior female member of the community, a traditional birth attendant, or by 
medical staff in a hospital. Occasionally, however, the husband forcibly performs penetration and bursts 
through the scar from the infibulation. 
24For Muslims, religious purity also implies other aspects, too. For example, a minor purification 
(wudu) is mandatory before each prayer by washing the hands, mouth, nose, face, arms, head, neck, 
ears, and feet. An additional stronger purification (gushi) by bathing is mandatory before a prayer if the 
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abstinence from premarital sex. Refraining from sexual activities and 
remaining a virgin until marriage is of outmost importance among Somalis, 
because the worst imaginable thing is an unmarried pregnant daughter, which 
is believed to result in persistent stigma directed at the entire family 
(Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002, p. 115). Becoming unmarriageable and rejected 
by one’s family represents a social disaster in a community, where both the 
culture and religion emphasise family as the primary social unit (Johnsdotter, 
Carlbom, Geesdiir, & Elmi, 2000, p. 26). Considering the patrilineal principle 
of Somali society—whereby every child inherits its father’s clan affiliation—a 
child born outside marriage is born with no blood ties (Johnsdotter Carlbom, 
2002, p. 116). Furthermore, the conceived immorality of the mother is 
transferred to the child, ‘making it a defiled person’ (Talle, 1993, p. 93).  
Talle (1993, p. 96), in turn, writes that, in Somali society, virginity is not 
considered a natural condition in women, but has to be forcibly implanted 
upon young girls—by stitching together and closing their vaginal entrance. 
Instead of virginity being indicated by a preserved hymen, a girl becomes a 
virgin through infibulation (pharaonic cutting) and remains ‘closed’ until her 
future husband ‘opens’ her once married (Talle, 1993, p. 96). According to her, 
for Somalis, a chaste girl means a ‘sewn’ girl, whereby the closing is more 
important than the excision of the clitoris and other tissue. People also 
perceive FGM/C as protecting women against rape. In Somaliland, support for 
pharaonic cutting associates with rural and nomadic lifestyles, as shown in, for 
instance, Lunde’s (2012, p. 54) study. She explains, if girls must walk long 
distances to fetch water and firewood or to tend animals, they become more 
vulnerable to sexual assault, and pharaonic cutting is thought to protect girls 
in such circumstances. In Lunde’s study, participants also claimed that rape is 
increasing as a result of girls no longer undergoing pharaonic cutting, and 
rapists attempt to find girls who underwent sunnah cutting.  
Proceeding to arguments around marriageability, first we must note that 
Somali marriage ‘is not merely a pact between a man and a woman, but an 
alliance between agnatic families’ (Talle, 1993, p. 95), whereby both bride 
wealth and dowry are exchanged. If a girl’s infibulation is broken before 
marriage, her parents lose (the substantial) bride wealth and their competence 
as guardians is questioned (Talle, 1993, pp. 95?96). Examining the 
marriageability argument from the perspective of men’s preferences in 
Somaliland, 94% of unmarried men who participated in Newell-Jones’ (2016, 
pp. 32-33) study preferred to marry a cut woman (Newell–Jones, 2016, pp. 
32-33). Some young men, however, changed their mind after discussing 
FGM/C in a group setting and after considering the health implications, which 
they previously did not link to their future marital life. They worried about the 
impact of pharaonic cutting on the health of their wives and on marital sex, 
whilst also wanting evidence of virginity. While the men in Newell-Jones’ 
study were concerned that they would not enjoy the marital sex with a cut wife, 
prayer is impure due to, for example, menstruation, childbirth or sexual intercourse (Akar & Tiilikainen, 
2009, pp. 52–53). 
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Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002, p. 57) points out that the fundamental Islamic 
value of women’s rights to sexual satisfaction in marriage is also mentioned 
when arguing for the eradication of female circumcision. Newell–Jones (2017, 
p. 27) also found that the type of cut that their future wife has undergone 
mattered for 84% of young men. Furthermore, 89% of unmarried men stated 
that they preferred to marry a woman who underwent sunnah cutting. Whilst 
only 3% of respondents preferred to marry an uncut woman, 29% preferred 
that their daughters remained completely uncut (Newell–Jones, 2017, p. 37).  
Turning our attention to national FGM/C prevention efforts in Somaliland, 
Bruchhaus (2013) states that unlike many other African countries where anti-
FGM/C activities encounter strong resistance and are regarded as foreign 
intrusions into the local culture, Somalia initiated awareness-building 
campaigns as early as the 1970s. Such campaigns collapsed with the fall of the 
Barre regime in 1991. In 1997, Bruchhaus describes, UNICEF held its first 
seminar in Somaliland aimed at relaunching anti-FGM/C activities. This 
included establishing a national committee and regional task forces in order 
to formalise policies. Establishing these agencies led to the inclusion of FGM/C 
in the national gender policy, categorised as a form of gender-based violence 
under the subheading ‘harmful traditional practices’ (Lunde & Sagbakken, 
2014). However, FGM/C was not seen as a priority in the 1990s since there 
were many more pressing needs (Lunde, 2012, p. 61). According to Bruchhaus 
(2013), international organisations initiating activities in Somaliland, along 
with the emergence of civil society, national NGOs, and a free press, have 
played a role in placing FGM/C back on the agenda in the post-war era. Given 
earlier efforts, FGM/C as an issue is quite openly discussed in urban areas, 
although in rural areas, communities remain reluctant to address the issue 
(Bruchhaus, 2013; Vestbøstad & Blystad, 2014). However, given the lack of 
water, food, and pasture, alongside difficulties accessing health centres and 
other public services in addition to interclan conflicts, FGM/C represents a 
less-than-urgent issue to tackle (Bruchhaus, 2013). 
The Republic of Somaliland’s National Constitution (Constitution of the 
Republic of Somaliland [English], 2001) mentions FGM/C under article 36, 
sub-article 2, stating, ‘the Government shall encourage, and shall legislate for, 
the right of women to be free of practices which are contrary to Sharia and 
which are injurious to their person and dignity.’ The National Gender Policy 
(2009) states that ‘the most predominant forms of violence against Somaliland 
women are traditional practices such as female genital mutilation/cutting and 
virginity checks’; the National Youth Policy (2010–15) indicates a need to 
‘sensitise the public about the eradication of Female Genital Mutilation and 
advocate for laws prohibiting it fully (Newell–Jones, 2016, p. 68). There is, 
however, no approved FGM/C policy or law in place in Somaliland.25 
According to Newell–Jones (2016, p. 68), drafting a National Policy for the 
Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM/C Policy) began in 2009. 
25Chapter 2 describes on legislation and policies preceding and during data collection for this study 
in October 2016. Some changes thereafter are described in Chapter 7.  
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UNFPA in collaboration with local CSOs intended to present the final policy to 
the Cabinet in 2016, but further discussions between ministries were required. 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
have agreed on the proposed policy in relation to WHO types II and III (see 
Table 1), but disagreed on sunnah cutting (WHO type I). According to Newell-
Jones (2016, pp. 8–9), the Ministry of Religious Affairs supports banning all 
types except sunnah cutting, whereas the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
supports banning all types of FGM/C. Amongst community members, 80% of 
men and 63% of women support legislation banning all types of FGM/C except 
sunnah cutting, whilst less than 10% favour banning all types of FGM/C 
(Newell–Jones, 2016, p. 30).  
Network against Female Genital Mutilation in Somaliland (NAFIS, 2014) 
found that people in Somaliland consider religious leaders best-suited to stop 
FGM/C, and to explain and declare FGM/C as not fulfilling a religious duty. 
Respondents also called on medical professionals to handle the health-related 
issues; the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and 
Ministry of Justice to make appropriate laws; the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs and the Ministry of Education to integrate FGM/C into the 
school curriculum; and clan leaders and elders to convince communities about 
stopping FGM/C. Young men in particular mentioned that ‘intelligent’ and 
‘knowledgeable’ people should take the lead in challenging FGM/C, whilst 
women of all ages wanted non-governmental and civil society organisations to 
play a leading role.  
Whilst this chapter discussed the gender policies and FGM/C practices in 
Somaliland, in the next chapter I discuss the theoretical notions of patriarchy, 
gender-based violence, and masculinities. 
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3. THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
PATRIARCHY, GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE, AND MASCULINITIES
In this chapter, I outline my theoretical framework which draws from critical 
studies on men and masculinities (CSMM). The CSMM critically addresses 
men within the context of gendered power relations. Hearn (2004, p. 51) sums 
up the use of the CSMM framework, which ‘seeks to make clear that these 
studies of men are critical; on men; explicitly gendered; and by men and 
women, separately or collaboratively.’ The framework is, however, somewhat 
at odds with contemporary feminist theorising which I outline through 
Beasley’s (2012, 2013, 2015) critique of CSMM. 
After discussing some alternative directions for the interaction between 
feminist and CSMM theorising, and thereby motivating my use of CSMM, I 
proceed to present the ‘juridico-discursive’ (Foucault & Gordon, 1980) 
perspective to gendered power in the context of men and masculinities. This 
model draws upon notions of patriarchy, gender order, hegemony, and 
ideology (Whitehead, 2002). I focus on the structures and practices of 
patriarchy, relying on, for instance, Walby (1990, 2011), whose theorising I use 
to illuminate how FGM/C upholds and is upheld by other patriarchal 
practices. I also discuss the role of women as both victims and the primary 
perpetrators of FGM/C. I proceed by discussing men’s anti-violence activism, 
feminist concerns that it entails a risk of reproducing male privilege, and 
intersectional concerns that research on male ‘allies’ has failed to attend to the 
structured differences in men’s lives and has failed to promote marginalised 
men’s engagement in gender justice work. 
I then discuss the theoretical conceptions of men and masculinities, and 
the poststructural and materialist critique of the concept of (hegemonic) 
masculinity. According to the poststructural critique presented through, for 
instance, Whitehead (2002) and Wetherell and Edley (1999, 2014), the 
concept of masculinity/masculinities does not fully capture the variability, 
complexity, and contradictions in the way that men do/perform ‘being a man’. 
The materialist critique, in turn, is presented through Hearn (2004, 2014), 
who posits that the concept takes attention away from men's practices. I go on 
to discuss notions of Muslim masculinities drawing upon Arat and Hasan’s 
(2018) findings on the salient character traits conveyed in the Qur’an. I then 
discuss the core ideals of ‘Somali manhood’ (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016) as 
well as the socio-economic realities within which masculinities are negotiated 
in Somaliland.  
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3.1 POSTMODERN CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL STUDIES 
ON MEN AND MASCULINITIES
In this section, I discuss critical studies on men and masculinities (CSMM), 
drawing heavily from Beasley (2012, 2013, 2015), who analysed the discordant 
theoretical directions between the three major subfields of gender/sexuality: 
feminism, sexuality studies, and pro-feminist (critical) studies of men and 
masculinities (CSMM)26. Whilst she found significant epistemological links 
between the subfields, as well as important differences in terms of, for 
instance, theoretical trajectories, content, focus, cause, and scholars, her 
primary critique and concern addresses the current location and future 
directions of CSMM. Beasley (2012, 2013) argues that the theoretical frame of 
reference employed by most CSMM writers offers a quite strict adherence to 
modernism in contrast to feminism and sexuality studies, which were heavily 
influenced by a postmodern critique. Whilst Beasley (2012, p. 748) views 
modernism and postmodernism ‘as broad theoretical trajectories located on a 
continuum, rather than as distinct—much less necessarily oppositional’, she 
argues that the differential trajectories cannot simply be combined without 
explanation. The prevalence of (modernist) social constructionism in CSMM 
theorising—conceiving of power in terms of social structures and oppression, 
and identities formed by the social structuring effects of power—highlights the 
growing gap against feminism and sexuality studies (Beasley, 2012, 2013). 
Beasley (2013) identifies three specific points to support her claims 
regarding the deepening relationship between feminism and sexuality: ‘the 
take-up of postmodern thinkers, a sustained questioning of gender categories, 
and a position which disengaged gender and sexuality, associated with a 
comparatively more positive pro-sex view of sexuality.’ To her, this deepening 
relationship is not evident in the case of CSMM. Beasley (2012, 2013) takes 
Connell’s work as a starting point, since her work provides the central 
reference point for many in the field of CSMM. Adopting an approach that 
rejects both macro-structural determinism and its opposite, micro-level 
agency by voluntarist subjects, 'does not involve a rejection of a modernist 
concern with structures of power, but rather merely a rejection of strong 
structuralist principles’ (Beasley, 2012, p. 754).  
Yet, Beasley (2015) notes that Connell nevertheless proposes a less fixed 
conception of gender identity than some other CSMM writers. ‘Connell’s 
inclination to reiterate the gender category term, masculinity, enables gender 
to be viewed in the less fixed sense of a historical pattern of gender practice 
which is separate from sexed bodies’ (Beasley, 2015, p. 571, original emphasis). 
By contrast, Beasley (2015) argues that a range of other approaches to CSMM 
retain a more rigid account of gender identity, and these approaches strongly 
associate with practical interventions. She exemplifies with Hearn—another 
26Beasley refers to critical studies of men and masculinities, CSMM (2012), to masculinity studies 
(2013), and to men/masculinity studies, MMS (2015). In this study, I use critical studies on men and 
masculinities (CSMM), unless when directly quoting texts or speech that employ different terms. 
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central figure within the CSMM—who argues for moving from ‘masculinities’ 
back to ‘men’, ‘men’s’ practices’, and ‘men’s social relations’ (Hearn, 1996b; 
see also Section 3.4). Beasley (2015, p. 572), however, claims that an 
investment in gender category politics ‘involves parcelling together social 
norms of gender with a particular sexed body and, hence, invokes what 
feminist theoretical debates would associate with naturalised associations 
when compared to Connell’s focus on “masculinity”.’ In his critical analysis of 
Hearn’s theoretical position, Berggren (2018, p. 335; referring to MacKinnon, 
1989) draws parallels between Hearn and masculinity scholars informed by 
radical feminism, for whom ‘there is no meaning to the terms “men” and 
“women” beyond dominance and subordination’, and who are thus less 
inclined to appreciate the notion of masculinities in the plural.  
Reflecting on the relationship between contemporary feminist theories, 
CSMM scholarship, and practical interventions around violence, Beasley 
(2015) suggests three alternative directions for the interaction between 
feminist and CSMM theorising. These alternatives are ignoring disjunctions, 
confronting them and bringing variance into accord, or making connections 
that bridge disjunctions. In terms of this last approach, Beasley draws from 
Spivak’s (1990) postcolonial feminist position, suggesting ‘strategic 
essentialism’, according to which the use of a universalised group identity may 
be at times strategically necessary in practice, whilst gender identity categories 
must be theoretically unsettled and resisted. In addition to ‘strategic 
essentialism’, I also follow Walby (2011, p. 103) who, relying on Felski (1997) 
and Sayer (2000), argues that refusing to stabilise categories makes it difficult 
to engage in analysis, and, hence, a certain amount of abstraction is necessary. 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Walby, Armstrong, and Strid (2012), whilst 
remaining fluid over time, at any one moment, relations involving social 
inequality enjoy some stability as a consequence of their institutionalisation. 
The way forward is to recognise that concepts need to have their 
meaning temporarily stabilised at the point of analysis, even while 
recognising that their social construction is the outcome of changes 
and interactions over time and to note the historically varied 
construction of these categories  
(Walby, Armstrong, & Strid, 2012, p. 236) 
In my study, I primarily follow Whitehead (2002), who (together with 
Wetherell & Edley, 1999) Beasley (2012) argues serve as examples of CSMM 
scholars engaged in postmodern lines of enquiry. Whitehead (2002, p. 9) 
emphasises the multiplicity of masculinities, ‘while also recognising that men’s 
behaviours have material (often violent) and political actuality, though not one 
based in biology.’ In Section 3.4 below, I discuss in greater detail the different 
approaches to men and masculinities, including those put forth by Connell and 
Hearn. However, I next turn to a discussion of the structures and practices of 
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patriarchy, which I find useful in scrutinising FGM/C and its relationship to 
other patriarchal practices.  
3.2 STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES OF PATRIARCHY
Explanations of FGM/C relying on patriarchy characterise the practice as ‘an 
intentional (or subconscious) patriarchal action whose goal or consequence is 
the oppression of women’ (Gruenbaum, 2001, p. 40). Mackie and LeJeune 
(2009, p. 5), however, argue that patriarchy as the cause of FGM/C is 
insufficient, ‘because most, if not all, communities that do not practice FGM/C 
are also patriarchal.’ They emphasise the importance of distinguishing 
between the origin of a social practice from factors perpetuating it. Even if 
FGM/C presumably originated from imperial polygyny and the interests of the 
male elite, as, for instance, Mackie (1996) suggests, the practice was not 
necessarily supported for a similar reason by those occupying lower strata or 
by subsequent generations (Mackie & LeJeune, 2009). But, if FGM/C was 
established in a community, other forms of patriarchy often encouraged the 
continuation of the practice, and patriarchy thus became a supporting 
condition of the practice. In what follows, I present a theoretical discussion on 
patriarchy, concluding with my own standpoint. In Section 3.3, I discuss how 
FGM/C comprises a patriarchal practice and discuss how it relates to other 
patriarchal practices and structures. 
Millett (1970) introduced the term ‘patriarchy’ into contemporary feminist 
scholarship. For Millett, ideologies that work through masculinist definitions 
of gender and sexuality serve as key tools for male oppression. Millett argues 
that women are pressured to accept inequality vis-à-vis men through sex-role 
stereotyping and the stigmatisation of women who attempt to challenge 
socially correct ‘feminine’ behaviour. Whilst Millett stresses ideological forces, 
other feminists, such as Rich (1976), also emphasise the physical force: 
Patriarchy is the power of fathers: a familial-social, ideological, 
political system in which men—by force, direct pressure, or through 
ritual, tradition, law, and language, customs, etiquette, education, and 
the division of labour—determine what part women shall or shall not 
play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male.  
(Rich, 1976, p. 57) 
Stressing that patriarchy extends beyond autocratic rule by the male head of a 
family, Lerner (1986, p. 239), for example, defines patriarchy as ‘the 
manifestation and institutionalisation of male dominance over women and 
children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in 
society in general.’ According to Lerner, patriarchy implies that men hold 
power across all important institutions in a society. As such, women are 
deprived of access to such power, although not completely powerless or 
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deprived of rights, influence, and resources. Lerner (1986, pp. 239–240) also 
argues that paternalism describes a particular mode or a subset of patriarchal 
relations that is based on reciprocity; male protection and economic support 
is traded for female sexual service and unpaid domestic work.  
Walby (1990, p. 20), in turn, defines patriarchy as ‘a system of social 
structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress, and exploit women.’ 
She argues that theories of patriarchy that utilise ‘a simple base–
superstructure model of causal relations’ do not aid in understanding variation 
and change (Walby, 1990, p. 16). In Walby’s theorising, the private and the 
public (1990)—or the domestic and the public (2009, 2011)—comprise the 
primary forms of patriarchy. The private patriarchy is based upon housework 
as the main site of women’s oppression, and the expropriation of women’s 
labour takes place primarily by individual patriarchs within the household. 
Public patriarchy, by contrast, is based upon employment and the state, where 
the expropriation of women represents a more collective appropriation 
(Walby, 1990, p. 24). Furthermore, in the domestic form, the processes of 
power are primarily exclusionary—thereby excluding women from locations 
of power and influence; in the public form, these processes are 
segregationary—that is, segregating women in the public sphere into 
positions of lesser power and influence (Walby, 2011, p. 105). Transformation 
from the domestic to the public patriarchy is well advanced in the global North, 
but nearly absent in the global South according to Walby (2011). 
In the core of Walby’s (1990) theorising are six primary structures (also 
referred to as ‘fields’ or ‘sites’) from which patriarchal relations emerge and 
which form patriarchy. These six structures consist of paid work, housework, 
sexuality, culture, violence, and the state. Each structure carries causal effects 
upon the others, by both reinforcing and blocking them, and the 
interrelationships between structures create different forms of patriarchy 
(Walby, 1990, pp. 16, 20). In each of the six structures, patriarchal practices 
vary and develop separately. In her subsequent works, Walby (2009, p. 301; 
2011, p. 104) defines the term ‘gender regime’ (which she uses interchangeably 
with the term ‘patriarchy’) as ‘a set of interconnected gender relations and 
gendered institutions that constitutes a system’. Instead of the six fields, she 
outlines four major institutional domains that define the gender regime, which 
encompass the economy (paid and domestic unpaid work), polity 
(conventional states, state unions like the EU, and organised religions with the 
capacity to regulate important aspects of social life), violence, and civil society 
(including culture, media, knowledge institutions, and sexuality). 
Referring to Puleo (1995) and De Miguel (2015), Kaplan et al. (2017, p. 152) 
claim that every patriarchal system relies on coercion and consent, where the 
coercive model sanctions what is allowed and what is forbidden to women, 
whilst the consent-based model ‘builds inequality through binary narratives 
that leverage gender roles in a rigid way.’ With regards to the latter model, 
patriarchy is often associated with a patriarchal ideology that justifies male 
dominance and attributes it to inherent natural differences between men and 
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women. According to Lerner (1986, p. 240), sexism defines the ideology of 
male supremacy, superiority, and beliefs that sustain it. In her view, sexism 
consists of prejudice, stereotyping, or discrimination based on gender and 
‘stands in the same relation to paternalism as racism does to slavery.’ Connell 
(2005a) points out religion, biology, cultural tradition, and organisational 
mission (such as that used in the military) as ideologies that are used to justify 
men’s supremacy. Drawing on Gramsci (1971), Lazar (2007) argues that 
gender ideology is hegemonic in that it often does not appear as domination at 
all. Instead, she points out, it is often embedded and hidden in everyday 
routines and interactions and appears as largely consensual and acceptable to 
most within a community. Gaining consent and perpetuating dominance are 
thus largely accomplished through discursive means (Lazar, 2007).  
According to Hirdman’s (1990) theory of a genus (a Swedish term referring 
to both gender and sex) system, genus is constructed around the principles of 
separation and hierarchy. In Hirdman’s conception, separation of (or simply 
difference between) sexes entails both defining feminine and masculine as 
dichotomous and in opposition to one another, as well as a gendered division 
of private life and work. Hierarchy, in turn, entails the superiority of the 
masculine, portraying man as the human norm, and concentrating the 
material, cultural, and symbolic power in the hands of men. In this study, I 
borrow from Hirdman, and suggest that the strict separation of the sexes and 
their hierarchical order comprise central components in patriarchal 
ideologies, which underlie the fields or domains described by Walby (1990, 
2009). I expand further on my standpoint at the end of this section. 
As, for instance, Whitehead (2002, p. 87) notes, a ‘key strength of the 
concept of patriarchy lies in its ability to describe the ideological material 
conditions of gender inequalities and oppressions across multiple sites.’ 
However, the concepts of patriarchy and gender system have been criticised 
for emphasising structure and stability at the cost of agency and change 
(Julkunen, 2010, p. 19; Walby, 2011, pp. 103–104). Gender system as a concept 
has been replaced with gender order in, for instance, cultural studies 
(Julkunen, 2010, p. 19). In Walby’s (2011, p. 103) view, however, ‘the varied 
aspects of gender relations are sufficiently interconnected to merit being 
analysed as a social system.’ But, because the term ‘patriarchy’ is presumed to 
entail an ahistoric, essentialist, and reductionist approach to the analysis of 
gender relations, Walby (see, for example, 2009, 2011) replaces the term 
‘patriarchy’ with the term ‘gender regime’. She, however, maintains that they 
refer to the same underlying concept.  
Julkunen (2010, p. 19) addresses the critique that ‘patriarchy’ and a ‘gender 
system’ emphasise structure and stability by claiming that, whilst systems tend 
to uphold themselves, a system based on a strict segregation and hierarchy 
creates contradictions and incongruities that open up possibilities for agency 
and renegotiation. Referring to Hirdman’s (1990) concept of a ‘gender 
contract’, which embeds support for the patriarchal system and comprises the 
cultural understanding of gendered rights and responsibilities, 
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representations of gender, and rules for intimate heterosexual relationships, 
Julkunen (2010) also suggests that oppressive gender systems cannot be 
upheld without some level of acceptance—and, hence, agency—from women. 
Thus, she also addresses the critique that the concepts of patriarchy and a 
gender system promote a Victorian view of women as ‘morally pure victims’ 
(see Elshtain, 1981).  
Walby (1990) notes that essentialism and ahistoricism in socialisation 
theory (see Belotti, Appignanesi, & Wordsworth, 1975; Comer, 1974; Parsons 
& Bales, 1956; Sharpe, 1976) and in psychoanalytic theories (see Chodorow, 
1979; Irigaray & Gill, 1985; Irigaray, Porter, Burke, & Burke, 1985; Mitchell, 
1975) can be overcome through poststructuralist discourse analysis. Whilst the 
‘field’ of culture plays a crucial role in constituting patriarchy via 
socialisation—whereby boys and girls learn the appropriate behaviour for their 
sex via representations of gender in cultural texts and institutions—notions 
about masculinity and femininity extend to all areas (‘fields’) of social relations 
in Walby’s theorising. In other words, whilst socialisation appears to cause the 
differentiation into masculine and feminine, it does not explain where the 
content of these notions originated (Walby, 1990, p. 93).  
In this study, following Walby (2009, 2011), I prefer to use the concept of a 
patriarchal gender regime over patriarchy and a patriarchal gender system.27 
Drawing upon Walby (1990) and Lerner (1986), I define the patriarchal 
gender regime as a system of interrelated social structures and practices which 
manifest and institutionalise men’s domination in all areas of social relations. 
The patriarchal gender regime—and thereby men’s domination—is upheld and 
legitimated by patriarchal interpretations of ideologies and belief systems, 
such as a religion, a cultural tradition, or an organisational mission (see 
Connell, 2005a); nationalism (see, for example, Gutmann, 1996; Nagel, 1998); 
and science (for example, functionalism28). Such patriarchal interpretations 
often entail gendered stereotypes, roles, norms, and ideals that are used to 
justify strict separation of the sexes and their hierarchical order (see Hirdman, 
1990; Lerner, 1986). Furthermore, these interpretations are reproduced and 
mediated—but also constantly renegotiated—via institutions such as family, 
education, and media, as well as through coercive and non-coercive routines 
and interactions in all areas (‘fields’) of social relations. As Walby (1990) notes, 
these often hidden, consensual practices can be explored using 
poststructuralist discourse analysis, which helps to illuminate the ‘content’ 
that informs, for instance, the socialisation process. Thus, my methodological 
framework (see Chapter 4) draws on Fairclough’s (1992, 1995, 2001) and 
Lazar’s (2007) critical discourse analytical approaches. 
27Whilst ‘gender order’ has replaced the concept of a ‘gender system’ in, for instance, cultural studies 
(see Julkunen, 2010, p. 19), in this study, a patriarchal gender order refers to the superiority of men and 
the inferiority of women (drawing on Hirdman’s [1990] concept of ‘hierarchical gender order’). 
28According to structuralist functionalist thinking, which flourished in the social sciences from the 
1940s to the 1970s, the roles of men and women were seen as naturally different but complementary, 
and the sexual division of labour represented a collective egalitarian decision serving joint interests (see 
Parsons & Bales, 1956). 
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Furthermore, to avoid essentialism and reductionism, and viewing women 
as ‘morally pure victims’ (see Elshtain, 1981), I emphasise that, besides 
accepting the patriarchal gender order (as indicated by Hirdman’s [1990] 
concept of a ‘gender contract’), women also actively engage in patriarchal 
practices, as, for example, the main perpetrators of FGM/C. I discuss this in 
greater detail in the following section, illustrating how FGM/C comprises and 
relates to other patriarchal practices. This section also turns a critical gaze 
towards the involvement of men in the prevention of violence against women. 
3.3 PATRIARCHAL VIOLENCE AND MEN’S ANTI-
VIOLENCE ACTIVISM
In this section, I first discuss FGM/C in light of theories on gender-based 
violence. Inspired by considerations on what is specifically gendered about 
gender-based violence, I illustrate how FGM/C affects gender and is thus a 
gendering practice, as well as how it (partly) entails performing gendered 
behaviour and is thus a practice of gender. In the latter part of this section, I 
discuss men’s anti-violence activism and show that efforts to prevent violence 
against women can sometimes risk reproducing male privilege. 
FGM/C AS A GENDERING PRACTICE AND AS A PRACTICE OF 
GENDER
Violence against women entered human rights discussions and discourse 
largely through the women’s movement in the 1990s, almost half a century 
after the international human rights mechanism was established under The 
Charter of the United Nations (1945) and The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) (Nousiainen & Pentikäinen, 2017). The official United 
Nations definition of gender-based violence was first presented during the 
1993 United Nations General Assembly when it passed the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women. According to this definition, 
‘“violence against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results 
in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering 
to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’ (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1993). According to the declaration, violence against women 
encompasses, but is not limited to: 
a) Physical, sexual, and psychological violence occurring in the family, 
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-
related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation, and other traditional 
practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence, and violence related to 
exploitation; 
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b) Physical, sexual, and psychological violence occurring within the 
general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment, and 
intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in 
women, and forced prostitution; and 
c) Physical, sexual, and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned 
by the state, wherever it occurs. 
In the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, ‘female 
genital mutilation’ is listed as one of the traditional practices harmful to 
women, together with battery, the sexual abuse of female children in the 
household, dowry-related violence, and marital rape (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1993).  
According to Ronkainen (2017), ‘violence’ is a value-laden term, identifying 
something as negative, reprehensible, and wrong. She points out that labelling 
something as violent entails separating legitimate violence (for example, by 
police for ‘due’ course) from illegitimate violence, and results from cultural, 
historical, and social negotiations. Such negotiations justify and account for 
certain forms of violence, she argues. Gender represents one factor impacting 
the cultural and social meaning-making of violence, and both gender and 
violence are connected to power in various ways (Ronkainen, 2017). Bufacchi 
(2005) suggests that violence can be conceptualised in terms of the verb ‘to 
violate’, meaning to infringe, or transgress, or to exceed some limit or norm. 
Yet, Waldenfels (2005) notes that disagreement exists regarding what exactly 
is violated when an act of violence occurs. If the answer is a ‘violation of 
women’s rights’, then something must be said about the nature of those rights 
that are violated (Opoku, 2017). 
'Violence against women' (VAW), 'gender-based violence’ (GBV), and 
‘gendered violence’ are often used interchangeably. Anderson (2009) points 
out that when one assumes that VAW equals GBV without analysing the 
relation to theories of gender, one fails to analyse the gender–violence nexus 
in light of theory. She criticises sex parity findings in partner violence studies, 
according to which male and female partners are equally violent towards one 
another, and partner violence against women is thus unrelated to gender. 
Discussions about who hits whom cannot clarify if and how violence is 
gendered (Anderson, 2009). Bumiller (2010) calls for a focus on the meaning 
and purpose of violent acts and their relation to the performance of gender. 
Ronkainen (2017) notes that research on GBV should focus on resources 
enabling violence, how violence is justified to oneself and others, and the kind 
of gendered agency attached to it. Stark (2010, p. 209) argues that 
investigations of the violence–gender nexus should ‘identify how violence 
functions in relationships to preserve and extend gender inequalities’ rather 
than asking who uses violence. Hunnicutt (2009) emphasises that the 
principal characteristic of GBV lies in that it occurs against women precisely 
because of their gender. She posits that the concept of patriarchy maintains 
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the theoretical focus on dominance, gender, and power, and anchors violence 
against women within social conditions rather than against individual 
attributes. hooks (2000), in turn, proposed using the term ‘patriarchal 
violence’ as a label for the abuse and violence that happens at home due to 
patriarchal structures, beliefs, and values, since the term ‘domestic violence’ 
does not maintain the connection between violence and structures.  
Considering FGM/C and Stark’s (2010) request to identify how violence 
functions to preserve and extend gender inequalities and Hunnicutt’s (2009) 
notion that gender-based violence occurs against women precisely because of 
their gender, I now turn to Mackie and LeJeune (2009), who argue that 
patriarchy as the cause of FGM/C is insufficient. They emphasise the 
importance of distinguishing between the origin of a social practice and what 
causes its perpetuation. To link the current distribution of FGM/C practices to 
places in which it originated and its diffusion, Mackie (1996) proposes a single-
source diffusion theory that situates the origins of the practice in ancient 
Meroe (present-day Sudan), where infibulation was practiced in the context of 
extreme resource inequality. He suggests that for highly polygynous wealthy 
males, the genital cutting of girls and women symbolised controlled fidelity 
and a certainty of paternity. Mackie hypothesises that the practice was then 
dispersed across social strata and spread throughout female slave trade routes. 
Others have argued a dual-source origin, arguing that as infibulation spread 
from its original core area, it encountered and merged with pre-existing 
practices. For instance, Dorkenoo (1994) argues that FGM/C developed 
independently amongst certain ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa as a part 
of puberty rites. Lightfoot–Klein (1989) claims that excision practices date 
back thousands of years and, at some point, came into being through a 
preoccupation with virginity and chastity.  
By considering FGM/C a gendered practice, it is important to note that 
communities that practice it do not view it as violence, but as a means of 
guaranteeing cultural notions of what is best for girls (see Mackie & LeJeune, 
2009). Yet, FGM/C corresponds to Hunnicutt’s (2009) notion of the principal 
characteristic of GBV: it occurs against women precisely because of their 
gender. Wilson (2002) discusses patrilineal property inheritance as a 
significant feature when considering the effects of patriarchy on current 
FGM/C prevalence. She points out that families involved in agriculture hand 
over land to their sons, whilst the daughters are expected to be taken care of 
by their husband. Illiteracy and weak employment opportunities uphold the 
patriarchal order assigning women the role of giving birth and carrying out 
domestic duties, whilst men are assigned the role of providing for their family. 
Marriage is thus often the (only) way for women to earn a living and status, 
Wilson argues, whilst virginity and chastity exist as prerequisites to marriage, 
symbolising the honour of the girl’s family. Under these circumstances, 
FGM/C is carried out to preserve the girls’ morality, chastity, and fidelity as 
well as marriageability and family honour (Gruenbaum, 2006). Mackie and 
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LeJeune (2009) also emphasise the socioeconomic subordination of women 
in the continuation of FGM/C practices: 
Patriarchal institutions include socio-economic subordination that 
makes women dependent on marriage for material well-being and, 
therefore, unable to risk not undergoing FGM/C. They also include 
social norms that ensure that women have little voice in matters that 
affect them, rendering them unable to publicly challenge harmful, 
threatening, and subordinating practices.  
(Mackie & LeJeune, 2009, p. 6) 
Above, both Wilson (2002) and Mackie and LeJeune (2009) reflect on the 
interrelatedness of FGM/C and patriarchal practices in different structures, 
putting forth the notion that patriarchy does not cause FGM/C, but represents 
a supporting condition of the practice (Mackie & LeJeune, 2009). Building 
upon their views and on Walby’s (1990) understanding of the six fields of 
patriarchy (paid work, housework, sexuality, culture, violence, and the state), 
I argue that FGM/C comprises patriarchal violence that sustains and is 
sustained by other patriarchal practices. Crosscutting the fields of sexuality 
and culture, FGM/C represents a valued tradition often assumed to be 
mandated by a religious doctrine and linked to understandings of honour, 
thereby justifying the use of violence to control women’s virginity and fidelity. 
In the fields of paid work and housework, women’s socio-economic 
subordination upholds women’s dependency on marriage and, therefore, 
FGM/C as a prerequisite to marriage in practicing communities. Health 
problems and child marriages, which often follow FGM/C, further 
disadvantage women’s possibilities of gaining an education and participating 
in working life. Furthermore, in the field of the state—often dominated by 
men—the refusal or reluctance to intervene in FGM/C through specific 
legislation and policy contributes to the perpetuation of the practice. 
After illustrating how FGM/C functions to preserve and extend gender 
inequalities (see Stark, 2010), and occurs against women precisely because of 
their gender (see Hunnicutt, 2009), I next examine if performing FGM/C 
implies performing a practice of gender. Mainstream feminist research on 
violence relies on constructions of male perpetrators and female victims, 
characterised by unequal, gendered positions of power (Jokinen, 2017; 
Keskinen, 2010). Hearn (2004) argues that gender-based violence involves 
power imbalances where, most often, men are the perpetrators and women the 
victims. Radical feminists (for example, Brownmiller, 1976) argue that men’s 
violence against women is indeed the basis of men’s control over women. A 
central question regarding men’s violence against women in Walby’s (1990, p. 
136) view is, ‘whether men are violent to women as a consequence of their 
power over women or in order to gain power over them.’ Jakobsen’s (2014) 
study of the meaning of male-to-female partner violence in Tanzania 
exemplifies how wife-beating is gendered in the sense that it supports and is 
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supported by the masculine ideal: to be a man is to be in charge, to beat is to 
be in charge and is masculine in itself: 
To be able to beat is to be in authority, and to be in authority is to be a 
man. Thus, beating to control is an enactment of being a man, of being 
the head of the house, of inhabiting the role of control that is a 
masculine role. In addition to enforcing gender, beating is doing 
gender: it is not only affecting gender, and thus a ‘gendering practice’, 
it is also a practicing of gender, in that it is in itself performing 
gendered behaviour. […] Gender is in both the act of beating and in the 
subordination that results, illustrating the aforementioned duality of 
gender as a social structure that often eludes the researcher 
(Jakobsen, 2014, p. 15) 
Similar mechanisms can be found which relate to intimate partner violence 
and sexual violence irrespective of the cultural context. Studies on male 
perpetrators of intimate partner violence in, for instance, Finland show that 
men’s violence often aims at retaining control, controlling women’s sexuality, 
and performing masculinity (Keskinen, 2010).  
Female perpetrators and violence in homosexual relationships challenge 
constructions of male perpetrators and female victims (Keskinen, 2010). 
Moreover, Ronkainen (2017) writes that femininity is often associated with 
empathy, care, and the fostering of life, traits which are antithetical to violence. 
Masculinity, in turn, is attached to power, force, and outbound activity, all of 
which are compatible with violence. FGM/C, however, is almost always 
organised by mothers and grandmothers, and ‘operated’ by women (Fusaschi, 
2017), rendering it ‘women’s business’ (Mackie & LeJeune, 2009), and a form 
of gendered violence, where women comprise both victims and the primary 
perpetrators. Thus, carrying out FGM/C is not ‘practicing masculinity’ in the 
sense that wife-beating represents a practice of masculinity in Jakobsen’s 
(2014) study presented above.  
In her study on violence perpetuated by women against women in Tanzania 
(female genital cutting, widow cleansing rituals, and woman-to-woman 
marriage29), Opoku (2017) explores women’s roles in the reproduction of 
patriarchy by examining how subordinate groups or classes accept and actively 
participate in their own oppression. Opoku (p. 80) emphasises how ‘the 
immense power of the community in traditional African communities explains 
why African women have to undergo some of the harmful rituals at the expense 
of their health.’ She also examined why many African women in senior 
29According to Opoku (2017), a ‘widow cleansing ritual is a cultural practice some women undergo 
after the death of their husband. It requires the widow to have sex with a village cleanser to be purified 
from the haunted spirit of her deceased husband. Through this cleansing ritual, the widow is inherited 
into the deceased homestead and accepted in her community. Woman-to-woman marriage refers to the 
institution whereby a barren woman or a woman who has only girl children pays a dowry to marry 
another woman (very often a younger woman) and assumes control over her and her offspring. The 
younger women in such relationships are frequently treated as “the reproductive instrument” for another 
woman’ (Opoku, 2017, abstract.). 
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positions pass these rituals on to the next generation despite the physical and 
psychological harm to the human body. Drawing on Venter (2004), Opoku 
(2017, p. 78) writes that the individual is born out of and into the community 
and will always be a part of the community. Ostracising an individual or group 
who disobeys represents the most severe punishment for many African groups 
(Ejizu, 2007).  
Bicchieri’s (2006) theory of the dynamics of social norms describes the 
circumstances in which parents decide to cut their daughters. First, 
individuals are aware that the social ‘rule’ of cutting of girls applies to them. 
Second, individuals prefer to conform to this rule, because they expect that a 
large segment of their social group will cut their daughters (empirical 
expectations) and that a large segment of their social group thinks that they 
ought to cut their daughters (normative expectations). A social norm like 
FGM/C is difficult for individual families to stop, Bicchieri argues, since they 
believe that if they do not conform to community norms, they will pay a price 
in the form of social exclusion, criticism, ridicule, stigma, and/or an inability 
to marry their daughters. Moreover, legal and moral norms that regulate 
behaviours adhering to social norms are often enacted by different sources and 
stand at odds with one another. For example, legislation that prohibits FGM/C 
is expected to discourage the practice. But where social norms governing 
FGM/C remain in place, the fear of social exclusion for not conforming to the 
norm may outweigh fears of fines and imprisonment (UNICEF, 2013).  
Newell-Jones’s (2017) investigation in Somaliland reflects the decision-
making dilemma that women confront vis-à-vis FGM/C.30 The vast majority 
(94%) correctly listed the complications resulting from pharaonic cutting, yet 
pharaonic cutting persists as the dominant type in Somaliland (see Section 
2.3). As Newell–Jones argues, this suggests that a lack of knowledge is unlikely 
to persist as the primary reason for continued cutting. Yet, 95% of female 
respondents to Ismail et al.’s (2016) study reported that they would perform 
sunnah cutting on their daughters, whilst less than 5% said they would 
perform pharaonic cutting. Furthermore, 83% of women in Newell-Jones’ 
(2017) study hope for some abandonment of the practice (59% want to 
abandon only pharaonic cutting, 20% pharaonic and the intermediate type, 
and 4% all types of cutting).  
Yet, the pressure to conform to social norms regarding FGM/C that women 
experience against their aspirations and hopes is enforced by a lack of 
communication between men and women, and women’s often inaccurate 
perceptions of men’s preferences (Newell-Jones, 2017). Since mothers 
consider FGM/C as proof of virginity and frame the practice through concern 
for their daughter’s marriageability, the messages men send to women 
influence the decision-making process (Newell–Jones, 2016). According to 
Newell-Jones’ (2017) study, an overwhelming majority of men (98%) in 
30In Somaliland, decisions about whether a girl is cut and the type of cut she undergoes are assumed 
to be made by the mother alone in a clear majority of cases, by grandmothers in approximately 10% of 
cases, and jointly by mothers and fathers in less than 10% of cases (Newell–Jones, 2016, Chart 7.2.9A). 
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Somaliland wish to see some abandonment of the practice (89% want to 
abandon only the pharaonic cutting, 3% pharaonic and the intermediate type, 
and 6% all types of cutting). It also seems that men are increasingly 
participating in dialogues of FGM/C both in their own families and within the 
community (Bruchhaus, 2013). Furthermore, both men and women exert 
influence through a preference for either a cut or an uncut daughter-in-law: 
80% of community members prefer their sons to marry a cut woman, 
regardless of the participants’ gender, age, and rural or urban location 
(Newell–Jones, 2016).  
In addition to being the primary decision-makers regarding a daughter’s 
FGM/C, across various societies, women are almost always the ‘operators’ of 
FGM/C, Fusaschi (2017) wrote. She found that such women are often elderly 
and responsible for different practices associated with women’s and children’s 
bodies and health (such as labour and childbirth), and their knowledge usually 
passes down from mother to daughter. Being a circumciser can provide a good 
income and represent one of the very few opportunities for women to gain 
status within their communities. In Somaliland, for example, circumcisers 
earn approximately US$10 per circumcision, a rather significant sum (Lunde, 
2012, pp. 65–66).31 Through the dissemination of information about health 
risks, parents now increasingly turn to medical practitioners to cut their 
daughters (UNICEF, 2010). These health professionals (nurses, midwives, and 
doctors) are also primarily women who may earn significant additional income 
from performing FGM/C. Newell–Jones’s (2017) interviews with healthcare 
professionals in Somaliland revealed the contradictions they face between 
their understanding of professional role (which does not entail performing any 
type of FGM/C) and the pressure they feel to minimise the harm done to an 
individual girl by performing a cut using medical equipment and their 
knowledge of anatomy. 
To summarise, I posit that FGM/C is a form of patriarchal violence which 
occurs against women precisely because of their gender and preserves and 
extends gender inequalities. The practice is sustained by other patriarchal 
practices, above all the socio-economic subordination that renders women 
dependent upon marriage for their material well-being and, therefore, parents 
(specifically mothers) pressured to expose their daughters to FGM/C. Thus, it 
is important to explore if and how women’s socio-economic subordination and 
violence as a means to control women and girls are discursively justified, 
normalised, and (re)produced. Furthermore, I suggest that FGM/C is a 
practice of gender. In deciding to have their daughters cut, mothers perform 
the gendered role into which they were socialised, which includes perpetuating 
traditional practices and preparing children, especially girls, for adulthood. In 
terms of men, practicing FGM/C is not about practicing masculinity since 
cutting is almost always organised and performed by women. However, I will 
31The average wage in 2012 was US$1.85 per day ('Labour force survey Somaliland, 2012. Report on 
Borama, Hargeisa & Burao,' 2013). The proportion of the population living below the poverty line 
(US$1.90 in 2016) was 52.7% ('Somaliland in Figures 2016', 2018). 
Theoretical constructions of patriarchy, gender-based violence, and masculinities 
54 
discuss men’s support for FGM/C as an enactment of masculinity in Section 
3.5.  
After discussing the role of women in the perpetuation of FGM/C, I next 
discuss men’s involvement in the promotion of gender equality in general and 
in the prevention of gender-based violence in particular. 
MEN’S ANTI-VIOLENCE ACTIVISM
Connell (2005a) along with Holmgren and Hearn (2009) claim that gender 
issues have been widely regarded as women’s concerns given how they 
appeared on the public debate agenda. Men receive a ‘patriarchal dividend’, a 
set of material and interpersonal privileges, from gendered structures of 
inequality (Connell, 1987). Promoting gender equality is thus often viewed as 
against men’s interests, contributing to men and boys’ resistance and 
antifeminist politics (Flood, 2004, pp. 458–461). Connell (2005a) argues that 
some men accept change in principle, but in practice continue to act in ways 
that sustain men’s dominance of the public sphere and assign domestic labour 
and childcare to women. In addition to the ideologies that justify men’s 
supremacy on the basis of, for instance, religion, biology, or cultural tradition, 
men in business and government typically reject government actions in 
support of equality, favouring the unfettered action of the market (Connell, 
2005a).  
According to Hearn (2001, p. 10), men’s resistance to gender equality also 
emerges for reasons such as complicity in current arrangements, defining 
gender equality as ‘women’s business’, preferring men and men’s company, 
and less conscious psychological forms of ambivalence and resistance. The 
gender norms that boys and men are expected to follow are often rigid and do 
not include solidarity with women or any other disadvantaged groups (Adams 
& Coltrane, 2004). Against this background, it is unsurprising that men who 
advocate for gender equality may face ridicule, contempt, and anger (Connell, 
1995; Crooks, Goodall, Hughes, Jaffe, & Baker, 2007; Flood, 2004; Ruxton & 
van der Gaag, 2013).  
Despite challenges and setbacks, men’s support for gender equality occurs 
in various forms, such as through intellectual and public advocacy, 
organisational and political alliance, campaigns amongst men, youth work, 
and ‘men’s work’, Connell (2003) describes. In her view, the most extensive 
social action, combining government and non-government initiatives, has 
occurred in Scandinavia, and has demonstrated that men can change their 
behaviours when circumstances favour doing so. According to Flood (2011), 
men can be motivated to promote equality by appealing to their personal well-
being (for example, freedom from the costs of conforming with dominant 
definitions of masculinity), relational interests (men’s care and love for the 
women and girls in their lives), collective and community interests (the 
benefits to communities, for example, by diminishing the civil and 
international violence associated with aggressive constructions of masculinity 
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and patriarchal nation-states), and principle interests (men’s ethical, political, 
or spiritual commitments).  
Flood (2004, pp. 458–461) argues that one of the most significant efforts 
to alter men’s involvement in gender relations centres on men’s violence 
against women (VAW), a key focus of anti-sexist men’s groups since the early 
1970s. In both developed and developing countries, groups of men have 
emerged seeking to end men’s violence against women and children, he notes. 
Efforts to prevent VAW now increasingly take as a given that they must engage 
men as participants in education programmes, as targets of social marketing 
campaigns, as policy makers and gatekeepers, and as activists and advocates 
(Casey, Tolman, Carlson, Allen, & Storer, 2017; Flood, 2011; Peretz, 2017, 
2018b). Such efforts are often framed in terms of ‘ally’ development, since they 
mobilise a group that is socially privileged by their identity to work against one 
of the outcomes of that very privilege (Casey et al., 2017; Peretz, 2017). Men’s 
engagement in anti-violence work parallels ally development in other social 
justice causes, such as white antiracists activists and heterosexuals who work 
for gay rights (Casey & Smith, 2010; Peretz, 2017). 
Carlson et al. (2015) suggest that the theoretical framework for men’s 
engagement in VAW prevention continues evolving. Furthermore, findings 
remain largely descriptive and stem from small qualitative samples, Casey et 
al. (2017) point out. They further claim that the association between specific 
reasons for men’s anti-violence involvement and successful long-term 
engagement or between gender equality attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours 
remains unexamined. Carlson et al. (2015) identified two theory-informed 
approaches often used when discussing the engagement of men and boys in 
VAW prevention. First, the pro-feminist rationale of engaging men and boys 
relies on the argument that if the goal is to end VAW men must be involved, 
because they are the primary perpetrators (Flood, 2004, 2011). Furthermore, 
adherence to rigid or traditional notions of appropriate masculinity associates 
with the greater acceptance of and risk for the perpetration of violence (Flood, 
2011; Murnen, Wright, & Kaluzny, 2002). Messner (1997, p. 54), however, 
claims that ‘politics of guilt’ is unlikely to produce effective and affective male 
allies.  
Second, the social norms approach posits that correcting individuals’ 
misconceptions of social norms can reduce problem behaviours and increase 
healthy behaviours (Berkowitz, 2002). In terms of men’s VAW, the approach 
aims to identify misconceptions of men’s concurrence with each other’s sexist 
and violence-supportive norms, whilst challenging men’s own beliefs and 
attitudes (Fabiano, Perkins, Berkowitz, Linkenbach, & Stark, 2004). Through 
role models, education, surveys, and media campaigns, the approach aims to 
empower the previously quiet majority of men who value respect and non-
violence to take a more active stance in promoting these ideals (Carlson et al., 
2015).  
With regards to men’s role in the prevention of FGM/C, the pro-feminist 
rationale is not well applicable as FGM/C prevention addresses women’s 
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patriarchal violence against other women. Furthermore, FGM/C often does 
not represent violence in the communities practicing it. Since FGM/C exists as 
a social norm upheld by biased empirical and normative expectations 
(Bicchieri, 2006), the social norms approach is better applicable in the 
prevention of FGM/C. However, since men are not the perpetrators of FGM/C, 
the rationale for engaging them is not primarily focused on correcting men’s 
misconceptions of norms, but on correcting parents’ (mainly mothers’) 
misconceptions of men’s preference for cut wives where men are actually 
turning against FGM/C.  
Several frameworks for generating individual men’s interest in violence 
prevention have adopted a ‘stages of change’ approach. For instance, Casey 
and Smith (2010), along with Prochaska, Colleen, and Kerry (2002) propose 
models for men’s pathways into anti-violence work assuming a continuum of 
‘statuses’ over time relative to men’s awareness, willingness, and ability to act 
as allies to women. Carlson et al. (2015) argue that men’s catalysts for joining 
anti-violence efforts include making a solid personal connection with the issue 
of gendered violence. In their study, fatherhood most often represented the 
reason for becoming engaged. Other reasons included men’s desire to give 
back after they had benefited from a programme, recognising their wealth and 
privilege, and their relationships to others. According to Carlson et al., men’s 
focus on health behaviours in general also encouraged them to engage in 
violence prevention. Other catalysts that they identified included tailored 
invitations highlighting men’s strengths and potential, and approaching men 
as a critical and positive element to solve VAW, as well as messengers or 
‘ambassadors’ reflecting the identities and concerns of the men they hope to 
involve. In a geographically diverse sample of 392 men, Casey et al. (2017) 
found that a social justice commitment represented the most often endorsed 
reason for men’s involvement in VAW prevention. Other commonly reported 
reasons included exposure to the issue of violence through work, hearing a 
moving story about domestic or sexual violence, and disclosure of abuse from 
someone close to the participant. They summarise that to encourage men’s 
anti-violence participation, men must feel welcome to work against VAW, to 
view VAW as an issue that is relevant to them, and to feel as though VAW is 
inextricably tied to gender inequity and male privilege. 
Men’s participation can be viewed as a pragmatic means of advancing 
gender equality and preventing VAW. However, even men active in anti-
violence movements carry ‘an invisible backpack’ of privilege, a taken-for-
granted set of unearned benefits and assets (McIntosh, 1989). Ruxton and van 
der Gaag (2013, p. 170) noted that men’s socially condoned leadership roles 
can lead to encroachment into fields formerly led by women: ‘[i]f men join in 
the struggle, they will take over.’ In their study on men’s motivation to 
participate in preventing VAW, Casey et al. (2017) found that those same men 
who demonstrated the highest levels of gender equitable attitudes were also 
more likely to endorse protecting women and being their voice. Furthermore, 
when efforts to involve men in building gender equality simultaneously speaks 
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to men’s ‘pain’, there is a risk of men asserting their interests at the expense of 
women, denying male privilege, and seeing themselves as victims (Flood, 
2004).  
Even when not ‘taking over’, men involved in VAW prevention may be 
granted a higher status, more power, and further recognition than women who 
do similar work (Macomber, 2012). That men rise more quickly to leadership 
positions echoes the ‘glass escalator’, an effect documented by, for instance, 
Williams (1995) in nursing and primary school teaching professions. Peretz 
(2018a), in turn, described a ‘pedestal effect’, representing the persistence of 
male privilege in feminist contexts, which manifests as gratuitous acclaim, 
heightened attention, unearned credibility, career mobility, and romantic 
attraction (see also Landsberg, 2000; Luxton, 1993). Researchers (see, for 
example Flood, 2004, p. 463; Hearn & McKie, 2008; Hearn et al., 2013; 
Sweetman, 2013) also raised concerns that efforts to engage men in VAW 
prevention may reduce funding for women’s organizations and services. Casey 
et al. (2017) noted that men also draw upon their institutional privilege to 
attract funding rarely available to women.  
To avoid reproducing male privilege, the strategy of involving men in VAW 
prevention should not diminish the legitimacy of women-only programmes 
and prompt ‘a mistaken belief that all interventions should include men’ 
(Flood, 2015, p. 161). Interventions to engage men in preventing VAW should 
develop from treating men simply as perpetrators or as the allies of women, 
consisting of approaches that seek to transform relations, social norms, and 
systems that sustain gender inequality and violence (Jewkes, Flood, & Lang, 
2014). Such interventions should not draw upon ideas often associated with 
the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ such as strength, warrior, or leader, or 
which use the classic male role models such as sports stars, possibly 
reinforcing the gender-inequitable masculine ideals that need to be changed 
in order to prevent VAW (Flood, 2015; Jewkes et al., 2014).  
Flood (2015) further warns about the risks of ‘Real men don’t …’ 
campaigns, aimed at redefining masculinity as nonviolent, but which 
simultaneously obscure the link between masculinity and VAW by suggesting 
that men rape or hit women to demonstrate themselves as real men. He posits 
that men’s VAW reproduces authority over women, implying that men, in 
general, benefit from this violence, and that men ‘lose’ from progress towards 
non-violence and gender equality. Thus, Flood suggests: 
Efforts to involve men in violence prevention must acknowledge the 
costs to men of undermining the patriarchal privileges that underpin 
men’s violence against women. They should also acknowledge the 
potential costs of involvement in violence prevention itself, given that 
the men and boys who participate may be ridiculed or harassed for 
lack of conformity to hegemonic masculine norms.  
(Flood, 2015, p. 167) 
Theoretical constructions of patriarchy, gender-based violence, and masculinities 
58 
Another concern with regards to men’s pro-feminist and anti-violence 
activism has been raised by intersectional theorists, who call into question any 
claims about women and men as a unitary category (see, for example, Messner, 
Greenberg, & Peretz, 2015; Näre, 2010; Peretz, 2017, 2018b). They would, 
therefore, disagree with notions that all men carry a (similar) ‘backpack’ of 
privilege. Originating from the lives and analyses of women of colour, 
‘intersectionality is the idea that various social categories of differentiation, 
such as race, class, gender, and sexuality are co-constitutive, inseparable 
forces that work to shape human experience’ (Peretz, 2017, p. 529; see also 
Näre, 2013). Despite the demonstrable utility of intersectionality, research on 
men’s engagement in women’s rights movements has largely focused on white, 
heterosexual, middle-class, young men. Thus, intersectionality has failed to 
attend to the structured differences in men’s lives and to promote 
marginalised men’s engagement in gender justice work (Peretz, 2017, 2018b).  
In Peretz’ (2017) view, the most crucial issue in understanding diverse men 
as feminist allies lies in how intersectionality and privilege meet. Thus, he calls 
for research that concentrates on the workings of intersectionality in social 
locations where people are both privileged and oppressed. Through his 
research on American male allies who benefit from gender but are 
marginalised because of their racial, religious, gendered, and sexual identities, 
Peretz (2017) demonstrates how men’s intersecting identities shape men’s 
likelihood of understanding and identifying with women’s experiences of 
sexism and gender-based violence. He found, for instance, that Muslim men’s 
pathways were often dependent upon input from women and were based on 
their parenting and other life experiences. Gay/queer men’s pathways began 
earlier, did not rely on women’s input, did not create a shift in a gendered 
worldview, and lacked a pathway narrative because they connected to gender 
justice through their own intersecting identities and experiences (Peretz, 
2017). Silberschmidt’s (2011) research on East African men who are 
marginalized by uneven global and local income distribution shows that 
lacking income-generating activities and economic capabilities to satisfy the 
needs of their wives and families frustrates men and renders them unlikely to 
promote gender equality. She suggests that to motivate such men to 
participate in the struggle for gender justice, men’s roles-based identities—
what a person does, as opposed to existential identities focused on what a 
person is—must be strengthened (Silberschmidt, 2011, p 104).  
In Section 3.5, I discuss the intersectionality in the lives of my study 
participants, and discuss the socio-economic realities within which 
masculinities are negotiated in Somaliland. I now move from discussing 
violence to theoretical conceptions of men and masculinities. 
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3.4 APPROACHES TO MEN AND MASCULINITIES
In the 1970s, conceptualising masculinity and femininity as ‘sex roles’ 
highlighted the constructed nature of gender, as opposed to seeing gender as 
innate and inevitable (Berggren, 2014; Whitehead, 2002). The male sex role 
consisted of distancing oneself from femininity and from being emotional, 
striving for success through competition, being in control, and acting 
aggressively (David & Brannon, 1976). Critiques, however, considered the 
notion of the ‘sex role’ as insufficient in accounting for men’s power and 
women’s subordination (see, for example, Carrigan, Connell, & Lee, 1985; 
Connell, 1987, 1995; Hearn, 1987, 1992). Such critiques emphasised men’s 
structural position of power and strived to render visible men’s oppressive 
practices across different domains of social life drawing from theories of 
patriarchy and Gramsci’s (1971) theory of hegemony. In what follows, I briefly 
present the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’, and then proceed to discuss 
the poststructural and the materialist critiques. I then conclude by describing 
my own standpoint at the end of this section. 
Carrigan, Connell, and Lee (1985) argued that dominant interpretations of 
being masculine are embedded in and sustained by social institutions, such as 
the state, education, and family. The concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ refers 
to ‘how particular groups of men inhabit positions of power and wealth and 
how they legitimate and reproduce the social relations that generate their 
dominance’ (Carrigan, Connell, & Lee, 1987, p. 179). In other words, 
hegemonic masculinity refers to ‘the configuration of gender practice which 
embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of 
patriarchy’ (Connell, 1995, p. 77). The concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ does 
not only take into account power hierarchies between genders, but also 
between men. At any given time, a particular formation of masculinity is 
culturally exalted and occupies the top of the ‘gender hierarchy’, imposing its 
‘order of play’ on all other forms of masculinity and femininity (Carrigan et al., 
1985). In Masculinities, Connell (1995) describes three non-hegemonic 
categories of masculinity: subordinate (for example, homosexual men), 
complicit (men who gain from hegemony and obtain a patriarchal dividend 
even if they do not represent a hegemonic position themselves), and 
marginalised (men who are disqualified due to their class or race/ethnic 
position).  
Whilst highly influential, the theory of hegemonic masculinity has been 
criticised for, for example, not accounting for the contradictory and 
inconsistent positioning that occurs in talk and interaction (Wetherell & Edley, 
1999); for the contradiction between stressing the openness of hegemonic 
struggles whilst presuming a fundamental unchanging structure of men’s 
power over women (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001); for reductionism in positing an 
intentionality (‘innate desire to dominate and oppress’) behind heterosexual 
men’s but not women’s and gay men’s practices (Whitehead, 2002); for 
leading to the classification of traits rather than focusing on processes (Pascoe, 
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2007); and for allowing little room for researchers to explain how 
masculinities that do not legitimate patriarchy can emerge and become 
normative, celebrated, and legitimate (Christensen & Jensen, 2014).  
Whilst crediting the concept of hegemonic masculinity for achieving what 
patriarchy fails to achieve by offering a nuanced account of the processes and 
relations of femininity and masculinity, and of contested male practices, 
Whitehead (2002, pp. 90, 93–94) summarises many of the critiques stating 
that ‘the fundamental inconsistency in the term hegemonic masculinity is that, 
while it attempts to recognise difference and resistance, its primary 
underpinning is the notion of a fixed (male) structure.’ Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005, pp. 832–833), however, found elements of optimism 
in the theory of hegemonic masculinity, whereby gender relations and 
hegemonic masculinities are historical. That is, they came into existence under 
specific circumstances, and are thus subject to change. In their view, a more 
humane, less oppressive means of being a man might become hegemonic.  
According to Whitehead (2002, p. 84), research on men and masculinities 
that draws upon the Foucauldian poststructuralist understandings of power 
brings back the subject, focusing on ‘the discursive subject as a product of, and 
mitigating factor in, the exercise of power’ and on the ‘regulatory 
consequences of privileged knowledges’. He writes that discourse refers to 
both language and practice, and also ‘signals the means by which the subject 
is enabled and marked as an individual’ (Whitehead, 2002, p. 102). Drawing 
upon Foucault, he argues: 
Discourses are the means by which we come to ‘know ourselves’; 
perform our identity work; exercise power (in contrast to ‘holding 
power’); exercise resistance; pronounce or deny the validity of 
knowledges and ‘truths’; communicate with others and ‘our selves’ 
through the reflexive process; and subjectively engage with the world 
around us.  
(Whitehead, 2002, pp. 103–104) 
In his attempt to connect a discursive model of power to masculinity, 
Whitehead (2002) introduces the concept of the masculine subject. In doing 
so, he sees men as ‘discursively informed masculine beings, a state of gender 
signification enabled, not least, by virtue of gender being the primary 
identification that holds them (and females) on entry into the social web’ 
(Whitehead, 2002, p. 111). In his view, the use of the concept ‘masculine 
subject’ allows one to explore the practices of gendered identity work without 
reducing men to a prediscursive, essential identity. Hence, it enables the 
exploration of masculinities as constantly moving configurations of practices, 
whilst also understanding ‘men’ as a more stable political category. 
Whitehead (2002) suggests that the term masculinism best illustrates the 
gendered manifestation, where masculinity exists as a regulatory practice and 
dominant knowledge form. Brittan (1989, p. 4), who introduced the concept 
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of ‘masculinism’, defined it as the masculine ideology that ‘justifies and 
naturalises male domination, as such it is the ideology of patriarchy’. 
Whitehead, however, calls for understanding masculinism as a dominant 
discourse rather than a dominant ideology. In discussing the dynamism of 
discourses, Whitehead (2002, p. 108, emphasis added), however, refers to a 
‘belief system that exists through discourse’ and which serves as ‘an anchor 
from which the contingent subject holds on to particular reality.’ He also notes 
that to understand masculinities as discursive is not to ignore the material 
actualities of gender inequality and the political dimensions of identity work: 
The individual cannot hold power, but (he) can exercise it through the 
utilisation of dominant discourses of masculinity. In so doing, the 
individual contributes, possibly unknowingly, to political categories of 
gender and to the power regimes that configure them.  
(Whitehead, 2002, pp. 109–110) 
Whitehead argues that herein lies the distinction from juridico-discursive 
models of male power: Foucauldian inspired poststructuralist theorising 
allows the subject in as a subject to discursive power regimes and as an active 
player in the social enactment of gender. ‘For men, the question is not whether 
they take up masculine discourses as practices of self-signification, but rather 
which masculine discourses to engage in’ (Whitehead, 2002, p. 110). 
One influential poststructuralist approach consists of discursive 
psychology, which examines how subject positions are constructed and 
negotiated through discourse (Wetherell & Edley, 2014). As such, discursive 
psychology recognises that people are both products and producers of 
discourse (Billig, 1991), and ‘aims to examine not only how identities are 
produced on and for particular occasions but also how, in the form of 
established repertoires or ways of talking, history or culture both impinge 
upon and are transformed by those performances’ (Wetherell & Edley, 2014, 
p. 355). Regarding masculinities, the discursive psychology approach draws 
upon West and Zimmerman (1987, 2009), and focuses on how masculinities 
are routinely ‘done’ or accomplished, or actively negotiated in relation to other 
forms of identity in specific cultural contexts.  
In Wetherell and Edley’s (1999, 2014) view, the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity does not explain how the forms Connell (1995) identified actually 
prescribe or regulate men’s lives, and the exact content of the prescriptive 
social norms that form hegemonic masculinity. They found it difficult to 
describe their study participants as either ‘complicit’ or ‘resistant’. Thus, 
Wetherell and Edley (1999) suggest that it is more useful to see complicity and 
resistance not in either/or terms, but ‘as labels to describe the effects of 
discursive strategies mobilised in contexts as opposed to labels for types of 
individual men.’ Thus, Connell’s norms are in fact discursive practices, and 
identification represents ‘a matter of the procedures in action through which 
men live/talk/do masculinity and […] these procedures are intensely local 
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(situationally realised) and global (dependent on broader conditions of 
intelligibility)’ (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p. 353).  
Moreoever, Wetherell and Edley (1999) present three contrasting 
procedures, ‘imaginary positions’ men adopt to describe themselves in relation 
to the social position of being a man. In ‘heroic positions’, men strongly align 
themselves with the conventional ideals of the masculine. In ‘ordinary 
positions’, men separate themselves from conventional or ideal notions which 
become reconstructed as social stereotypes, instead emphasising the self as 
normal, moderate, or average. In ‘rebellious positions’, men define themselves 
in terms of their unconventionality, flouting social expectations. Wetherell and 
Edley (1999, p. 350) argue that even the two latter ‘imaginary positions’ trade 
on the hegemonic values of autonomy and independence, celebrating ‘the 
courage, strength, and determination of these men as men to engage in these 
potentially demeaning activities.’  
Berggren (2014) argues that all of the major theoretical perspectives on 
masculinities feature drawbacks regarding subjectivity. He puts forth the 
possibility of ‘[having] it both ways and to avoid the false choice between 
discourse, norms, and power on one hand, and bodies, emotions, and lived 
experience on the other’ (Berggren, 2014, p. 245). In doing so, he aims to bring 
poststructuralist feminist ideas to critical studies on men and masculinities 
putting forth gender as nonessential and performed, feminist 
phenomenological accounts of subjectivity, and the impact of sex and gender 
on experiences and understandings of the world. Berggren claims that a 
cultural attribution of masculinity applies to bodies read as ‘men’. The 
masculinity discourse(s) shape, direct, and orient the bodies encountered as 
‘men’, but they are not the only discourses positioning ‘men’. A conflict can 
emerge, for instance, between the manhood discourse and an egalitarian 
discourse that refuses the positioning offered by the manhood discourse that 
often prescribes hierarchy between men and women. Instead of automatic 
incorporation of masculinity by men, there is a history of experiences of living 
with and acquiring masculinity, Berggren claims.  
Whilst the poststructural critique of the theory of hegemonic masculinity 
focuses on the notion of a fixed (male) structure and the lack of a connection 
to men’s lives, in Hearn’s (1996b, p. 208) view, the anti-materialist 
assumptions from many versions of the concept of masculinity ‘divert 
attention away from material practices, whether in work, sexuality, violence, 
or elsewhere, and away from a materialist or materially based analysis of 
gendered power relations.’ Hearn, thus, argues for a movement from 
‘masculinities’ back to ‘men’, ‘men’s’ practices’, ‘men’s social relations’, and so 
on, which has been criticised for representing a modernist frame of reference 
and a fixed conception of gender (see Section 3.1). According to Hearn (2004, 
2012), however, ‘men’ as a social category is embodied, instead of representing 
a slippery and merely theoretical concept. Thus, ‘men’ stands as a significant 
concept in the consideration of, for example, interpersonal violence against 
women.  
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Hearn (2004) posits that a basic question in the social analysis of men 
focuses on whether men’s domination is understood as primarily related to the 
economic system and the formation of the nation-state, or to the gender 
system (patriarchy). Through the concept of hegemonic masculinity, the latter 
has been pursued, Hearn claims, and acknowledges the concept as identifying 
different forms of domination by men, both over women and over other men. 
However, instead of focusing on (hegemonic) masculinity, Hearn suggests that 
the hegemony of men in relation to women, children, and other men needs to 
be addressed more directly. As Hearn (2004, p. 61) notes, ‘Hegemony is not so 
much, or at least not only, a matter of the social contestation and reproduction 
of particular forms of hegemonic masculinities as the contestation and 
reproduction of the hegemony of men in a particular society or combination of 
globalising societies [see Hearn, 1996a], both as a social category and in men’s 
practices.’ Aligned with the ideas of Puleo (1995), De Miguel (2015), and 
Kaplan et al. (2017) discussed above in Section 3.2, there is room for men’s 
domination with and through force and men’s domination without force (with 
consent) within patriarchies, Hearn (2004) writes: 
Men’s domination with force can be formally organised (for example, 
with corporate violence, military violence) or individualised and 
interpersonal (for example, with men’s violence to known women and 
children in the home). Men’s domination without force can also be 
formally organised (for example, men’s supposedly ‘peaceful’ 
domination of managerial positions) or individualised and 
interpersonal (for example, with men’s social status as fathers, 
husbands).  
(Hearn, 2004, p. 65) 
The place of consent represents the place in which the concept of hegemony 
can be employed: ‘[t]he notion of hegemony provides a way of talking about 
overarching ideologies at the level of everyday, taken-for-granted ideas and 
practice performed “with consent”, “without coercion”’ (Hearn, 2004, p. 53). 
The concept of hegemony can provide further assistance for engagement with 
both material and discursive gender power relations, Hearn (2004) notes. 
Summarising his efforts in developing a materialist–discursive analysis of 
men, Hearn (2014, p. 7, original emphasis) claims that materiality can be 
understood ‘as both reproduction of the social relations of production, and the 
reproduction of society through ideas, ideology and discourse.’ Hearn (2014, 
p. 6) borrows from feminist materialism’s ‘recognition of bodily materialism 
and sexuality as material (what people do rather than what people are or 
think)’. Furthermore, for Hearn, materialism includes (productive) 
labour/work, biological reproduction, housework, violence, sexuality, bodily 
generativity/degeneration, and culture/ideology/discourse. In terms of the 
simultaneity of materialism and discourse in the ‘arena’ of violence central to 
my study, Hearn (2014, p. 9) argues that violence is ‘both a matter of 
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experience of change in bodily matter, and a matter of change in discursive 
constructions.’ Thus, violence is understood as historically, socially, and 
culturally constructed. Therefore, (men’s) talk about violence does not just 
represent norms, but creates reality, Hearn argues. 
Coming to my own standpoint, I do not understand patriarchy or 
masculinity/masculinism as an ideology per se (unlike, for example, Brittan, 
1989). Referring back to Section 3.2, I define a patriarchal gender regime as a 
system of interrelated social structures and practices which manifest and 
institutionalise men’s domination across all areas of social relations. This 
domination is upheld and legitimated by patriarchal interpretations of 
ideologies and belief systems such as religion, cultural traditions, or 
nationalism. Such patriarchal interpretations often emphasise a strict 
separation of sexes and their hierarchical order (see Hirdman, 1990). Hence, 
they shape and orient bodies encountered as ‘men’ or ‘women’ differently. 
However, whilst ideologies serve as ‘an anchor from which the contingent 
subject holds on to particular reality’ (Whitehead, 2002, p. 108), they are also 
continuously negotiated and alternative interpretations occur. 
Masculinities, in this study, are understood as plural and multiple. That is, 
‘they differ over space, time, and context, are rooted only in the cultural and 
social moment, and are, thus, inevitably entwined with other powerful and 
influential variables such as sexuality, class, age and ethnicity’ (Whitehead, 
2002, p. 34). Masculinities are understood as both norms/ideals and 
practices—they are ‘both illusion and reality’ (Whitehead, 2002, p. 42). When 
specifically pointing to the masculine norms, I use the terms prevailing 
masculinities or idealised manhood. Regarding masculinities as practice, I 
follow Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2001), whose approach to discourse analysis I 
employ (see Chapter 4). He posits that social practice and linguistic practice 
inform one another, but are not identical. Hence, masculinities herein are not 
understood as merely discursive practice. Instead, masculinities32 are 
understood as configurations of materialist and discursive practices used to 
enact and (re)negotiate the norms and ideals that orient bodies encountered 
as ‘men’. Drawing upon Hearn (2014), materialist practices are understood as 
(productive) labour/work, biological reproduction, housework, violence, 
sexuality, and bodily generativity/degeneration. The discursive practices, in 
turn, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
Accordingly, hegemonic masculinities (in the plural; several hegemonic 
masculinities with different informing ideologies and/or with different 
derived practices can exist simultaneously) are here understood as 
configurations of materialist and discursive practices, which draw from, 
legitimate, and reproduce the patriarchal interpretations of prevailing 
ideologies. It is worth noting here that the dominant masculinities are not 
32Respectively, femininities are understood as configurations of materialist and discursive practices 
used to enact and (re)negotiate the norms and ideals that orient bodies encountered as ‘women’. 
Furthermore, prevailing femininities or idealised womanhood is used to specifically point to such 
gendered norms. 
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necessarily hegemonic, as shown by, for example, Christensen and Jensen 
(2014) and Groes-Green (2011).  
Whilst drawing from scholars who have been subjected to the 
poststructuralist critique, my definitions above honour the notion of 
masculinities in the plural and allow the subject in as a subject to materialist–
discursive power regimes. The interpretations of ideologies and belief systems 
are not just ‘befalling’ upon actors, but are continuously negotiated—
reproduced and challenged—through materialist and discursive practices. In 
the next section, I discuss the prevailing masculinities in Somaliland given my 
theoretical framework presented above. 
3.5 PREVAILING MASCULINITIES IN SOMALILAND
The shape of Somali culture is affected by the interaction between nomadic 
pastoral traditions and norms with Islamic teaching (APD, 2002). In what 
follows, therefore, I focus on studies regarding Muslim masculinities and 
notions of Somali gender norms. Since the local patterns of masculinity are 
shaped by globalisation, imperialism, colonialism, and international 
migration (Connell, 2005b), I conclude this section by briefly discussing the 
socio-economic realities within which masculinities are negotiated in 
Somaliland. 
Ouzgane (2006, p. 1) argues that whilst numerous masculinities studies are 
emerging in the West, scholarly attention to gender issues in, for instance, the 
Middle East and North Africa continue to focus almost exclusively on 
understanding women—specifically related to Muslim women’s oppression, 
the question of the hijab, and FGM/C receiving most of the scrutiny. Ouzgane 
maintains that only a few studies render Muslim men visible as gendered 
subjects or show that masculinities are embedded in a history and form a part 
of gender relations in Muslim cultures. Gerami (2005) claims that the 
recognition of masculinity studies in the South are hampered by the marginal 
attention given to colonised masculinities as opposed to Western hegemonic 
masculinity (or the ethnic masculinities in Western societies). In her view, this 
is less a failure of Western gender studies than of the cultural context of the 
gender debate in the South. Furthermore, Gerami (2005, p. 450) forecasted 
that, in the Islamic societies grabbling with the ‘crosscurrents of globalisation, 
cultural liberalisation, Islamic fundamentalism, and democracy’, the gender 
discourse will revolve around women’s rights and roles for the foreseeable 
future. Thus, she posits, the gender discourse in the West should consider 
colonised masculinities, in the hope that organic studies will emerge at some 
point.  
According to DeSondy (2013, p. 3), ‘discussions on Muslim men are limited 
to the essentialised form of masculinity related to Islamic patriarchal society’, 
similar to understanding Muslim women as a single figure stereotypically 
related to Islamic oppression. He claims that many Muslim men cannot 
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identify themselves in the most codified image of Muslim manhood coalescing 
since the time of the Prophet Mohammed. Aligned with my own 
understanding of the role of different ideologies and belief systems in shaping, 
directing, and orienting bodies encountered as ‘men’, DeSondy argues that the 
Qur’an is only one source informing the construction of Muslim masculinities, 
which are also informed by other expressions fostered in various local and 
cultural contexts. Ouzgane (2006, p. 2) posits that masculinities in Islamic 
contexts ‘emerge as a set of distinctive practices defined by men’s positionings 
within a variety of religious and social structures.’  
Arat and Hasan (2017, p. 11) claim that ‘[t]here seems to be a disconnect 
between the characteristics of a “good man” prescribed in the Qur’an and those 
of the “real man” that are displayed or aspired to by many.’ Drawing on these 
notions, I shed light on the construction of masculinities in Somaliland by first 
introducing Arat and Hasan’s findings. They argue that the texts in the Qur’an 
promote multiple masculinities because the Qur’an ultimately aimed to 
establish and spread monotheism, and beyond that, the message becomes 
conditional and complex: ‘“[m]asculinity” in the Qur’an, therefore, is 
embedded within and constructed in relation to a series of institutions, 
resulting in fluid and multidimensional masculinities’ (Arat & Hasan, 2017, p. 
11).  
Arat and Hasan (2017) outline five overlapping yet contradictory salient 
character traits that may be taken as prescriptions of masculinities. 
Submissiveness, taken as the opposite of domination and defiance, is the most 
exalted trait of the believer, since Islam means surrendering or submitting to 
God (see, also, DeSondy, 2013, p. 5). Defiance is, however, valued at times: the 
Qur’an, for instance, approves prophets’ acts of defiance against communities 
in favour of monotheism. The most frequent expression in the Qur’an of the 
second trait, altruism, is the duty of a charitable act. One of the five pillars 
(basic acts) of Islam, zakat, requires all adult Muslims to annually give about 
2.5% of their wealth to those in need. Altruism also involves compassion 
towards the vulnerable or those deserving protection.  
The third trait identified by Arat and Hasan (2017), righteousness, is 
defined as morally correct behaviour and thinking, transecting all other 
desirable character traits and offering the most uniform characterisation of 
ideal masculine traits regardless of context or individual identity. The 
righteous husband tends to his wife’s needs with care and commitment, and 
the righteous parents guide their children towards good and virtuous lives 
preventing them from committing sin. Samuel (2011) notes that whilst the 
Qur’an aims to protect women and assert their rights, it explicitly outlines 
men’s authority over women. Commitment to the faith characterises the 
principle expression of the fourth trait identified by Arat and Hasan (2017), 
steadfastness, which also prescribes a man’s devotion to his wife and 
refraining from adulterous relationships and sinful desires. Some verses 
encourage believers to fight, although combat, the fifth trait, only legitimises 
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fighting when defending the faith against those ‘who disbelieve in the signs of 
Allah’ (Arat & Hasan, 2017).  
Arat and Hasan (2017, p. 11) conclude that the diverse and contradictory 
prescriptions of Muslim masculinities converge in a resounding message: 
‘men should use their judgement and act according to the situations. Each 
situation merits a unique combination of masculine ideals. These ideals do not 
establish hierarchal masculinities with one serving as the hegemonic one.’ Like 
many studies drawing upon the concept ‘hegemonic masculinity’, Arat and 
Hasan’s (2017) study can be criticised for providing only a classification of 
traits (see Pascoe, 2007). In addition, as they note themselves, Qur’anic 
prescriptions may not always depend on the believer’s gender. Hence, the 
question remains to what extent the salient character traits identified by Arat 
and Hasan specifically address men. The following quote, for example, implies 
that similar ideals apply to both men and women: 
For Muslim men and women and for believing men and women, for 
devout men and women, for true men and women, for men and women 
who are patient and constant, for men and women who humble 
themselves, for men and women who give in charity, for men and 
women who fast (and deny themselves), for men and women who 
guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage much in 
Allah's remembrance for them has Allah prepared Forgiveness and 
great reward.  
(Qur’an 33:35, referred to and translated in APD, 2002, p. 11) 
However, I adopt Arat and Hasan’s (2017) notion that Qur’an promotes 
multiple Muslim masculinities. I also follow their notion that the application 
of the Qur’anic message is challenged by alternative discourses, material 
conditions, and structural factors guiding Muslim boys and men, as well as the 
women who raise them. Accordingly, I now turn to notions of Somali gender 
norms and ideals, which provide a set of alternative discourses orienting 
bodies encountered as ‘men’ in Somaliland. 
Helander (1987, p. 6) wrote that Somali men are considered strong and 
hard, and as such bring all the ‘hard parts’ of the body to the baby, whereas 
women are considered soft and bring all of the ‘soft parts’. Accordingly, he 
argues, relations between the male members of a lineage are thought to be 
hard and matrilateral relations are thought to be soft. Kleist (2010) points out 
that the complementary gender ideals are not uniform, but hailed by some and 
contested by others in Somaliland. The introduction of Islam, colonisation, 
independence, and civil war all resulted in changes to gender relations, and 
‘there is and was not one singular way of “doing” Somali masculinity or 
femininity’, Kleist (p. 190) argues.  
In their analysis of Somali men’s masculinities and gender relations, El-
Bushra and Gardner (2016) note that the core ideals of ‘Somali manhood’—
responsibility, self-discipline, courage, humanity, and generosity—are widely 
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held amongst both older and younger generations, as well as by men and by 
women, educated and illiterate, urban and rural, across all regions and 
subcultures. These ideals are (partly) reflected in the concept of ‘raganimo’, 
the local notion of a ‘real man’. According to Hansen (2008), the ‘real man’ is 
characterised as being tough and brave, but also helpful and generous as well 
as oratorically skilled, capable of speaking eloquently and loudly. Echoing the 
tenets of the precarious manhood thesis, which implies that attaining and 
maintaining manhood requires a man to repeatedly prove himself (Vandello & 
Bosson, 2013), El-Bushra and Gardner (2016) refer to a Somali proverb which 
states that ‘raganimo is like your footprints which are wiped out by the rain.’  
El-Bushra and Gardner (2016) highlight that young Somali men should be 
useful and reliable, contribute to society through their labour, and accept the 
authority of older men. Transitioning to adulthood is marked by marriage and 
fatherhood. A Somali man’s reputation, status, and power depend upon how 
well others judge that he fulfils his familial and clan obligations, being 
‘ordained by God as responsible for the family, its leader, manager, and 
shield’—that is, the protection between the family and the outside world (El-
Bushra & Gardner, 2016, p. 448). A boy is expected to learn his role from his 
father so that he can replace him, thereby ensuring the security and well-being 
of his mother and younger siblings, as well as the wider clan. In addition, the 
ideal husband nurtures a harmonious relationship with his wife, being 
‘emotionally sensitive to his wife’s needs, caring, kind, and responsible’ (El-
Bushra & Gardner, 2016, pp. 448–449). His fathering skills depend upon his 
capacity to educate his children on religion, ethics, and culture, and he should 
gain the loyalty of his children through kindness.  
In Table 2, I summarise Arat and Hasan’s (2017) findings on the salient 
character traits conveyed in the Qur’an and the core ideals of ‘Somali 
manhood’ as described by El-Bushra and Gardner (2016) and Hansen (2008). 
I suggest that these idealised masculinities are largely compatible. 
Table 2. Prevailing masculinities in Somaliland.
Salient character traits in the 
Qur’an (Arat & Hasan, 2018)
Core ideals of Somali manhood
(El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016; Hansen, 2008)
Righteousness Responsibility 
Steadfastness Self-discipline
Altruism Humanity, generosity, helpfulness
Combativeness Courage, toughness, bravery
Submissiveness to God Submissiveness to (male) elders 
 
Examining the nexus of FGM/C and idealised masculinities in Somaliland, I 
argue that men’s support for the perpetuation of FGM/C can be viewed as an 
enactment of religiously and/or culturally idealised masculinities. In 
Somaliland, as discussed in Section 2.3, FGM/C is often framed as a ‘religious 
tradition’. In particular, this applies to sunnah cutting, which is widely 
understood as mandated by Islam. Accordingly, supporting sunnah cutting 
aligns with the submissiveness norm—surrendering or submitting to God—
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and the righteousness norm—morally correct behaviour and thinking (see 
Arat and Hasan, 2017). Furthermore, those supporting FGM/C—including 
pharaonic cutting—assume that it serves as an effective means of safeguarding 
girls against premarital sex, rape, stigma, and ostracism. Given that Somali 
men’s fathering skills are judged based on their capacity to educate their 
children on religion and ethics, and on their capacity to guarantee the safety 
of their family, I argue that men’s support for FGM/C aligns with the 
masculine responsibility norm (see El-Bushra and Gardner, 2016). 
In terms of the gender order, I suggest that both Islam and Somali culture 
provide patriarchal interpretations that emphasise men’s superiority. The 
idealised ‘Somali manhood’ (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016), for instance, reflects 
Young’s (2003) concept of masculinist protection—the heavy responsibility of 
the masculinist leader as the head of the family and society. According to 
Young, the masculinist leader must protect others and take risks. He is not evil 
and does not subordinate women for his own pleasure. Instead, the well-
intentioned patriarch sacrifices himself to protect weaker individuals (such as 
women and children) from ‘other’ men, often represented as selfish, 
aggressive, and malicious (Young, 2003). The ‘price’ women pay for this 
‘protection’ the idealised form of masculinity offers them is their minor legal 
status, dependency upon men, a limited agency, and no publicly visible 
participation in decision-making outside the home (El-Bushra & Gardner, 
2016).  
The core ideals of ‘Somali manhood’, however, remain largely unachievable 
in the current economic and political climate characterising southern Somalia, 
Puntland, and Somaliland (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016). The collapse of the 
state and, hence, employment have wiped out individuals’ status, as well as the 
self-respect, security, and income of many men. This collapse, El-Bushra and 
Gardner argue, has been experienced as an existential catastrophe for many 
men, who view themselves as dispensable with no meaningful role and no 
stake in the future. Numerous fathers and husbands are absent or present but 
idle, depend on their wives and children, contribute little or nothing to the 
household income, and neglect their children (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016). 
Luedke (2018, p. 20) described how ‘efforts to preserve the remaining 
elements of some idealized past version of Somali masculinity’ leads many 
men to chew khat (a mild amphetamine) and sit idly rather than maintain their 
family by taking advantage of economic opportunities in the informal sector. 
She argues that because of the fear of stigma men ‘continue to see themselves 
as part and parcel of a divine and “all-encompassing responsibility” but are 
reluctant to compromise when it comes to taking jobs that exist at the margins 
of society’ (Luedke, 2018, p. 20). 
El-Bushra and Gardner (2016) argue that such tensions contribute to stress 
and vulnerabilities within families. The capacity of many fathers to serve as 
the gatekeeper to their son’s relationship with the clan, to serve as the role 
model and as the source of cultural knowledge has been affected. The 
impossibility of men to fulfil their responsibilities may open up spaces for a 
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renegotiation in gender relations, roles, and expectations. El-Bushra and 
Gardner see signs of these renegotiations, although limited merely to the 
younger age groups. Considering that many elderly men do not want their sons 
to marry an uncut woman, because they think that FGM/C is a religious 
obligation and/or part of the Somali culture (NAFIS, 2014), the weakening 
influence of fathers as a source of cultural knowledge may contribute to the 
eradication of the practice if more young men ignore the pressure to marry cut 
women and to expose their daughters to FGM/C.  
Yet, as I discussed in Section 3.3 in relation to men’s anti-violence activism 
and intersectionality, lacking income-generating opportunities and the 
economic capabilities necessary to satisfy the needs of their families—and, 
hence, to enact the idealised manhood—often frustrates men and renders 
them unlikely to promote gender equality (Silberschmidt, 2011). In 
Somaliland, the youth unemployment rate reaches 84% (Luedke, 2018). 
Young men are not only marginalised by uneven global and local income 
distribution, but also because of their age. One of the core ideals of Somali 
masculinity implies submissiveness to older men, whose authority young men 
are expected to accept. Attitudes towards youth—that they are immature and 
volatile, and that they lack leadership skills and knowledge—represent major 
barriers to youth involvement in, for instance, decision-making (SONYO, 
2016, p. 8). 
In the next chapter, I present my methodology, including poststructuralist 
discourse analysis, which I employ to explore the interpretations of Islam and 
Somali culture/tradition, which my study participants (re)produce. 
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4. RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA
In this chapter, I describe the methods I applied to my data collection and 
analysis. I first present the discourse analytical approach in general, and 
Fairclough’s (1992, 1995, 2001) critical discourse analytical approach in 
particular. I then proceed to document each step from gaining access to the 
field, identifying study participants, conducting interviews, transcribing the 
interview responses, organising and analysing the data, through to identifying 
the discourses.  
Similar to the feminist approach, the critical studies on men and 
masculinities (CSMM) framework my study draws upon emphasises self-
reflection and power relations, recognises the localisation of both the topic and 
the researcher, and serves to enhance women’s and men’s emancipation and 
gender equality (Jokinen, 2010). Thus, I conclude this chapter by discussing 
my position as well as that of the research participants, and the context in 
which the discourses were produced and interpreted. I also discuss the risks 
my research poses to the research participants and the Somali community in 
general. 
4.1 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Discourse analysis does not necessitate employing separate techniques to 
employ, but rather is based upon a profound theoretical premise of social 
reality constructed through language, which, in turn is a product of the social 
reality (see Potter & Wetherell, 1998). As I wrote in Chapter 3, drawing on 
Walby (1990), poststructuralist discourse analysis provides a tool to overcome 
essentialism and ahistoricism when scrutinising systems, in my case a 
patriarchal gender regime. Borrowing from Derrida (1976), a 
deconstructionist emphasis to patriarchal gender regimes aims to break down 
a unified notion of ‘women’, and explores how the category of women is 
constructed. The discourse tradition, based on the work of Foucault (1981, 
1987), examines the implications of such dialogues on gender inequality, and 
analyses how patriarchal discourses are created and maintained. Thus, Walby 
(1990, pp. 100, 104) claims, the discourse tradition shares similarities with 
radical feminist theorists and the dominant ideology thesis that views the 
ideological constructs of patriarchy as critical to women’s subordination. She 
refers, for instance, to Daly (1978), who claims that patriarchal beliefs and 
practices stand at the core of all world religions, including the contemporary 
Western equivalent of medical science. They all include ‘practices of sado-
rituals against women which are authoritatively justified within that system of 
thought as good for the woman, so that she might marry, be healthy or pure’ 
(Walby, 1990, p. 101, referring to Daly, 1978).  
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Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an approach to the study of discourse, 
which highlights issues of power asymmetries, manipulation, exploitation, 
and structural inequities in different domains (Blommaert & Bucean, 2000). 
Scholars who exemplify the CDA approach (for example, Fairclough, 1992, 
1995, 2001; Gee, 1999; van Dijk, 1993; Wodak & Meyer, 2001) view language 
as a form of social practice and posit that (non-linguistic) social practices and 
linguistic practices constitute one another. Thus, CDA approaches social 
inequality by focusing on the role of discourse in the (re)production of and 
challenges to dominance (van Dijk, 1993). Language connects with the social 
context as the primary domain of ideology, and as a site of and a stake in 
struggles for power (Fairclough, 1995). Accordingly, social changes do not 
simply involve language, but are significantly constituted by changes in 
language practices (Fairclough, 1992).  
My methodological framework is inspired by Fairclough’s (1992, 1995, 
2001) CDA approach, which emphasises the interrelation between discourse 
and social change. Fairclough (1992, p. 36) builds upon whilst simultaneously 
criticising linguistically oriented discourse analysis and the social theory 
approach to discourse analysis. In his view, these approaches do not deal 
satisfactorily with how discourse contributes to the reproduction and the 
transformation of societies. For Fairclough (1992, p. 3), ‘discourses do not just 
reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or “constitute” 
them; different discourses constitute key entities in different ways, and 
position people in different ways as social subjects’. He distinguishes between 
three constructive effects of discourse, in light of which I explore the 
discourses I identify in my data. First, discourse contributes to ‘social 
identities’ and ‘subject positions’ (‘identity’ function); second, it constructs 
social relationships between people (‘relational’ function); and, third, it 
contributes to the construction of systems of knowledge and belief (‘ideational’ 
function) (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64).  
Fairclough’s (1992, p. 3) focus lies on the social effects of discourse, as well 
as on historical change, that is, ‘how different discourses combine under 
particular social conditions to produce a new, complex discourse’. This focus 
makes his approach well-suited for my study, which explores the discursive 
practices of young, urban, educated men who occupy the intersection of 
different ideologies, knowledge, and belief systems (such as religion, tradition, 
and science). For Fairclough, discourse represents a mode of action and a 
mode of representation, with a dialectical relationship between discourse and 
social structure: 
Discourse contributes to the constitution of all those dimensions of 
social structure which directly or indirectly shape and constrain it: its 
own norms and conventions, as well as the relations, identities, and 
institutions which lie behind them. 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 64) 
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Fairclough (1992) developed a three-dimensional framework for studying 
discourse, aiming to map the micro-, meso-, and macro-level analysis onto one 
another. First, Fairclough (1992, p. 75) sees any discursive ‘event’ as a piece of 
text, a written or spoken ‘product’ of text production. This text dimension 
attends to a close linguistic analysis of text, which pays attention to vocabulary, 
grammar, cohesion, and text structure. Since those interviewed in this study 
did not use their native language during the interviews (and some required 
translation assistance), a fine-grained analysis of these elements does not lie 
at the centre of my analysis. Second, Fairclough (1992, p. 75) sees any 
discursive ‘event’ as an instance of discursive practice. This dimension 
specifies the nature of the processes of text production, distribution, and 
consumption, and directs attention towards the force of utterance (for 
example, promises, requests, threats, etc.), the coherence of texts, and the 
intertextuality of texts. The ‘core’ of this discursive practice dimension lies in 
exploring how text production and interpretation is constrained by members’ 
resources (internalised social structures, norms, and conventions), and by the 
specific nature of the social practice of which they are a part (Fairclough, 1992, 
p. 80). The latter constraint determines from which elements members’ 
resources are drawn and how. In Section 4.4 below, I discuss the specific 
nature of the social practice in which the discourses I identified were 
produced. The discursive practice dimension is relevant for the analysis I 
present in Chapters 5 and 6.  
In my analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, I focus on the internalised social 
structures, norms, and conventions that constrain the actors (discursive 
practice dimension), as well as on Fairclough’s (1992, pp. 3–4) third 
dimension, the social practice dimension, implying that any discursive ‘event’ 
represents an instance of social practice. This dimension attends to the 
institutional and organisational circumstances of the discursive event, and to 
the constructive/constitutive effects of discourse. Fairclough focuses on the 
concepts of ideology and hegemony, suggesting that all types of discourse are 
to varying extent open to ideological investment. He thereby takes a dialectical 
position: ‘subjects are ideologically positioned, but they are also capable of 
acting creatively to make their own connections between the diverse practices 
and ideologies to which they are exposed’ (Fairclough, 1992, p. 91). I find this 
dialectical position quite plausible, since it opens up to social change, whilst 
recognising the ideological constructs as critical to social inequality. 
Furthermore, Fairclough’s emphasis on the constraints of the discursive 
‘event’ is relevant for my study, given the complicated positions of myself and 
the study participants, discussed in greater detail in Section 4.4. In keeping 
with Fairclough (1992, pp. 3–4), I use the term ‘discourse’ (without an article) 
to refer to language use in the above-mentioned three-dimensional way, and 
‘a discourse’ (with an article) for a particular class of discourse types or 
conventions.  
My analysis is also inspired by Lazar’s (2007) feminist perspective on CDA, 
which maintains that many social practices, far from being neutral, are 
Research methods and data 
74 
gendered, as well as embedded and hidden in everyday routines and 
interactions. According to Lazar (p. 150), the interest in feminist CDA lies in 
‘how gender ideology and gendered relations of power get (re)produced, 
negotiated, and contested in representations of social practices, in social 
relationships between people, and in people’s social and personal identities in 
texts and talk.’ As such, feminist CDA highlights the complex and subtle ways 
in which taken-for-granted gendered assumptions and hegemonic power 
relations are discursively produced and sustained as commonsensical and 
natural, as well as challenged, Lazar (p. 147) writes. 
4.2 ACCESS TO THE FIELD AND THE RECRUITMENT 
OF PARTICIPANTS
In 2014, I opened discussion with an international non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) that supported various local civil society organisations 
(CSOs) in Somaliland in, for instance, their efforts to prevent FGM/C. Initially, 
I also aimed to interview members of the Somali diaspora in Finland. In 2015, 
I thus had two consultative interviews with experts from a Finnish NGO that 
works towards preventing FGM/C amongst people living in Finland 
originating from regions where girls are traditionally cut. The purpose of those 
consultative interviews was to gather information regarding Somali men’s 
anti-FGM/C activism in Finland, and to understand how to gain access to the 
field in Finland. In May 2015 and May 2016, I contacted 13 organisations who 
work with Somalis in Finland. Only a few replied, most of which informed me 
that they do not address FGM/C. A common viewpoint these organisations 
held was that members of the Somali diaspora have been overwhelmed by the 
numerous studies conducted amongst and on them in recent years. I was also 
told that without existing connections to the Somali community in Finland, I 
would not be easily trusted on a sensitive issue like FGM/C. In spring 2016, I 
tried to recruit a research assistant from amongst the Finnish Somali 
community in order to carry out interviews. But that was unsuccessful, and I 
had to abandon the idea of interviewing Somalis in Finland. 
Simultaneously, arrangements with the international NGO operating in 
Somaliland moved forward. A fieldwork visit to Somalia was organised to take 
place in September through October 2016. In Somaliland, community support 
for research must be obtained by sharing the overall objectives with 
community leaders. The local CSO informed the Ministry of Social and Labour 
Affairs of my research in August 2016. At the Ministry’s request, I submitted a 
letter of request (see Appendix 1) together with a letter of invitation from the 
international NGO (Appendix 2) and a detailed work plan (Appendix 3). In 
August 2016, I drafted a memorandum of understanding with the 
international NGO, defining our respective mutual roles and responsibilities 
(Appendix 4). The international NGO then helped to arrange a visa so that I 
could enter Somaliland.  
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My personal safety in the field was taken into consideration during 
preparations, and I regularly followed travel bulletins issued by the Finnish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Whilst Somaliland remained relatively 
stable despite continual violence affecting southern Somalia, MFA did not 
recommend that Finnish citizens travel to Somalia (including Somaliland) in 
2015 and 2016 when I was preparing my fieldwork. In spring 2016, a few 
months before travelling to Somaliland, the MFA bulletin was updated stating 
that ‘all travel to Somalia (including Somaliland) should be avoided’. I 
consulted MFA and representatives of international NGOs working in 
Somaliland about the situation. Their recommendation was that I could follow 
my travel plan if I strictly adhered to safety protocols and stayed in the capital 
city of Hargeisa. A mere three days before my scheduled departure, the 
University of Helsinki sent me a letter, where I was advised against travelling 
to Hargeisa, referring to the MFA bulletin. At that time, however, I did not 
consider cancelling my fieldwork trip. Thankfully, during the weeks I was in 
Hargeisa, I experienced no security-related issues. In keeping with the MFA 
guidelines, I submitted a notification of travel to MFA for use in case of an 
emergency. I secured special travel insurance and booked accommodation in 
a hotel known for its security arrangements. Once in Hargeisa, I only left the 
hotel area with a driver and trusted local companion. Furthermore, I followed 
the local dress code (covering my hair with a scarf and wearing a long dress) 
so as not to draw attention.  
In order to identify potential key informants, schedule interviews, enhance 
interviewee confidence, and secure assistance with translations, I required 
local research assistance. A colleague at the University of Helsinki who had 
conducted research in Somaliland connected me to an assistant and a driver 
with whom she had cooperated. They were willing to assist me, and I hired 
them in spring 2016. The research assistant was a 29-year-old man, who had 
studied pharmacy in Sudan. He completed his secondary education partially 
in English and was, thus, fluent in English. We maintained contact via email 
and social media, and sorted all of the practicalities well before my trip. 
However, four days before my departure to Somaliland, the research assistant 
informed me that his employer was sending him to a duty station remote from 
Hargeisa. He, thus, quickly recruited his colleague to assist me during the 
interviews. This new research assistant had a Bachelor’s degree in Economics 
from the University of Hargeisa, and he, too, was fluent in English. 
The student interviewees volunteered in an anti-FGM/C project supported 
by the international NGO, and implemented by the local CSO. That project, 
which began in 2015 and was completed by the end of 2017, aimed at raising 
awareness of the negative health and social consequences of FGM/C. The 
project activities included establishing groups of parents, youth, and religious 
leaders in rural villages, and mobilising journalists and university students to 
advocate against FGM/C. Student participants were nominated by the 
respective university management in accordance with the criteria set by the 
local CSO. Those criteria consisted of interest in the subject matter; 
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preliminary awareness of the negative health consequences of FGM/C; 
willingness to volunteer for anti-FGM/C campaigns; capability to influence 
through social/print/broadcast/digital media, blogs, newsletters, and any 
other means; capability to confidently debate and talk about FGM/C in public; 
and knowledge of Qur’anic verses and the Hadiths (testimonies about the 
sayings and doings of the Prophet Mohammed) regarding FGM/C. Senior 
students were given priority, and selection aimed at a balance between both 
men and women from different faculties.  
Between January and September 2016, a total of 30 students (15 men and 
15 women from different faculties) participated in training sessions covering 
the history, health and social effects of FGM/C, as well as human rights 
perspectives. Following the training, students were expected to write and 
share Facebook updates, raise awareness amongst their family members and 
in their neighbourhoods, and participate in anti-FGM/C activities in project 
villages. In September 2016, the research assistant contacted 20 of these 
students via phone and invited them to a meeting on the premises of the local 
CSO, during which he introduced my research project. All of the invited 
students agreed to an interview, and the research assistant scheduled 
interviews with 15 men and 5 women. Interviewees received a reminder of the 
interview a day before it was scheduled. All except for two women arrived as 
agreed. The two women had confirmed the same morning that they were 
coming, but could not be reached via phone at the time of the agreed upon 
interview, nor at a later time during my fieldwork visit. One extra interview 
was arranged, such that a total of four interviews with women were completed.  
Based on the data in the background information forms interviewees 
completed (Appendix 5), the average age of participants was 23 years old 
(range, 21 to 27 years). None of the interviewees was married or had children. 
Nine were born in Hargeisa, seven in other urban areas, and three in rural 
areas. Only one participant had lived abroad for a brief period of time during 
childhood. In total, 13 participants reported that some of their female family 
members were cut, three that all of their female family members were cut, and 
two that none of their female family members were cut. One participant did 
not know or chose not to answer. Table 3 summarises the socio-economic 
background of the student interviewees. 
Table 3. Socio-economic background of student interviewees.
Year of 
birth
Place of birth Have family members 
undergone FGM/C?
urban rural all some none N/A
Men (15) 1989–1995 12 3 3 10 1 1
Women (4) 1991–1995 4 0 0 3 1 0
 
We should note that at the time of the interviews the students had just finished 
their training. Since only a few had prior experience on advocating against 
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FGM/C, their accounts mostly addressed expectations rather than experiences 
of preventing FGM/C. 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Before travelling to Somaliland, I familiarised myself with the context by 
reading as much as possible about Somaliland, and by following a few English-
language social media accounts that provided updated news on Somaliland. In 
addition, I scheduled a Skype conversation with an employee of the 
international NGO stationed in Somaliland. I also had two meetings with a 
researcher from the University of Helsinki with extensive experience in 
Somaliland.  
During my first two days in Hargeisa, I met with the research assistants 
(the original assistant and his replacement) and with an employee of the 
international NGO to discuss schedules, interview strategies, and other 
practicalities. On the third working day, I conducted pre-planned interviews 
with employees from two local CSOs engaging men in anti-FGM/C activities. 
These background interviews were intended to elicit updated information on 
FGM/C and efforts to prevent it in Somaliland. During one of the interviews 
with the CSOs, I met an employee from a third CSO involved in FGM/C 
prevention, and spontaneously agreed to interview them as well. I was also 
invited to attend an FGM/C coordination meeting organised by the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs. During that meeting, I agreed to interview 
employees from two more local CSOs.  
The five interviews with CSO employees relied on a semi-structured 
interview guide (Appendix 6), which included open-ended questions designed 
to elicit information about the prevention efforts they use, the challenges they 
face, the role of gender in recruiting participants, the experiences of engaging 
boys and men, and the relationship between FGM/C and gender equality 
and/or women’s rights. I conducted these interviews at their respective offices 
in English without translation assistance. During two of the interviews, two 
employees were interviewed simultaneously, whilst during three interviews, 
one employee was interviewed. In total, I interviewed four men and three 
women from five local CSOs. The interviews lasted on average for one hour, 
ranging from 35 to 90 minutes. I voice-recorded all interviews and took 
additional notes during the interviews. I also asked for reports, booklets, and 
materials in order to gain a better understanding of how FGM/C is currently 
perceived in Somaliland.  
Interviews with students were carried out at the hotel where I was staying, 
in small garden huts that served as meeting rooms. Since the students were 
busy with their courses during the day, the interviews were conducted between 
4 p.m. and 8 p.m. (two each evening). I paid for the interviewees’ ride to the 
hotel. The first student to arrive and the last to leave were often accompanied 
by the research assistant, who shared a ride with those interviewed. The 
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assistant reported that, in the car, some interviewees called one another, and 
discussed the topics and questions raised during the interview, potentially 
diminishing the spontaneity of responses and possibly reducing any 
hesitations during the interviews. Privacy and soundproofing during the 
interviews proved adequate, and the interviews mostly continued without 
interruptions except when servers occasionally brought in refreshments that I 
offered to the interviewees. We stopped the interview for approximately 20 to 
30 minutes on a few occasions when the interviewee and the research assistant 
participated in evening prayers on the hotel premises.  
At the beginning of the interviews, I introduced myself and my assistant. I 
read aloud the English consent letter (Appendix 7) and my assistant read aloud 
the Somali consent letter (Appendix 8) for those who needed translation. I 
then asked for oral consent, because I was advised by the local CSO that, in the 
Somaliland context, asking for written consent often limits the willingness of 
the participants to share information. Subsequently, however, I think it would 
have been more systematic to ask for written consent. In reading the consent 
letter, I emphasised that participation in the interview was voluntary and that 
the interviewee had the right to withdraw from the interview at any time or to 
skip any questions. I shared my contact information and asked for permission 
to contact the interviewee in case I needed to check on anything later. I then 
clarified the focus of the research as well as the terminology used during the 
interview. I emphasised that by ‘FGC’ or ‘FGM’ I referred to both pharaonic 
and sunnah cutting; and by ‘uncut’ to women who had not undergone any type 
of cutting. Yet, respondents often used the term ‘FGM’ to refer to pharaonic 
cutting only. Accordingly, some informants used ‘uncut’ or ‘untouched’ to refer 
to women who underwent sunnah cutting. In many cases, I could not clarify 
which type of cutting respondents referred to unless this was individually 
specified.  
Because I did not expect to gather exceptionally rich accounts given the 
sensitivity of the topic, I used a semi-structured interview scheme (Appendix 
9) with the students, containing open-ended questions. Before the interviews, 
I discussed the order and wording of the questions with the international NGO 
employee and with my research assistants. I made minor adjustments to the 
wording and the order of the questions several times during the data 
collection, removed and added some questions. Since I was interviewing 
people who volunteered to publicly speak against FGM/C, I included quite 
straightforward and direct questions about their attitudes and priorities. I 
began the interview with a ‘warm-up’ topic (practical questions about their 
anti-FGM/C training) and proceeded to topics that specifically addressed 
FGM/C practices, FGM/C prevention strategies, gendered roles and ideals, 
and gender equality. I did not follow the scheme in a strictly disciplined 
manner. The order of topics remained the same, although the order of specific 
questions depended on the flow of the discussion.  
In general, respondents engaged in the interview discussion and provided 
nuanced accounts, often giving rise to improvised additional questions. Some 
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students provided quite short and concise replies, and then through specific 
probing questions I enticed them to expand upon their accounts. Only a few 
students had a tight schedule, such that I could not raise so many additional 
questions. The richness of the accounts clearly correlated with their English-
language skills. I encouraged interviewees to rely upon the research assistant 
for translation assistance if they did not fully understand the question or could 
not fully express themselves in English. In my view, translation would have 
been useful during several interviews, but most of the interviewees did not ask 
for assistance. Even if the interviewee did not ask for translation him/herself, 
I sometimes asked the assistant to translate and elaborate upon my questions 
if it seemed appropriate or helpful. During most interviews, translation was 
used for individual words or sentences. In five interviews during which most 
or all questions and replies were translated, the interviewees seemed capable 
of following and, thus, controlling the translations of their accounts. Since I do 
not have skills in Somali language, however, I could not similarly control how 
my questions and the respective replies translated. Ultimately, the translations 
excluded some more nuanced information.  
The student interviews lasted on average one hour, ranging from 30 to 75 
minutes. Taken together with the background interviews with the 7 CSO 
employees, the final data consists of 24 interviews with 26 individuals (19 
students and 7 CSO employees), comprising 1394 minutes (nearly 24 hours) 
of speech transcribed into text. During the interviews, I also took notes 
regarding my reactions and thoughts, the interviewees’ reactions, surprising 
or recurrent views expressed, and emerging ideas amongst other issues. In 
addition, descriptions of and reflections about the informal conversations with 
research assistants or random people at the hotel were recorded in the field 
notes. As described above, practical issues, such as access to the field, financial 
limitations, the timeframe, and security limited the data collection period and 
opportunities. The data and my contextual understanding would have been 
more extensive if I had had an opportunity to stay in Somaliland longer, and if 
the security situation allowed me to move around more freely.  
The research assistants (one of whom participated in all interviews) 
undertook transcription of the student interviews verbatim from the digital 
voice-recordings, whilst I transcribed the CSO interviews. Since this research 
focuses not on the fine detail of the discursive and rhetorical work, only some 
implied meanings as well as interruptions, laughter, or other explicit emotions 
were marked in the transcripts. Due to the deficient English skills of some 
interviewees, most accounts, even those understandable in terms of content, 
contained grammatical and lexical errors that the assistants transcribed 
verbatim. When entering the data into the ATLAS.ti software, I left those 
‘authentic’ errors in the transcripts. I listened through the original recordings 
to spot-check the transcripts for accuracy. To improve the readability of the 
transcripts, I corrected any major grammatical or lexical errors in the quotes I 
present in Chapters 5 and 6 below. 
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Before employing a discourse analytical approach, I approached the data 
using a thematic content analysis to familiarise myself with the data, and to 
complete as nuanced analysis as possible. In this initial phase, I aimed to 
identify all of the relevant issues, ideas, concepts, and perspectives that 
emerged in the data. After familiarising myself with the transcribed data once 
printed, I imported the data into ATLAS.ti, the qualitative analysis tool I used 
in the thematic content analysis. I carried out a preliminary analysis of all 24 
transcripts and categorised the data into coded segments based on my 
preliminary understanding, theoretical framework, and research questions, as 
well as looking at issues and patterns that emerged from the data. I organised 
these initial codes into code families, merging or splitting them into subcodes 
where necessary. For example, I divided the code ‘Motive’ into the subcodes 
‘Motive/altruistic’, ‘Motive/professional’, and ‘Motive/selfish’. Next, I printed 
out the transcripts and employed an inductive approach. I aimed to open-
mindedly identify key issues and patterns that emerged, without trying to fit 
the data into any pre-existing frames or codes. After identifying and reviewing 
meaningful issues and patterns, I systematically compared them with the 
initial codes, and adjusted and reorganised the initial codes accordingly. The 
data in ATLAS.ti was then categorised into segments according to the final 
codes and subcodes listed in Appendix 10. Appendix 11 summarises the 
correspondence between the initial codes and the final codes and related 
issues. 
I then turned to the discourse-analytical approach, which is not simply a 
method of analysis, but simultaneously serves as the theoretical and 
methodological framework of my research. As described above in Section 4.1, 
my methodological framework relies on the work of Fairclough’s (1992, 1995, 
2001) critical discourse analysis (CDA) which emphasises the interrelation 
between discourse and social change. I also drawn on Lazar’s (2007) feminist 
CDA which aims to understand the complex workings of power and ideology 
in discourse by sustaining gendered social arrangements. With a relatively 
large dataset, I identified the most significant ‘traces’ in the data. Informed by 
Fairclough (1992, p. 135), however, I avoided making too coherent 
interpretations when making connections across elements of the data. Whilst 
I focused the analysis on the male students’ interviews, I systematically cross-
checked the female students’ interviews to identify deviances and similarities. 
To first examine how violence against women is (re)negotiated and 
(de)legitimated, I analysed how the meanings and consequences of different 
FGM/C practices, as well as the subject positions in perpetuating and 
preventing the practice are negotiated in the data. Second, I examined how 
masculinities and gender order are negotiated. I investigated notions of men’s 
and women’s ‘natural’ characteristics and roles, notions of gendered rights and 
responsibilities, as well as understandings of gender equality in Somaliland 
and the concept of ‘gender equality’ itself. Throughout the analysis, I paid 
attention to the assumptions made, causalities suggested, as well as to the 
systems of knowledge and belief from which participants drew. I paid special 
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attention to the taken-for-granted ideas and justifications granted to, for 
instance, the current state of gender (in)equality, as well as to the 
identification of the ‘root causes’ of some harmful practices. I also explored 
whose stance was taken and whose was forgotten, and whose interests were 
promoted or ignored. 
4.4 RESEARCH ETHICS AND RESEARCHER 
POSITIONING
Because my study focuses on a particularly sensitive topic, I have carefully 
considered ethical issues at all phases—from research design to analysis and 
reporting. The ethical questions in this study relate to the aim and theoretical 
framework of the research at both the ideological and political level, and to the 
research methods at a more practical level. In terms of my underlying aim to 
contribute to preventing FGM/C, I discussed the justification and problems 
associated with applying a (Western) liberal feminist agenda and human rights 
approach to the global South in general, and to FGM/C in particular in Section 
2.1. In terms of my focus on the engagement of men in preventing FGM/C, 
men’s anti-violence activism and feminist concerns about reproducing male 
privilege were discussed in Section 3.3. In this section, I first discuss the safety 
and anonymity of my research participants and the potential consequences of 
the study for the Somali community at large. I, then, discuss dilemmas in 
applying theories developed in the global North to the contexts of the global 
South, as well as my researcher position, and its implications on data 
collection, interpretation, and analysis.  
In terms of safeguarding the anonymity of the research participants, I only 
collected personal data that I considered relevant and that the participants 
voluntarily shared through an anonymous form they were asked to complete 
after the interview (Appendix 5). I use pseudonyms to refer to all interviewees 
and anonymise the NGOs and the CSOs attached to the project. Distinctions 
in the background information solicited were minor and, thus, are not 
reported in the text except with regards to gender. I did not ask students about 
their field of study, although that emerged during many interviews. The field 
of study seemed to correlate to some extent with certain values and meanings 
students expressed. Since there were only a few students from each field, 
reporting the field would jeopardise the anonymity of these informants and, 
thus, I do not report it. The university management members, as well as the 
employees of the local CSO who implemented the project, however, know who 
the interviewees are collectively.  
Both research assistants and the driver signed a declaration of 
confidentiality (Appendix 12), in which they agreed that all information would 
remain confidential and would not be shared with anyone except me. After 
finalising this thesis, I destroyed the voice recordings in which the speakers 
were identifiable. In the transcripts, no identifiers appear, and all transcripts 
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are stored electronically on a password-protected flash drive. The anonymity 
of the interviewees is, thus, carefully guarded, and these precautions follow the 
ethical instructions outlined by the National Advisory Board on Research 
Ethics (TENK, 2009) and the University of Helsinki. The only document 
(interview schedule) with any names or email addresses is stored as a hard 
copy for any future communication with the interviewees and is intended for 
my use alone.  
I must note that all of the interviewees were engaged in publicly advocating 
against FGM/C, either as volunteers or as paid employees, prior to 
participating in my research. Participants were, therefore, not exposed to any 
significant additional ‘risk’ by participating in this study. However, being seen 
with a Western woman, ultimately known to be discussing FGM/C, might not 
be advantageous for the interviewees and/or their anti-FGM/C efforts, since 
such activities are sometimes regarded as foreign intrusions into the local 
culture. The interviews with students were thus carried out at the hotel where 
I stayed, in garden huts with adequate privacy and soundproofing. Some hotel 
staff, of course, understood what was taking place. It seemed, however, that 
the topic was not as sensitive as I had anticipated. For instance, many hotel 
employees and guests, as well as locals who visited the hotel, asked about the 
purpose of my stay, and were encouraging when I explained my research. 
People spontaneously shared their views on why the practice perpetuates as 
well as the best prevention strategies. When I visited Hargeisa in October 
2018, I invited the student participants to discuss my initial results. Seven men 
and one woman promised to attend, but in the end only five men attended the 
meeting. I presented the main elements of the four discourses. The 
participants to whom I presented my findings expressed no objections, and 
their reflections did not result in changes to the analysis. 
Publishing results can carry harmful consequences for not only direct 
research participants, but also for the wider community they represent, 
particularly when results are presented as judgmental, in a prejudiced way or 
disrespectfully, painting a negative picture not based on comprehensive data 
or a systematic analysis. Keskinen (2017) argues that ‘culture’ easily becomes 
an all-compassing explanation represented as monolithic and an 
homogenising entity that encompasses the minds and practices of all those 
from a specific country. That often leads to polarising accounts of, for instance, 
the ‘equal’ Finnish ‘us’ as opposed to the ‘patriarchal’ immigrant ‘them’ 
(Keskinen, 2017).  
A considerable Somali minority population lives in Finland, and this study 
could risk stigmatising Somalis as carriers of FGM/C, particularly since 
FGM/C has remained in the headlines in Finland throughout the years I have 
been working on my research. For example, on 5 January 2014, just after I 
began my doctoral studies, the leading Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat 
published a photo reportage on young Masaii girls before, during, and after 
their genitals were cut (see Nousiainen, 2014). That reporting and the 
accompanying photographs lead to a heated debate on the ethics of publishing 
 83 
‘brutalising’ images of young girls who can be identified from the pictures. In 
2017, Annika Saarikko, the Minister of Family Affairs and Social Services, 
suggested that the government should consider legislation that specifically 
forbids FGM/C, following actions in other Nordic countries ('Minister: 
Finland should consider ban on female genital mutilation', 2017). In 2018, a 
Finnish textile company Finlayson launched a citizen’s initiative33 to enact a 
law explicitly prohibiting FGM/C (see 'Seis Silpomiselle', 2018). With 60,582 
signatures, the initiative met the threshold (50,000), whereby Parliament 
must put the item on its agenda ('Citizens’ initiative to ban FGM set for 
parliamentary consideration', 2018).  
Another risk related to this research involves entrenching the association 
between FGM/C and Islam. Whilst FGM/C is intertwined with Islam in my 
research context, it is not practised in an overwhelming majority of Muslim 
societies, nor in Saudi Arabia, where Islam had its origin in the 7th century 
(Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002, p. 54). Akar and Tiilikainen (2009) point out 
that female circumcision has a longer history than Islam, and is also practiced 
by Christians, Jews, and animists in countries and regions where FGM/C is 
common. For instance, in Niger and Nigeria, the prevalence is significantly 
higher amongst Christians than amongst Muslims (UNICEF, 2013, Statistical 
Table 1). By focusing on advocacy against FGM/C in Somaliland—a Muslim 
society—I hope to mitigate such risks. I want to deconstruct the understanding 
that individuals embedded in predominantly patriarchal structures are 
uniformly and passively socialised by religiosity (see Glas, Spierings, & 
Scheepers, 2018). Furthermore, by focusing on Somali men’s activism against 
FGM/C, my study challenges the common misunderstanding that all men 
actively support the continuation of FGM/C in communities that practice 
FGM/C, or that all Somali (or other African) and/or Muslim men behave in 
violently patriarchal ways (Hopkins, 2006, p. 338; Johnsdotter et al., 2000, p. 
32).  
To explore a community that is not my ‘own’, to apply theories and 
methodologies that are mostly produced in the global North, and to not 
undertake the research in collaboration with local or native scholars carries 
the danger of re-enacting historical imperialism. Mohanty (1984, p. 335), in 
her famous article, draws attention to the hegemony of Western scholarship, 
and blames Western feminism for ‘assumptions of privilege and ethnocentric 
universality on the one hand, and inadequate self-consciousness about the 
33Sections from the penal code and several laws on assault can all be interpreted as already 
criminalising FGM/C in Finland (‘Citizens’ initiative to ban FGM set for parliamentary consideration’, 
2018). Supporters of the initiative claim that a specific law would make Finland's stance clear, whilst 
others posited that the current legislation is sufficient to ban FGM/C (see, for example, ‘Oikeusministeri 
Häkkänen: Suomi ei tarvitse tyttöjen sukuelinten silpomista kieltävää erillislakia’, 2018; 
‘Oikeusoppineet USU:ssa tyttöjen silpomisesta: “Ei tarpeellista kriminalisoida rikoslaissa”’, 2017). 
Debates also emerged as to whether the actual bottleneck in FGM/C prevention in Finland stems from 
the skills and resources of social and health professionals towards discussing FGM/C with risk groups 
(see, for example, Latvala & Teshome, 2017). There are also voices warning that immigrant girls and 
women can be stigmatised due to the continuous public FGM/C debate, and due to the victimising 
discourses and pictures used by some NGOs in their private fundraising campaigns (Latvala, Teshome, 
& Ahmed, 2018). 
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effect of Western scholarship on the “third world” in the context of a world 
system dominated by the West on the other.’ By producing a reductive and 
homogeneous notion of ‘Third World Difference’ through a monolithic notion 
of patriarchy, Western feminists ‘colonise the fundamental complexities and 
conflicts which characterise the lives of women of different classes, religions, 
cultures, races, and castes in these countries’ Mohanty (1984, p. 335) claimed.  
In studies on gender and masculinity in particular, Connell (2014) argued 
that imported intellectual frameworks applied across the global South create 
a discontinuity in the intellectual culture, creating specific challenges in, for 
instance, applying the concept of masculinity. Ouzgane (2006, p. 6), in turn, 
notes that although critical studies on men and masculinities can be 
productively deployed to understand Islamic masculinities, one should bear in 
mind that the Muslim world is diverse and ever-changing. Local realities, 
religious and political agendas, the consequences of Western colonialism, and 
globalisation must be considered, he claims. Gerami (2005) points out that, 
whilst gender as socially constructed, gender power differentials as societal 
(and not natural), and the intersection of race, class, gender and other social 
distinctions have been widely accepted in the academic and intellectual gender 
discourses in many Muslim countries, sexuality, in particular, as socially 
constructed, remains highly contested.  
In contrast, Jakobsen (2014) builds upon postcolonial work that questions 
the notion that theory developed in the North should not be used in the South. 
She points out that fixating on ‘difference’ and the widespread acceptance in 
the North that social theory, particularly gender theory, is inapplicable to 
Africa undermines the possibilities for critical gender research in Africa. 
Narayan (2009), in turn, argues that framing Africa as primarily different from 
the global North is as ethnocentric and imperialist as assuming a sameness. I 
align with Jakobsen, adding that the eventual inapplicability of theories 
developed in the North to the Southern context provides an opportunity for 
revising theories. One should, however, remain sensible to the fact that 
applying ‘imported intellectual frameworks’ (Connell, 2014) often implies that 
certain issues are illuminated, and perspectives highlighted, whilst issues and 
perspectives that people living in a study context consider most relevant 
remain unexamined. Lazar (2007) claims that the structural imbalance in 
knowledge production between the global centre and margin is problematic, 
particularly if the researcher’s position remains inexplicitly defined. Thus, in 
what follows I discuss my own position relative to this research.  
As described in Section 4.1, Fairclough’s (1992, pp. 3, 80) discursive 
practice dimension specifies the nature of text production, distribution, and 
consumption in order to explore how text production and interpretation is 
constrained by members’ resources (internalised social structures, norms, and 
conventions), and by the specific nature of the social practice of which they are 
a part. Instead of, for example, observing ‘real life’ anti-FGM/C advocacy 
activities or exploring students’ social media updates, I collected data via semi-
structured individual interviews, as described in Section 4.3. Thus, instead of 
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discourses that students (re)produce during face-to-face interactions within 
their ‘target groups’ or via social media, my data consists of discourses 
produced ‘for me’. Kvale (1996) emphasises that interviews are first and 
foremost an interaction, and the knowledge produced during this interaction 
represents a product of that exchange and the production of views. What 
interviewees choose to share reflects the condition of their relationship and 
the interview situation, he writes. Thus, it is important to consider how I as 
the interviewer and the interview context in general were perceived by 
research participants.  
As a non-Muslim Western woman, I was likely offered different accounts 
on FGM/C, gender norms and gender order than would be offered to, for 
instance, an elderly and/or Muslim and/or Somali man. Also, the presence of 
the research assistant, a local Somali man, eventually impacted the interviews. 
Contrary to my expectations, however, sensitive issues such as sexuality were 
discussed quite openly—particularly by male students and male CSO 
employees. That these aspects arose is, to some extent, due to the interview 
topics and questions that guided the interviewees to consider certain aspects 
over others. Given that even sensitive issues were discussed quite openly with 
me implies that my sex was not considered a (very) significant factor amongst 
those interviewed. As a non-Muslim, in turn, those interviewed perhaps 
seldom explained the deeper meanings and connotations related to Islam. 
Such explanations where perhaps left out, based on the assumption that, as a 
non-Muslim, I would not understand or find them relevant. 
At the outset of each interview, I emphasised that my assistant and I were 
neither attached to the international NGO supporting nor to the local CSO 
implementing the anti-FGM/C project, and that my research aim was not to 
evaluate the training or the local CSO. I explicitly asked the interviewees to be 
open about any eventual challenges rather than ‘glorifying’ their experiences 
and expectations. Yet, I understood that some of interviewees viewed the 
interview as a ‘test’, whereby their knowledge on FGM/C was being evaluated, 
and they struggled to provide the ‘right’ answers based on the information they 
received during the training. Such positioning can be understood against the 
fact that the students were nominated for participation in the FGM/C training 
by their respective university’s management in accordance with the project’s 
criteria (see Section 4.2). Furthermore, I sometimes felt that I was viewed as a 
representative of the international NGO, and hence, potential employer. 
Viewing the interview as a ‘test’ or as an opportunity to advance one’s career 
may incentivise providing socially desirable accounts, for instance, by 
emphasising and reproducing themes (such as the health and social effects of 
FGM/C or a human rights perspective to FGM/C) that were central to the 
training. Interestingly, the latter part of the interview which addressed gender 
roles, gender ideals, and gender equality seemed less predictable to the 
interviewees. Thus, it seemed as though they did not ‘know’ how I ‘expected’ 
them to respond and provided more intuitive accounts.  
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Finally, I briefly reflect on the resources upon which I draw in the data 
collection and analysis, and in interpreting the discourses I identified from the 
responses. Ellsberg and Heise (2005, pp. 214–215) wrote that whilst 
quantitative researchers attempt to avoid letting their feelings or subjective 
views influence data collection or analysis, qualitative researchers argue that 
subjectivity in data collection and analysis is unavoidable. In qualitative 
research, they point out, neutrality in the data rather than in the researcher is 
sought. As I discussed in Section 2.1, the central premise guiding my research 
is the understanding of all FGM/C practices as problematic and as human 
rights violations, even if the human rights premise is not completely devoid of 
problems. During the interviews, however, I avoided expressing my personal 
views and attempted to create a non-judgemental and affirming atmosphere. 
To minimise exercising my position of power in the analysis and to tackle 
Mohanty’s (1984, p. 336) critical viewpoint that ‘any discourse that sets up its 
own authorial subjects as the implicit referent, i.e., the yardstick by which to 
encode and represent cultural Others’, I avoided challenging participants’ 
means of constituting knowledge. On the other hand, these approaches and 
theories equipped me with the ability to critically view my data. My 
interpretations of the data were also affected by the fact that I have not studied 
Islam. Thus, I was careful to focus on describing if and how informants 
referred to and interpreted Islam, without assessing how such interpretations 
relate to ‘official’ doctrines or alternative interpretations.  
In Chapters 5 and 6 which follow, I introduce the four discourses that 
emerged from the data, namely, the righteousness discourse (Section 5.1), the 
health discourse (Section 5.2), the hierarchical difference discourse (Section 
6.1), and the masculine responsibility discourse (Section 6.2). In the 
righteousness discourse, sunnah cutting is represented as not required and 
not harmful, whilst women’s religious purity (that is, virginity and abstinence 
from premarital sex) is decoupled from FGM/C. In the health discourse, 
pharaonic cutting represents a risk to women’s health and a hindrance to 
marital sex. In the hierarchical difference discourse, a strict gender 
segregation and men’s superiority are justified through Islam and gender 
difference. Gender inequality is disputed, and women are partially blamed for 
their marginalisation. In the masculine responsibility discourse, men’s 
superiority is, in turn, legitimated through physical and economic protection 
that men (are expected to) offer women, whilst (elderly) men are blamed as 
irresponsible since they neglect anti-FGM/C efforts. 
The quotes presented in Chapters 5 and 6 are primarily from the male 
students, although quotes from female students (and CSO employees) are also 
used, especially where I describe interesting and surprising differences or 
similarities between the male students’ accounts. Each quote begins with a 
pseudonym that refers to the interviewee (typically a male student unless 
otherwise indicated). I use brackets to indicate missing words that I filled in 
to render the quotes more readable. Brackets with three dots […] indicate 
sentences or words that were extracted from the quotes to shorten them. Sighs, 
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laughter, or other utterances are indicated in brackets if I considered them 
relevant to the context. Italics are used to emphasise certain words or phrases 
in the quotes. If the quote is based on the research assistant’s English 
translation from Somali, it is indicated at the end of the quote. 
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5. DISCURSIVELY NEGOTIATING THE 
ESSENCE OF FEMALE GENITAL 
MUTILATION/CUTTING PRACTICES
In this chapter, I present two interlinked discourses—the righteousness 
discourse and the health discourse—which construct the meaning, religious 
status, and health consequences of different FGM/C practices, as well as the 
subject positions in perpetuating and preventing the practice. These 
discourses formulate the understanding of violence against women by 
representing sunnah cutting as not required by Islam, on the one hand, but 
not harmful and, hence, acceptable, on the other. Pharaonic cutting, in turn, 
is represented as forbidden by Islam, a risk to women’s health, a violation 
against women’s rights, and a hindrance to marital sex. Furthermore, idealised 
womanhood is renegotiated by decoupling women’s religious purity (that is, 
virginity and abstinence from premarital sex) from all types of FGM/C. 
At the outset, I must note that the interviews and, thus, the data reflect 
confusion over the terminology around the cutting of female genitalia, 
described in greater detail in Section 1.1. Amongst most English-language 
speakers, FGC, FGM and FGM/C are assumed to refer to all types of female 
genital mutilation and cutting. In Somaliland, however, most people—
including most of my interviewees—use these acronyms to refer to the most 
severe types of cutting only (also known as pharaonic cutting), whilst the term 
‘sunnah cutting’ is used to refer to any type of cutting, which people believe 
Islam requires or recommends. 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, which describe the two discourses, are divided into 
subsections indicating the primary constructive elements of the respective 
discourse. In Section 5.3, I summarise the discourses and discuss how they 
reproduce or challenge the local gender regime and prevailing masculinities.34 
5.1 THE RIGHTEOUSNESS DISCOURSE
Aligned with Fairclough (1992, p. 91), who argues that all types of discourse 
remain open to ideological investment, I suggest that religion—in this case 
Islam—serves as an underlying element in all four of the discourses I identified 
in my data. I argue that this religious investment is quite explicit in the 
righteousness discourse, which is firmly attached to and reproduces the 
righteousness ideal, the most uniform characterisation of the salient Muslim 
character traits applied to both men and women (see Arat & Hasan, 2018). 
This discourse builds upon what the interviewees define as morally correct (or 
34Table 4 in concluding Chapter 7 summarises the constructive elements of the identified discourses, 
and consequences for the local gender regime and prevailing masculinities. 
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not incorrect) behaviour and thinking, and constructs what is (not) considered 
violence or a violation against women. The primary elements of this discourse 
consist of the negotiation of the religious status of sunnah cutting and the 
negotiation of women’s religious purity. The righteousness discourse 
constructs sunnah cutting as ‘not required’ by Islam, but also as not harmful 
or violent and, hence, acceptable. Simultaneously, in this discourse, all types 
of FGM/C are decoupled from a woman’s religious purity (that is, virginity and 
abstinence from premarital sex). 
REPRESENTING SUNNAH CUTTING AS NOT REQUIRED AND NOT 
HARMFUL 
In the righteousness discourse, the men I interviewed categorised FGM/C 
practices according to their understanding on religious guidance. In 
Somaliland, religious scholars mostly condemn the more severe pharaonic 
cutting. According to Newell–Jones (2016), 87% of religious leaders 
considered pharaonic cutting as ‘not required’ (see footnote 21 for an 
explanation of these categories). Accordingly, my interviewees unanimously 
opposed pharaonic cutting, which, hence, appeared as the primary ‘target’ of 
their anti-FGM/C activism. Respectively, religious leaders’ varying 
interpretations of the status of sunnah cutting were mirrored in my interviews. 
Agreeing with the minority of religious leaders (approximately 5% according 
to Newell–Jones, 2016) who consider sunnah cutting ‘obligatory’, a minority 
of my interviewees claimed that sunnah cutting is required by Islam, and thus 
women must undergo it: 
Farah: My idea is based on the religion, what the religion mentions. 
So sunnah is acceptable and I believe sunnah is perfect. But a woman 
with nothing [uncut] is a problem. So, women must undergo sunnah. 
 
Farah’s quote reflects Lunde and Sagbakken’s (2014) notion that 
Somalilanders do not see a contradiction in stating that they would not let their 
daughters undergo pharaonic cutting, yet consider it important for their 
daughters to undergo sunnah cutting. In Farah’s understanding, religion 
‘mentions’ sunnah cutting, rendering it ‘acceptable’, ‘perfect’ and also 
mandatory. He argued that women ‘must’ undergo sunnah cutting, because it 
is mentioned in the Hadith, becoming valuable as such:  
Maria: Would you describe why exactly it is important in religion. 
What value does it add to the girl to have sunnah?  
Farah: Of course, there is Hadith [oral tradition], in which the 
Prophet Mohamed mentioned that to make sunnah and everything in 
this society is based on religion. 
Maria: Yeah, I understand that. 
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Farah: The religion is a limitation and the Hadith is a limitation, then 
what they mentioned and what the Prophet Mohamed mentioned we 
must use that. That is the important thing. 
Maria: Yeah, but in the Hadith, is there some explanation for why the 
Prophet Mohamed said that sunnah is needed? 
Farah: Every activity the Prophet Mohamed mentioned we must do. 
 
Whilst 79% of religious leaders considered sunnah cutting as ‘honourable’ 
(recommended) according to Newell–Jones (2016), this view of sunnah 
cutting did not emerge clearly in my data. In contrast to a few interviewees, 
such as Farah above who considered sunnah cutting as required, the majority 
of my interviewees viewed sunnah cutting as ‘not required’, in agreement with 
5% of religious leaders in Newell-Jones’ report. However, not considering 
sunnah cutting as ‘required’ or ‘recommended’ resulted in my interviewees 
interpreting the practice as ‘permitted’ rather than ‘disapproved’ or ‘forbidden’ 
(see footnote 21 for an explanation of these categories). Aweys’ quote 
exemplifies this attitude to sunnah cutting:  
Aweys: You are free to do [sunnah cutting]. It is not an obligation. 
You can do it, or you can let it go and not do it, so it is your attitude. 
 
Aweys’ wording creates a bit of ambiguity, with regards to whom he refers 
when saying that ‘you can do it, or you can let it go’. If he means that a girl can 
decide for herself, then he ignores the role of parents in making the decision. 
Typically, the girls themselves are involved in less than 0.5% of the decision-
making processes (Newell–Jones, 2017, p. 34).  
Najib’s quote below implies that he does not view sunnah cutting as serving 
any significant purpose. He thinks that nothing is lost if sunnah cutting is also 
abolished. 
Najib: I thought that sunnah FGM was applicable in our society, or 
acceptable in our society, but when I got this chance [to participate in 
the anti-FGM/C training], I came to know that sunnah is just a cultural 
issue. So, if we eliminate sunnah, we lose nothing. I would eradicate 
all of them [all types of FGM/C].  
 
Najib distinguishes between what is ‘applicable’ or ‘acceptable’ in the society 
from what is ‘just cultural’. In other words, for him, ‘applicable’ and 
‘acceptable’ are defined by religion, but not by culture. Yet, as Najib further 
elaborates below, viewing sunnah cutting as not required by Islam and ‘just a 
cultural issue’ does not imply intolerance for it. Whilst above he states that 
nothing would be ‘lost’ if sunnah cutting was eradicated, he continues to accept 
the practice as ‘not a big problem’: 
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Najib: They [religious leaders] are taking a Qur’anic verse which 
says: ‘Human being is created into its best form’ as evidence. So, the 
two forms of FGM, the pharaonic type is totally forbidden and the 
sunnah type is mildly invasive, so it is not a big problem if it is done or 
left. So, if the woman is exposed to something that is not allowed in the 
religion that means her right is violated. 
 
Najib suggests that an ‘invasion’ or violation against a woman’s body is 
acceptable if it is ‘mild’. Simultaneously, he indicates that women can be 
exposed to anything that is not specifically forbidden by religion. Religion, 
therefore, determines not only what is considered ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, but also 
what is labelled as ‘violence’ and ‘harmful’ amongst others. What is understood 
to be required or not specifically forbidden by religion cannot be viewed as 
(totally) ‘wrong’, ‘harmful’ or ‘violent’. Such an understanding was also 
identified in Newell–Jones’ (2016, p. 42) data where the Head of the 
Department of Islamic Propagation, the Ministry of Religious Affairs said: 
‘[S]unna, well that is Islamic, you must understand that Islam would never 
permit anything which brings harm to a woman, that would be non-Islamic. 
So, sunnah cutting does not harm at all if performed properly.’ 
DECOUPLING RELIGIOUS PURITY FROM FGM/C
According to Dirie and Lindmark (1991), in Somalia, pharaonic cutting 
(tradition) appears to create a barrier that preserves virginity, which Muslims 
consider the will of God and, therefore, religious. Talle (1993), in turn, wrote 
that instead of virginity being indicated by a preserved hymen, a Somali girl 
becomes virgin through infibulation (pharaonic cutting).  
As described above, some interviewees framed sunnah cutting as required 
by Islam, and, hence, supported it as a religious obligation. None of the 
interviewees, however, argued that sunnah or pharaonic cutting is a necessary 
means by which to guarantee a woman’s religious purity (defined here as 
virginity and abstinence from premarital sex; see Section 2.3). The 
interviewees, thus, deconstruct the link between women’s religious purity and 
cutting female genitals. Instead, the interviewees equate a woman’s religious 
purity with chastity—such as by covering her body, behaving ‘modestly’, and 
keeping away from men: 
Omar: The religious girls always wear the hijabs. They wear the 
hijab, they may not talk to a man much unless they have something 
necessary for them. But someone who is not religious may wear 
Western kinds of clothes and they may go everywhere, and they may 
have a big party like Westerners. So, you can identify easily someone 
who is more religious and someone who is not.  
 
The hijab, Akar and Tiilikainen (2009, p. 41) explain, not only refers to 
physically covering one’s body, but also to ‘modest’ conduct with regards to 
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women’s ways of talking, moving, and using cosmetics, as well as by avoiding 
shaking hands with the opposite sex. Habiba elaborated on the double 
meaning of covering oneself: 
Habiba (woman): Covering, like I mean we cover our body, then I 
just mean to cover her body with what we call a scarf. There is another 
meaning of coverage, coverage means that she doesn’t go out with 
other men, she keeps herself so that men do not chase her. She needs to 
protect her dignity and not lose her virginity. 
 
Jama emphasised how a religious woman ‘keeps her distance’ from a man also 
during the courtship period: 
Jama: In terms of courtship, there is a way of doing it. A woman who 
is more religious will not allow you to shake her hand. You will sit a bit 
far away. The place that you will court her will be in her house. So, it’s 
a bit like you keep your distance during courtship (translated). 
 
The three quotes above illustrate how important it remains for an unmarried 
Somali girl ‘to show that she cherishes her own virginity and always refuses to 
let herself into sexual activities’ (Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002, p. 161). But, 
whereas in earlier accounts from the Somali community, a virgin girl referred 
to a ‘sewn’ (pharaonically cut) girl (Talle, 1993), in my data chastity—covering 
oneself physically (with clothes) and ‘socially’ (with modest behaviour and by 
keeping away from men)—indicates virginity and abstinence from premarital 
sex. Furthermore, being not ‘sewn’ (pharaonically cut) is represented as part 
of the idealised womanhood—at least amongst urban and educated people. 
This is illustrated in Muuse’s quote, where he describes his wishes regarding 
his future wife as follows:  
Muuse: She [bride] must be zero tolerant [uncut] or at least she must 
be sunnah, not pharaonic you know. That is the first point. The next 
thing is that she must be educated, at least a degree level or secondary 
education. […] The third thing is that she must cover her body because 
she, is you know, if she covers her body, she has been protecting herself 
for [a] long time.  
 
I argue that, by ‘protecting herself for [a] long time’, Muuse indicates that a 
woman should refuse sexual activities, and, hence, safeguard her virginity. 
Thus, Muuse expresses a preference for both a virgin and a woman who is not 
cut (at least not pharaonically), and clearly decouples religious purity from 
FGM/C. This finding aligns with Johnsdotter et al. (2000, p. 38), who found 
that Somali men in exile in Sweden preferred ‘natural’ virgins instead of 
virgins created through infibulation. Johnsdotter et al. (p. 39) claim that, for 
Somali men, virginity is important primarily in signalling that a woman is 
morally flawless. My interviewees do not refer to ’natural’ virgins as such, but 
they use paraphrases such as ‘protecting herself’ to signify virginity and 
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abstinence from premarital sex. Additionally, for them, virginity seems not to 
primarily indicate controlling women’s sexuality, but to signal a woman’s 
morality and religiosity. However, the persistent emphasis on women’s 
virginity risks upholding FGM/C, which is considered by many a culturally 
valued means of safeguarding virginity. 
To summarise, whilst the righteousness discourse constructs chastity as a 
sufficient indication of women’s religious purity (meaning virginity and 
abstinence from premarital sex), amongst a minority of interviewees, women’s 
religious righteousness also requires sunnah cutting, which they consider a 
religious practice (without connecting it to virginity or other religious virtues). 
Others view a woman’s religiosity righteousness as parallel to her chastity 
(religious purity) and/or even view uncut women as an ideal. Accounts that 
decouple women’s virginity and religiosity from all types of FGM/C 
renegotiate women’s agency by representing women as capable of controlling 
their own premarital sexuality and safeguarding their virginity without 
‘external’ control (that is, via FGM/C). Such accounts clearly contrast 
understandings that consider pharaonic cutting as necessary because ‘women 
are held to be easily affected by visual impressions and emotions and, thus, 
prone to be led astray by forces beyond their control’ (Talle, 1993, p. 91). 
5.2 THE HEALTH DISCOURSE
The second discourse constructing FGM/C reflects the biomedical discourse 
on FGM/C, identified by, for instance, Toubia and Sharief (2003), Talle 
(2010), and Lunde (2012). The biomedical discourse has made populations 
that practice FGM/C aware of the medical and health-related consequences of 
FGM/C. Whereas the righteousness discourse draws upon Islam, the health 
discourse draws upon medical ‘facts’. As Whitehead (2002, p. 43) points out, 
science is not neutral. Its practices and assumptions are invested in discursive 
properties in a similar way to other systems of knowledge and belief. In my 
data, the biomedical ‘scientific’ discourse also associated with the 
consequences for marital sex—that is, effects beyond strictly medical 
consequences. Thus, I label this discourse the health discourse instead of the 
biomedical discourse. 
The health discourse represents pharaonic cutting as a harmful cultural 
practice causing women severe health-related problems. Accordingly, 
pharaonic cutting is unanimously understood as standing against Islam. As 
discussed in relation to the righteousness discourse above, sunnah cutting 
does not associate with health-related problems in my data, because it is 
viewed as not specifically forbidden by Islam; sometimes it is also viewed as 
required by Islam. Even if pharaonic cutting is presented as harmful to women 
in both the short-and long-term, it is not framed as violence (that is, as a 
violent act or act of force). It is, however, represented as a violation of women’s 
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rights to health, to bodily integrity, and to marriage. The negative effects of 
pharaonic cutting to men associate with marital sex. 
REPRESENTING PHARAONIC CUTTING AS A RISK TO WOMEN’S 
HEALTH
The health discourse represents pharaonic cutting as a harmful practice 
causing women various health problems. Problems associated with 
menstruation, sexual intercourse, and childbirth are emphasised, as Abdi 
summarised: 
Abdi: When you see someone who cannot give birth and may have to 
undergo a caesarean section, when you see some girls who have 
menstrual problems, when you see someone who cannot urinate 
normally, when you can see those people who are affected from feeling 
sensation during sexual intercourse. When you are an educated person 
who has this country, those things I mentioned motivate you to take 
part in eradicating FGM. 
 
According to Boddy (2016), the realization that FGM/C–related healthcare 
expenses also deplete family resources can contribute to men’s opposition to 
the practice given the escalating cost of living in many practicing communities. 
This idea gained support in some accounts, exemplified by Omar, who 
considers FGM/C a ‘financial burden’: 
Omar: It is a burden, financial burden, yeah. He [the husband] is 
always taking [his wife] to the hospital and paying some money for 
her [FGM/C-related] medication. So that is what he is experiencing, I 
think. 
 
Whereas pharaonic cutting was seen to carry several negative health 
consequences, sunnah cutting was not connected to any significant health-
related problems. Mahad’s quote illustrates this clearly:  
Mahad: When they become married, women with FGM [pharaonic 
cutting] experience more complications, for example, fistula or other 
related diseases, but a woman with sunnah cannot acquire any 
diseases related to FGM [pharaonic cutting].  
 
Women echoed this view. In her quote, Naima, for instance, labels sunnah 
cutting as ‘not a big deal’. Her quote also clearly illustrates how the term ‘FGM’ 
is used to refer only to pharaonic cutting, when she claims that FGM has been 
eradicated and women nowadays undergo sunnah cutting:   
Naima (woman): Nowadays, FGM has been eradicated. And 
nowadays women undergo the sunnah type; so, it is less damaging 
than pharaonic. So, many years ago it [FGM/C] came with many 
 95 
problems like bleeding and fistula, but nowadays these problems have 
been eradicated. I do not think it is a big deal for women nowadays, 
but before it carried many damages or complications, both 
haemorrhaging, bleeding, fistula, pain during dysmenorrhoea and 
pain during sexual intercourse. 
 
As described in Section 2.3, evidence indeed exists indicating a shift in the type 
of cutting in Somaliland. For example, in the first cohort (2002-2006) from 
The Edna Adan University Hospital (Ismail et al., 2016) studies, 1% underwent 
sunnah cutting; in the second cohort (2006-2013), that share reached 17.8%. 
Contrary to Naima’s view, however, pharaonic cutting appears far from 
eradicated, since the remaining 82.2% of women and girls have quite likely 
undergone pharaonic or intermediate cutting.  
Clearly distinguishing between sunnah and pharaonic acts of cutting, 
Amina paralleled the former with pricking and labelled the latter as ‘cruel’ and 
‘totally illegal’. Yet, rather than being criminalised (which FGM/C is not, as 
explained in Section 2.3), by ‘illegal’ Amina presumably refers to pharaonic 
cutting being forbidden by Islam and/or becoming something only practiced 
by ‘ignorant’ people. That is, pharaonic cutting represents something that 
contradicts ‘modern’ ideas of acceptable practices in Somaliland, thereby 
reflecting Lunde’s35 (2012) findings on perceptions of female genital cutting in 
Somaliland.  
Amina (woman): The sheik [a man with extended knowledge of 
Islamic theology] differentiated between sunnah and pharaonic. 
Sunnah is simply like pricking the girls or cutting very slightly. So 
sunnah is something that you can do or not. But the pharaonic type 
which involves cruel cutting is totally illegal (translated). 
 
Amina’s thinking aligns with those rather indifferent attitudes to sunnah 
cutting demonstrated through the righteousness discourse, as well as Newell–
Jones’ (2017, p. 18) study where the interviewees were of the opinion that only 
cutting which involves stitches (intermediate or pharaonic cutting, see Table 
1) carries major health consequences. She found that only 4% suggested that 
pharaonic cutting carries no harmful effects. Simultaneously, most women 
(80%) and men (68%) considered sunnah cutting to not cause health-related 
problems. In reality, sunnah cutting may be close or equivalent to pharaonic 
cutting, since traditional cutters who primarily perform the practice are often 
unaware of the differences between practices (see, for example, Akar & 
Tiilikainen, 2009; Lunde, 2012; Vestbøstad & Blystad, 2014). Leila was the 
only student who explicitly mentioned this: 
35Lunde (2012, p. 85) suggests that in urban areas of Somaliland, pharaonic cutting is increasingly 
associated with the past, classified as harmful, and viewed as something practiced only by ignorant 
people as well as a practice that does not correspond to ‘modern’ ideas. Sunnah cutting, in turn, was 
characterised as a recent and milder practice or as the prevailing ‘normal’ practice. 
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Leila (woman): I have zero tolerance for FGM, and I prefer all forms 
of FGM to be stopped since women will experience the same 
consequences and the same problems. So, I would prefer no cutting at 
all. 
 
Even when represented as harmful to women in both the short- and long-term, 
pharaonic cutting was not framed as violence (meaning a violent act or act of 
force) in this discourse. Rather, it was framed as a violation against women’s 
health or infringing their ‘freedom to have good health’, as formulated by 
Yusuf: 
Yusuf: So, if all people need to have freedom, to have freedom means 
freedom to live and freedom to have good health and wellbeing in 
society, then why should we practice FGM on girls?  
 
In contrast, what is understood as violence, particularly gender-based 
violence, is illustrated in Yusuf’s subsequent reflection, in which he attributes 
the ‘vice’ of sexual violence and abuse to idling young men juxtaposed against 
the idealised manhood. Yusuf’s quote illustrates Hogan’s (2009, p. 9) 
suggestion that marginalised groups within a nation are often constructed as 
‘internal Others’, who represent ‘threats’ against the social order: 
Yusuf: Men really prefer to be responsible for families. But nowadays 
there are some exceptions, such as gender-based violence including 
rape. Those young men who drop out of school, who have no other 
social resources, who have no playgrounds and other entertainment, 
usually undertake this gender-based violence. They usually rape, they 
create some emotional abuse, as in the sexual abuse of women. 
 
That FGM/C—unlike rape and sexual abuse—was not labelled as violence by 
the interviewees illustrates how labelling something as violence results from 
cultural, historical, and social negotiations, where gender plays a major role 
(see Ronkainen, 2017). In the legislative framework in Somaliland, neither 
rape nor FGM/C is currently criminalised, although rape offences—unlike 
FGM/C offences—are reported in criminal statistics and criminalisation is 
further along in the process than the criminalisation of FGM/C (see Chapter 
2). In her investigation in Somaliland, Newell–Jones (2016, p. 31) asked 
people to clarify how they see the right to freedom from violence against 
women and girls in relation to FGM/C. 94% of women and 88% of men 
connected such violence to pharaonic cutting, whereas only 24% of women 
and 7% of men connected it to sunnah cutting. 
When disseminating information on the physical health-related 
consequences, students represented themselves as both competent and 
legitimate. Aweys, for example, described how rural people ‘easily’ receive 
anti-FGM/C messages from medical students because they simultaneously 
deliver much-needed health services to the communities: 
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Aweys: Yeah, we [students in health-related fields] are very respected 
in the rural areas because we do programmes called community 
medicine. We go there and treat them, so they are going to take that 
[anti-FGM/C] message from us easily.  
 
Since FGM/C remains a taboo topic between men and women in Somaliland, 
men should be targeted by male activists, particularly in rural areas, Gele, Bø, 
and Sundby (2013) argue. Amina, in turn, highlighted that women activists 
have an advantage due to their shared experiences when they address other 
women:  
Amina (woman): Yes, there is a difference. This problem [FGM/C] 
does not affect men and women equally. It affects women more. So, if 
girls share with other girls, they are connected (translated). 
 
Contrary to Gele, Bø, and Sundby’s (2013) claim, Aydarus argued that activist 
women can carry more credibility and more easily access male audiences, 
since FGM/C primarily impacts women, who thereby gain legitimacy. The last 
sentence in Aydarus’ quote implies that it is exceptional that in some instances 
women do not listen to men: 
Aydarus (CSO employee/man): Because we are specifically working 
in rural areas, it is better if we go as one male and one female, so men 
can talk to men, and women to women. But sometimes women can 
more easily talk to both, because this [FGM/C] has primarily impacted 
women. So, women can more easily have the same feelings about this 
as those affected. So sometimes if a man tries to talk, they are not 
listening, even the women.  
 
Whilst the interviewees recognised that FGM/C clearly impacts women 
directly, it also impacts men. As I will discuss later in this section, the effects 
on men primarily relate to marital sex, a taboo topic for discussion. Thus, the 
‘subjective experience’ of FGM/C-related problems associated with marital sex 
does not allow men a similar legitimacy to openly share their experiences with 
other men. Aside from lacking subjective experiences, some men revealed that 
they had been questioned for intervening in ‘women’s issues’. In these 
accounts, mothers appeared upset:  
Abas: Maybe they will ask you, ‘Aren’t you a man? Why are you 
talking about FGM?’ In the Somali context, they believe women can 
only talk about FGM because they will say it’s a special issue associated 
with women. […] Mothers are more sensitive than fathers, I think. 
 
This corresponds with Johnsdotter Carlbom’s (2002) findings among Somalis 
living in exile in Sweden. She found that several men felt powerless in terms 
of influencing their wives’ decisions to cut their daughters. Some of her male 
informants recounted how their effort to stop the practice was met with ‘strong 
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resistance’ from women, who stated that ‘men should stay out of women’s 
business, that this [FGM/C] was a matter concerning the mother and her 
daughter’ (Johnsdotter Carlbom, 2002, p. 143). These men also stated that 
their daughters were cut without their knowledge, despite their efforts to 
encourage their wives to refrain from the practice.  
In this discourse, however, men represent the natural leaders. NGOs and 
CSOs increasingly engage men in their efforts against FGM/C, given the ‘fact’ 
that most leaders are men. Representing this ‘fact’ as natural and the argument 
for engaging men as commonsensical, men’s domination in leadership 
positions is discursively reproduced. 
Ismail (CSO employee/man): But then we also work with adult men. 
Because we realise adult men are the decision-makers in this society, 
politically, socially, and spiritually. Most religious leaders are men, 
most politicians are men, clan leaders and all those are men, 
predominantly, if not all. So, we try to engage with the opinion makers 
and the young men at the school youth clubs.  
 
Engaging men in FGM/C prevention was also represented as empowering to 
women, who then get the opportunity to realise that men care about women’s 
health. For instance, Habiba stated that she was positively surprised that men 
condemn the practice and are willing to prevent it: 
Habiba (woman): I was so surprised, but it is nice they [male 
participants in the activist training] said it [FGM/C] is not beautiful 
for women to be circumcised because it is not good for their health. 
They were more active than us [female participants].  
 
Yet, some interviewees believed that female participants hesitated to speak up 
during the anti-FGM/C training in a mixed group, because the topic addressed 
female genitals. Mixed group sessions also carry the risk that men’s 
judgemental or shocked reactions to FGM/C awareness-raising material 
caused anxiety amongst women who were cut.  
REPRESENTING PHARAONIC CUTTING AS A VIOLATION AGAINST 
WOMEN’S ‘RIGHT TO MARRY’ AND RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY
The health discourse also reveals that no universal understanding of human 
rights and women’s rights exists. For instance, Muuse’s quote illustrates that 
FGM/C is seen as a violation of women’s rights to health, and, thus, a violation 
of her ‘right to marry’:  
Muuse: FGM is part of an injustice or injuring their [women’s] rights 
because women are in competition with other women from 
neighbouring countries like Ethiopia or other nations. So, if the woman 
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is circumcised, she may have poor health. At that point, her right is 
violated.  
 
Muuse suggests that FGM/C-related health problems decrease women’s 
marital prospects since they ‘compete’ with women from neighbouring 
countries like Ethiopia.36 Muuse also refers to a female family member, to 
demonstrate that cut women fear marrying due to FGM/C-related 
complications: 
Muuse: She [a family member] is in Europe now and she said she will 
never marry. I asked her why and she said because she was very afraid 
of marriage. It is not something else, it is FGM. So, I think there is a 
direct relationship between these two [women’s rights and FGM/C]. 
 
In addition, Habiba, referring to her friend, constructed FGM/C as a violation 
of women’s rights because it hampers their opportunity to marry. In Habiba’s 
words, her friend cannot marry because she is afraid of FGM/C-related 
problems. She is likely referring to problems and pain associated with sexual 
intercourse, even if not explicitly stating so.  
Habiba (woman): Like one of my friends, she was subjected to FGM 
when she was younger. Now she said her rights are neglected because 
she knows she cannot marry because she knows she will face a lot of 
problems. She says her mother, she knew that she would face 
problems, but [her mother] did it to her.  
 
Rather ambivalently, even if FGM/C frequently occurs to secure a girl’s 
marriageability, the practice to Muuse and Habiba’s minds violates a woman’s 
‘right to marry’. Constructing marriage as a ‘woman’s right’ reflects the 
importance of marriage as a guarantee for social security amongst women in 
Somaliland.  
In this discourse, ‘ignorant’ mothers are represented as the primary 
perpetrators of pharaonic cutting and, therefore, the main violators of their 
daughters’ right to health and ‘right to marry’. In, for example, Habiba’s 
narrative above, her friend blames her mother for neglecting her rights and 
subjecting her to FGM/C despite the health risks. Habiba and the friend to 
whom she refers are not questioning the freedom of the mother to choose in 
making the decision or who else is involved in the decision-making. CSO 
employee Halima, in turn, appears more understanding of mothers, most of 
whom in her view perpetuate FGM/C because they think it is in the best 
interests of their daughters: 
Halima (CSO employee/woman): In general, women believe if they 
cut their daughter, they protect her. They believe if they do not do 
36In Ethiopia, approximately 74% of women have undergone FGM/C, although the prevalence of the 
most severe types of cutting are significantly lower (UNICEF, 2016). 
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[FGM/C], she [the daughter] will have to go underground. So, they 
protect her, and the tradition. 
 
Halima refers to the cultural and social norms and beliefs that guide mothers 
in their decision-making. As I argued in Section 3.3, mothers and other women 
in the family who often assume responsibility for decisions to cut daughters, 
perform the gendered role into which they were socialised, including 
perpetuating traditional practices and preparing daughters for adulthood. 
Newell–Jones (2017) describes the dilemma not only faced by mothers, but 
also by female health professionals, regarding their role in perpetuating 
FGM/C practices:  
Mothers, the key decision-makers, are balancing wanting not to harm 
their daughters with their perceived expectations of religious leaders, 
the father, and the wider community. Midwives and other [female] 
health professionals are faced with the contradiction between their 
personal preference, their understanding of their professional role, 
and the pressure they feel under to minimise the harm done to an 
individual girl. 
(Newell–Jones, 2017, p. 36) 
Newell–Jones (2017) states that health professionals and mothers blame each 
other, particularly with regards to who is responsible for continuing the use of 
stitches (related to the more severe types of cutting), whereby both claim it is 
the wish of the other. 
Whereas the interviewees’ opposition to pharaonic cutting firmly links to 
the associated health problems in this discourse, small hints also suggest that 
a more principal opposition to all FGM/C practices exists. In these accounts, 
FGM/C practices are condemned regardless of their short- and long-term 
health consequences. Such views belonged to the male interviewees, whereas 
women (except Leila as shown above) regarded sunnah cutting as ‘not a big 
deal’ and something not requiring intervention. For example, Abdulle 
emphasised that FGM/C violates a woman’s bodily integrity and right to self-
determination since it is carried out without her consent.  
Abdulle: They should not face a risk, so the right they have is to keep 
their body, all its parts, the 360 organs, you know, of their body, so 
they have that fundamental right. And women should be given consent 
about FGM, you know, the thing is that when Mum and Dad or those 
who are performing FGM, they do not [ask for] consent.  
 
Hussein addressed all types of cutting as ‘crimes against a human being’, 
regardless of how severe the effects were. He simultaneously repeated the 
Western FGM/C typology and connected these ‘crimes’ to Islam, saying that 
‘Islam cannot encourage’ such ‘crimes’:  
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Hussein: […] Somehow, they are not so dangerous, type 1 and type 2. 
But type 3 and 4 are unacceptable. For example, type 1 is the cutting of 
the clitoris. That has an effect, but it is somehow better than others. 
Also, type 2, type 3 and type 4 are unacceptable and crimes against a 
human being. Even type 1 and type 2 are crimes against a human 
being. And Islam cannot encourage, human rights cannot encourage, 
and any human being can not encourage [FGM/C]. 
 
In Section 3.3, I referred to the discussion regarding what is violated when an 
act of violence takes place (Waldenfels, 2005). In addition, I referred to 
Opoku’s (2017) notion that something ought to be said about the nature of 
rights violated if violence is viewed as a violation of rights. This discourse 
represents women’s rights to health and ‘right to marry’ being violated by 
FGM/C. A few interviewees also emphasised the violation of women’s rights 
to bodily integrity and self-determination. However, the interviewees claimed 
that rights-based arguments are not easily applicable to campaigning against 
FGM/C in Somaliland. Specifically, religious leaders and ‘ordinary people’ are 
represented as backwards, paralleling human rights with Western values, and, 
thus, despising them.  
Fadumo (CSO employee/woman): But everything that is related to 
human rights is very sensitive. So, we prefer to bring it up so that they 
will listen. But when we are discussing the line ministers with whom 
we are working, we always talk about how FGM violates girls’ rights. 
But, when we go to religious leaders or communities, we just cannot 
talk about rights. Because they believe it [human rights] is something 
from Western society. 
 
Not only do interviewees, thus, question the applicability, but also the 
legitimacy of human rights arguments in this discourse. For example, Kadra 
stated that FGM/C opposition ‘should not be dictated from above’. In her view, 
it is not meaningful to appeal to human rights declarations that originate from 
a country or countries that the (often illiterate and uneducated) target 
audience does not even know of or which carries no legitimacy in guiding 
decisions about FGM/C. Lunde (2012) suggested that the legitimacy of a 
human rights approach is further weakened in Somaliland since the region’s 
sovereignty remains unrecognised by states that promote a human rights 
approach. Kadra also claimed that the language used by international NGOs 
as well as by local CSOs has alienated the local community from the FGM/C 
discourse:37  
37During my field work, I was invited to join a meeting on FGM/C prevention at the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs. Approximately ten local and international NGOs attended the meeting, which 
was conducted in Somali. Without speaking Somali, I managed to follow the agenda most of the time 
since so many English words and phrases were used. 
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Kadra (CSO employee/woman): And the community is well aware, 
they see it as an NGO issue. So, this has created barriers. We need to 
use the language that is used in our communities and households. 
 
Kadra’s view echoes Koomen (2014), who warns that particular campaign 
strategies (such as demands for the criminalisation of FGM/C) and language 
(including rights-based terminologies) may position anti-FGM/C advocates as 
outsiders and even ‘enemies’ in the eyes of their own communities, even when 
they view themselves as grassroots insiders. In this context, FGM/C may gain 
new significance as a reified symbol with an insider identity, Koomen notes. 
Similarly, Prazak (2007) found in her research in Kenya that some of the 
hostility towards FGM/C prevention efforts within the community stemmed 
from the fact that the leaders of alternative rite rituals used the language of 
international NGOs in their rhetoric. 
REPRESENTING PHARAONIC CUTTING AS A HINDRANCE TO 
MARITAL SEX
In the health discourse, accounts regarding the effects of FGM/C on men 
constructed pharaonic cutting as a hindrance to marital sex. Men’s accounts 
addressed problems related to penetration (especially on the wedding night), 
a wife’s pain and related reluctance to have sex, and a wife’s sexual 
‘insensitivity’. The physical effects on men’s genitals resulting from FGM/C, 
such as wounds to or infections on the penis reported by, for example, 
Sudanese men (Almroth et al., 2001), were not mentioned during my 
interviews.  
Marital sex is discursively constructed as a male ‘performance’, 
complicated by the seal covering the pharaonically cut vagina, and the pain 
following the re-opening of the vagina. In Ahmed’s quote below, the husband 
pays attention to his wife’s pain, yet, it is he who takes the decision to continue 
the intercourse or to ‘give up’. 
Ahmed: The first night [after the wedding] that they come together 
and try to engage in sexual intercourse, you know, there is injury and 
it is reopened, the place or area that was circumcised, sealed, and cut, 
you know. That night, when they try to engage in sexual intercourse, 
you know, that place or area is injured, she may be bleeding. She may 
be feeling severe pain, she may feel you know a lot of pain, she may get 
seriously sick and then if he gives up and does not engage in sexual 
intercourse, it is sealed again. So, even if they engage in sexual 
intercourse you cannot imagine how much pain she is suffering. 
 
Ahmed gives the impression that the husband opens the sealed vagina through 
penetration. This contradicts with Ismail et al.’s (2016) notion that, in 
Somaliland, the reopening is primarily performed by a senior female member 
of the community, a traditional birth attendant, or by a medical staff member 
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in a hospital. Farah, in turn, suggests that the reopening of the sealed vagina 
(which Farah referred to as an incision) takes place in a hospital, insinuating 
that this reopening causes damage to the female genitals, and, hence, makes 
intercourse ‘problematic to the men’.  
Maria: So, do you think that female genital cutting can affect men’s 
life somehow? 
Farah: When marriage comes, the women must go to the hospital. 
Then, the doctor must create an incision and then there is damage to 
the women, such that sexual intercourse is problematic to men. 
 
The men interviewed shared the view that FGM/C constrains women’s 
willingness to engage in marital sex. In agreement with recent studies in 
Somaliland (Bruchhaus, 2013; Warsame & Talle, 2011), they viewed this as a 
disadvantage: 
Muuse: It is a little bit of a sensitive [topic] but a woman who is 
untouched is more active sexually and more preferred by a man than 
the one who has undergone FGM [pharaonic] or sunnah. […] A woman 
who has not been circumcised, if you touch her body, or if she sees a 
man, her feelings will change because of some biological you know, 
hormones or you know. But the woman who has been you know, 
circumcised she may, you know, she may never accept a man to touch 
her hand, or she may not change her feeling. Even if she needs to 
engage in sexual intercourse, she may be afraid and she may not do 
this [intercourse], you know.  
 
The majority of respondents in Warsame and Talle’s (2011) study in 
Somaliland also stated that men are beginning to prefer uncut women or 
women who are mildly cut due to the diminished sexual drive men associate 
with infibulated (pharaonically cut) women. In addition, Bruchhaus (2013) 
identified an emerging trend in urban areas of Somaliland and amongst 
educated young men to marry ‘untouched’ girls, also known as ‘digital’ girls 
(meaning ‘modern’ and ‘sensitive’). In my data, the focus remained on men’s 
sexual pleasure, and women’s sexual willingness, although women’s sexual 
pleasure was also mentioned, referred to as a ‘sensation’ by Abdi below:  
Abdi: I think they are much better, women or girls who had no FGM 
compared to those who have undergone FGM. Simply from the side of 
sensation or feeling sensation, I think, when the women’s clitoris is cut, 
they may not feel sensation, or their sensation is reduced.  
 
It is not completely clear from Abdi’s account whether being able to ‘feel’ is 
‘better’ for the woman herself, for the male partner, or for both. At this point, 
we were, however, discussing the effects of FGM/C on men. Thus, I assume he 
means ‘better’ primarily for the male partner. The ‘fundamental Islamic value 
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of women’s rights to sexual satisfaction in marriage’, which, according to 
Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002, p. 57) is sometimes mentioned when advocating 
for the eradication of female circumcision, does not emerge in my data. 
However, a man’s sexual pleasure appeared to depend upon a woman’s sexual 
pleasure, as in Ismail’s narrative: 
Ismail (CSO employee/man): One challenge in this society is that we 
do not talk about romantic sexuality. I think that if that was in the 
discussions, people talked about how it affects the sexual relationship. 
Because if all the sensitive parts have been removed, and there is a 
scar, pain or anything, then definitely that person will not enjoy it. And 
then the partner may not enjoy it either.  
 
Whilst religious purity (that is, virginity and abstinence from premarital sex) 
remains the norm and girls are thus expected to strictly control their 
premarital sexuality, when women marry men expect them to willingly engage 
in marital sex and prefer that their wives enjoy marital sex. In the 
righteousness discourse, men described women as capable of controlling their 
premarital sexuality without undergoing FGM/C, thereby undermining 
‘demand’ for cutting female genitals. In the health discourse it remains unclear 
to what extent men’s opposition to pharaonic cutting results from the 
understanding that the practice has impact on women’s willingness to and/or 
pleasure from marital sex. The marital sex ‘element’ expands the local FGM/C 
discourse and contributes to making FGM/C a men’s issue as well. However, 
it primarily contributes to opposition to pharaonic cutting which is associated 
with health problems and marital sex problems. Furthermore, the 
consequences of FGM/C to men should not be emphasised at the cost of the 
risks to women. 
5.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE 
RIGHTEOUSNESS DISCOURSE AND THE HEALTH 
DISCOURSE 
In my data, the essence of FGM/C practices were discursively constructed and 
negotiated through the righteousness discourse and the health discourse. In 
both discourses, a clear distinction is made between pharaonic cutting as a 
harmful cultural practice—and, thus, the primary ‘target’ of anti-FGM/C 
activism—and sunnah cutting as a ‘harmless’ practice with some religious 
grounds. Through the righteousness discourse, my interviewees negotiate the 
religious status of the main types of FGM/C in Somaliland, on the one hand, 
and genital cutting as a means to prove women’s religious purity (that is, 
virginity and abstinence from premarital sex), on the other. Sunnah cutting 
primarily emerges as not required by Islam, but also contradictory views 
emerge. This tension reflects the disagreement amongst local religious 
scholars regarding how to advise communities on sunnah cutting, a majority 
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of whom consider sunnah cutting as ‘honourable’ (that is, recommended). 
Even those student interviewees who construct sunnah cutting as not required 
by Islam appear to consider it as permitted by Islam and, hence, remain 
indifferent to it. They construct sunnah cutting as ‘not a big deal’—neither 
bringing any benefit, nor causing health problems. Accepting what is 
understood as ‘just pricking’ or ‘a mild invasion’ undermines women’s rights 
to bodily integrity. In light of my data, it remains unclear whether ignorance 
regarding the sunnah cutting results from a lack of information on the varying 
sunnah procedures (see Table 1) and related health consequences or due to the 
understanding that sunnah cutting cannot be harmful because it is not 
specifically disapproved or forbidden in Islam.  
The righteousness discourse is firmly attached to and reproduces the 
righteousness ideal, the most uniform characterisation of the salient Muslim 
character traits which addresses both men and women (see Arat & Hasan, 
2018). Whilst renegotiating women’s righteousness by challenging the 
dominant religious interpretations regarding sunnah cutting as ‘honourable’, 
religious purity (that is, virginity and abstinence from premarital sex) remains 
a central norm that specifically addresses women. Traditionally, pharaonic 
cutting was carried out to symbolise virginity in Somali society (Talle, 1993). 
In my data, virginity and abstinence from premarital sex are detached from all 
types of FGM/C and attached to chastity—covering one’s body, behaving 
‘modestly’, and keeping away from men. The continued emphasis on 
safeguarding a woman’s premarital virginity, however, risks perpetuating 
FGM/C, since many people in Somaliland still consider FGM/C a culturally 
approved and efficient means of guaranteeing it. 
The health discourse represents pharaonic cutting as a harmful cultural 
practice that causes women various health problems in both the short- and 
long-term. It is, however not framed as violence (that is, representing a violent 
act or act of force), but rather as a violation of women’s rights to health. This 
is problematic first, since talk about violence does not just represent norms: ‘it 
is (a creation of) reality in its own right’ (Hearn, 2014, p. 9). Labelling and not 
labelling something as violence entails separating legitimate violence from 
illegitimate violence (see Ronkainen, 2017). Second, a health approach to 
violence against women frames violence as a contributor to women’s poor 
health, whereas feminist approaches frame violence against women as a 
symptom of gender inequality and oppression (Flood, 2015). Furthermore, 
most interviewees represented pharaonic cutting as a threat only to women’s 
physical health, bypassing the long-term psychological and social effects that 
maintain women’s subordination. As the only student to address these issues, 
Yusuf described how FGM/C-related physical problems could lead a girl to 
drop out of school and to marry young. Later in life, as an uneducated mother, 
she will be unable to support her children. This sustains poverty across 
generations and maintains women’s dependence on marriage for their socio-
economic security.  
Discursively negotiating the essence of female genital mutilation/cutting practices 
106 
In the health discourse, students represented themselves as competent and 
legitimate. Female activists were viewed as advantaged, because a majority of 
people see FGM/C as a ‘women’s issue’, which is both inappropriate for men 
to intervene in and a taboo topic for discussions between men and women. 
Furthermore, female activists are assumed to have subjective experiences with 
FGM/C, which grants them legitimacy. Such accounts renegotiate women’s 
public agency and their role in preventing FGM/C instead of being viewed as 
victims of FGM/C alone. Yet, because positions of power are currently held by 
men, it appears ‘rational’ to engage men in anti-FGM/C efforts, thus 
reproducing men’s domination.  
In addition to women’s rights to health, pharaonic cutting also represented 
a violation against women’s ‘right to marry’ in the health discourse. Such 
understanding is problematic as it does not challenge women’s socio-
economic subordination and dependency on marriage. The emerging—yet 
weak—emphasis on a woman’s right to bodily integrity, in turn, opens the 
possibility for opposition to all types of FGM/C, since it is less focused on the 
severity of the health consequences. This emerging support also challenges the 
relativist view, in which communities that practice FGM/C do not see it as 
violation of the body or girls’ dignity. Instead, this weak human rights 
discourse supports Donnelly’s (2007, p. 291) notion that ‘[n]o culture or 
comprehensive doctrine is “by nature”, or in any given or fixed way, either 
compatible or incompatible with human rights.’ The interviewees, however, 
highlighted the difficulty in invoking human rights arguments, particularly 
amongst ‘ordinary people’ and religious leaders.  
In addition to the effects on women’s health, ‘right to marry’, and right to 
bodily integrity, the health discourse included accounts of how pharaonic 
cutting complicates marital sex, particularly for men who represent the 
primary ‘performers’ of the intercourse. Uncut or sunnah cut women were 
portrayed as more ‘sensitive’ and thus more willing to engage in marital sex. 
This relates to idealised womanhood renegotiated through the righteousness 
discourse. The thin—yet gleaming—sexuality discourse together with the 
nascent human rights discourse illuminate how discursive ‘codes and 
elements’ can be combined in new ways (see Fairclough, 1992, pp. 96–97). 
These references also illuminate how ideologically positioned subjects can act 
creatively forming their own connections between diverse ideologies to which 
they are exposed (see Fairclough, 1992, pp. 91, 97). 
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6. DISCURSIVELY NEGOTIATING GENDER 
NORMS AND GENDER ORDER 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, FGM/C is sustained by other patriarchal practices, 
such as women’s socio-economic subordination, which renders them 
dependent upon marriage and, therefore, parents (specifically, mothers) feel 
pressured to expose their daughters to FGM/C. Thus, it is important to explore 
how different patriarchal structures and practices are discursively justified, 
normalised, and (re)produced. Whilst Chapter 5 examined how violence 
against women is discursively (re)negotiated and (de)legitimated, this chapter 
turns to analysing how gender norms and the gender order are discursively 
negotiated. Here, I present the hierarchical difference discourse and the 
masculine responsibility discourse, which construct gendered stereotypes, 
roles38, norms, and ideals, as well as gender power relations. In these 
discourses, men assume a ‘heroic position’ (see Wetherell & Edley, 1999) 
towards religiously and culturally idealised masculinities. These discourses 
formulate the understandings of gender norms and the gender order by 
justifying rigid gender norms and a strict gender segregation through Islam 
and through ‘natural’ differences between men and women. A hierarchical 
gender order (men’s superiority) is also legitimated through masculinist 
protection.  
In what follows, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 describing the two discourses are 
divided by subsections indicating the main constructive elements of the 
respective discourses. In Section 6.3, I summarise the discourses and discuss 
how they reproduce or challenge the local gender regime and prevailing 
masculinities.39 
6.1 THE HIERARCHICAL DIFFERENCE DISCOURSE 
Similar to the righteousness discourse in Chapter 5, I argue that religious 
‘investment’ is quite explicit in the hierarchical difference discourse. In this 
discourse, strict gender segregation represents a ‘balance’, justified by Islam 
and emphasized gender difference, which entails both defining feminine and 
masculine as dichotomous and in opposition to one another, as well as a 
 
38In this study, ‘gendered roles’ refer primarily to gendered division of private life and work. On the 
contrary, ‘sex roles’ were employed to conceptualise masculinity and femininity in the 1970s (the male 
sex role consisting of distancing oneself from femininity and emotionality, striving for success through 
competition, being in control, and acting aggressively; see David & Brannon, 1976). The ‘sex roles’ 
approach has been criticised as insufficient in accounting for men’s structural position of power and 
women’s subordination (see Chapter 3).  
39Table 4 in the concluding Chapter 7 summarises the constructive elements of the identified 
discourses, and the consequences for the local gender regime and prevailing masculinities. 
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gendered division of private life and work (see Hirdman, 1990). Furthermore, 
men’s superiority is also justified through Islam. Women comprise not just the 
distinct ‘other’, but the ‘second’ in rank. Thus, I label this discourse the 
hierarchical difference discourse. In this discourse, Somaliland is 
characterised as a gender equal society, where violations against women’s 
rights remain rare and are based on individual misinterpretations or non-
compliance with the Qur’an. Women are blamed for jeopardising the ‘balance’ 
if they assume ‘men’s’ (public) roles, but also for ‘marginalising themselves’ if 
they maintain the traditional (private) roles. 
JUSTIFYING SEGREGATION AND MEN’S SUPERIORITY THROUGH 
ISLAM, GENDER DIFFERENCE, AND ‘BALANCE’
In this discourse, the roles of women and men are characterised as strictly 
separate. Women’s roles remain predominantly in the private sphere where 
women assume responsibility for the household and the children. The public 
and leadership roles are reserved for men.  
Liban: As a Muslim community, the role of a man and the role of a 
woman are quite separate. The man usually goes to work. Men usually 
take part in politics and occupy that sector. They are usually 
responsible of all that is happening in the family. They are the ones 
who are responsible for the family. They also take part in the 
administration. And children, as a Muslim community, mothers are 
always at home raising children and at the same time doing the 
household work and that stuff. So, in Islam, as I believe, women stay 
at home whilst men work. 
 
Gender segregation is justified through Islam, as illustrated by Liban’s 
explanation, where he situates his stance by referring to Somaliland ‘as a 
Muslim community’. Most interviewees, however, agreed that changes to 
gender roles have taken place. In particular, women’s role in the labour market 
and in public life in general, is expanding, as described by Guled, who noted 
that women’s ‘primary role’ remains in the home: 
Guled: Because we are a Muslim community, there are different roles 
for women and men. As such, the primary role for women is to 
maintain everything related to the home and raising children and 
taking them to the school and all that is related to the house. Also, 
nowadays, many women participate in community issues. 
 
Women increasingly assume an economic role, which the interviewees 
associated with girls’ increasing level of education, the impact of the Somali 
diaspora on the gendered roles, but also with high unemployment that has 
wiped out the income-generating potential of many men. Whilst recognising 
this reality, respondents disagreed as to whether the diminishing gender 
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segregation is welcomed. Three different positions emerged. First, some 
interviewees supported women’s increasing economic involvement for 
practical reasons, such as women’s contribution to income resilience:  
Yusuf: This is a good change, because, earlier, it was the man who 
was supposed to get everything for the family. But, now, there are 
multiple sources of income. Mothers are really there and if something 
goes wrong, or if some disaster happens overnight, women can go and 
solve it. 
 
Yet, those supporting women’s increasing economic involvement struggled to 
argue their stance. Below, Aweys aims to consolidate Islam and globalisation, 
stating that Islam is unchangeable; but, due to globalisation, interpretations 
of Islam change, enabling social change: 
Aweys: Islam, our religion, tells us the role that a woman has to play 
and the role a man has to play in the community. So it is quite different 
from European culture. Two or three decades ago, it was so shameful 
to see a girl talking in a public place; but, right now, they love to do so, 
and they do not face any problems doing so. That is a development on 
that issue. 
Maria: So, does that mean that this interpretation of Islam has 
changed? 
Aweys: Yeah, there have been some change. 
Maria: So, people somehow interpret the roles of women and men a 
bit differently now? 
Aweys: Yeah, I think that those are the effects of globalisation. Yeah, 
we know the roles that women can assume in Europe and other 
societies, but Somalis, we just take lessons from that. In the past, we 
did not know about that, but right now we know. Still, Islam is as it 
was, but people change their attitudes. 
 
Second, some interviewees appeared hesitant about accepting the loosening of 
gender segregation, continuing to weigh the pros and cons. In keeping with El 
Feki, Heilman, and Barker’s (2017) study on masculinities in the Middle East 
and North Africa, and Levtov et al.’s (2014) study on men’s attitudes and 
practices towards gender equality in low- and middle-income countries, the 
men I interviewed expressed a mixture of equitable and inequitable attitudes. 
They supported women’s education and economic involvement, but remained 
overtly critical of women assuming a leadership role: 
Maria: Do you think that the change [in women’s roles] that you 
mentioned and described, do you think it is good or bad? 
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Muuse: In my opinion, it is somehow good, somehow not good. It is 
good when women learn something and when they come outside. It is 
good for the family, the fathers or the husbands of all Somali families. 
Most of them [families], their daily income is increased by women, 
because she works outside [the home]. So, at that part, it [women’s 
extended role] is good. And regarding learning, it is good. But when it 
comes to leadership, it is not good for a woman to lead the nation. I do 
not know if you heard that there was a woman who tried to launch a 
political party. She was refused, and I agree with that because if she 
becomes, you know, president, you know, it is not good. In our Somali 
society, we do not encourage woman to lead the nation. So, in that 
sense, [women’s extended role] is not good. 
 
Muuse’s account reflects NAGAAD’s (2019, p. 7) findings that, despite 
progress in girls’ school enrolment and retention rates in Somaliland, ‘the 
value of girls’ education is persistently linked to their reproductive role, with 
the expectation that educated mothers will raise educated children.’ Few focus 
group participants in the NAGAAD study linked girls’ education to the 
increased potential of an educated woman to enter the labour market and 
pursue self-fulfilment. Moreover, NAGAAD’s results suggest that, whilst 
women who work outside the home are admired for shouldering the double 
burden of housework and livelihood activities, their employment is largely 
viewed as a substitute for the male head of household’s capacity to provide. 
Supporting women’s rights to education as ‘it is good for the family and the 
husband’ is problematic, since it reproduces women’s traditional role at home 
and represents women’s education as a means to prepare girls for marriage 
and motherhood instead of responsibilities associated with paid work. Thus, 
society loses the competence and skills of many women that could be otherwise 
available in the public and organisational spheres, including in management 
and leadership positions (see McKie, Biese, & Jyrkinen, 2013). 
Whereas women’s rights to health and bodily integrity (that emerged as a 
part of the health discourse in Chapter 5) was not attached to the Qur’an, the 
hierarchical difference discourse attaches women’s rights to the gendered 
roles prescribed by the Qur’an. Women are, thus, viewed as enjoying 
comprehensive rights, and asking for further rights (or roles) is unacceptable:  
Hussein: In Somaliland, we believe that the rights of women are 
already granted by the Qur’an or religion. Every person believes that 
it is unacceptable for women to fight for additional rights. […] If the 
woman says that she is going to be the president of this country, it 
cannot be accepted. Ministers, MPs, or the head of a department or 
other high positions that can interfere with domestic work [are not 
acceptable]. So, most of the community prefer mothers to work in the 
home […]. And, the men work outside the house. So, gender inequality 
only exists when the Somali community does not apply what their 
religion dictated to them. 
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That women’s access to higher positions appears highly restricted whilst there 
is some loosening of the exclusionary strategies (that is, excluding women 
from locations of power) signifies a transformation from the domestic form of 
patriarchy to public patriarchy, where patriarchal strategies are collectively 
held and aligned to segregate women into positions of less power and influence 
(Walby, 2011, p. 105).  
Above, Hussein’s reference to consensus (‘every person believes’) and to 
Islam exemplify how taken-for-granted gendered assumptions and hegemonic 
power relations are discursively reproduced as commonsensical and natural 
(see Lazar, 2007, p. 147). Such arguments serve as a powerful means to defend 
and reproduce the status quo, which excludes women from positions of power, 
including the power to (re)interpret religious texts, and thus reconstruct the 
prevailing gender norms and gender order.  
Both in Hussein’s narrative above and in Omar’s below, concern for 
housework and childcare also serve to justify women’s exclusion from public 
activities. Omar associates women’s work outside the home to the neglect of 
children and the destruction of homes: 
Omar: Every change has its good and bad sides. It is good, I think, for 
women who are participating in community activities, who are 
participating and contributing to the economy, to have new roles and 
status in the community. But it may also have a bad impact. When 
women go out, the children may not get the care they need. The 
families may be destructed somehow, I think. 
 
Third, some interviewees expressed support for the perpetuation of a rigid 
gender segregation, which they justified through religion. In Muslim societies, 
husbands traditionally assume the roles and responsibility related to 
economically supporting their families, whilst wives assume the roles and 
responsibilities of raising children and housework (Akar & Tiilikainen, p. 18). 
Guled and Leila reproduced such understandings: 
Guled: Women’s life is not like in the past. They are entering into 
community life. Earlier, all [women’s] roles concerned the home, but 
now they are in public. And, as Muslims, we do not support this 
culture. 
 
Leila also represents women and men as fundamentally different and assigns 
them different roles, whilst considering them equal. Segregation parallels 
‘balance’: 
Leila (woman): As a Muslim community there is, there is a difference 
between a man and a woman. So, a woman and a man cannot be the 
same. Each one has his own role and they cannot be the same. But there 
is no inequality (translated). 
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In the hierarchical difference discourse, not only gender segregation but also 
men’s superiority is justified through Islam. As Connell (2005a) argued, many 
ideologies justify men’s supremacy on the grounds of, for example, religion, 
biology, cultural tradition, or an organisational mission. In the interviewees’ 
accounts, women comprise not just the distinct ‘other’, but the ‘second’ in 
rank: 
Naima (woman): Gender equality, it is, it is different. When we say 
gender, we mean male and female, so in our Islamic [society] male is 
first.  
 
By claiming that gender equality is ‘different’ in Somaliland, Naima suggests 
that a strict gender segregation and men’s superiority do not jeopardise gender 
equality; they just render it ‘different’. Naima’s explanation also illustrates 
how gender equality parallels the ‘balance’ between those separate roles and 
exemplifies the local ‘gender contract’ (Hirdman, 1990), which women 
support even if it positions them as inferior.  
Representing gender equality as a ‘zero-sum game’ was also used to justify 
strict gender segregation. Some of the men interviewed presented the 
improvements to women’s labour market status as simultaneously weakening 
men’s positions. Muuse, for instance, complained that some employers favour 
women and discriminate against men through their recruitment policies: 
Muuse: The job has qualifications and conditions. These 
qualifications include knowledge level, experience, and similar things. 
Finally, they said you know, women are especially encouraged to 
apply. So, that means, if the job needs one person and, in the end, there 
remain two persons—a man and a woman—it is common that the 
woman will succeed, because she is already mentioned. So, in that 
way, there is gender inequality.  
 
The norm of the man as the single breadwinner along with the current 
situation in Somaliland, featuring record-high unemployment (see Section 
2.2), contribute to men’s fears of losing their ‘patriarchal dividend’ (Connell, 
1987). If international organisations offering lucrative contracts adhere to 
affirmative action supporting women’s careers, men have even more ‘to lose’. 
Thereby, the lack of support for expanding gender equality in the labour 
market amongst academically educated young men may stem from—not 
despite—their relatively solid employment prospects compared with many 
other young people in Somaliland.  
DENYING INEQUALITY AND BLAMING THE VICTIM
In the hierarchical difference discourse, gender segregation does not imply 
gender inequality. Quite the contrary, as Liban demonstrates. Unsettling the 
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‘gender balance’ appears to lead to gender inequality. Accordingly, women are 
accused of taking over ‘men’s roles’ and, thus, causing inequality:  
Liban: There is not that much inequality in Somaliland. Everybody 
has a role and inequality happens when men assume the role of women 
and women assume the role of men. And if there is inequality, it is the 
women who take over some of the roles of men. For example, women 
moving from their role in the house and going to work leads to slight 
inequality (translated). 
 
In the global North, Walby (1990, p. 108) claims the ideologies of femininity 
and masculinity have shifted from the justification of difference through a 
naturalising ideology to an approach that denies the extent of inequality. 
Furthermore, ‘the patriarchal ideology shifts from the open exclusion of 
women as “naturally” different, to one of denying the extent of women’s 
disadvantages and denying that women’s slight “underachievement” is a result 
of discrimination’ (Walby, 1990, p. 108). In the hierarchical difference 
discourse, the justification of difference and denial of inequality emerge 
simultaneously. 
Women’s exclusion from leadership positions is further downplayed by 
representing them as ‘important change makers in society’, working behind 
the scenes and making their husbands ‘more of a man’, as Naima argues: 
Naima (woman): Women are the only ones who can change the 
society at large. They have the power to make a man more of a man or 
less of a man. 
Maria: I would like to hear more about that. How does it happen? 
How can a wife make somebody more of a man? 
Naima: Simply by sharing information, telling something, helping 
with what he is doing and giving some support. They [wives] can do 
many things for him [husband]. They can do many things at home, 
change community and workplaces. Women can do everything in their 
power, so women are the main changers in society. 
 
Naima’s view reflects El-Bushra and Gardner’s (2016) findings that, in 
Somaliland, women prepare their husbands for important clan meetings by 
feeding them properly, by counselling them, sharing ideas with them, and 
advising them on the issues under consideration. NAGAAD (2019) found that 
women are perceived as supporting but not leading in Somaliland. Women are 
known, for instance, for advocating for a certain male representative, whilst 
opportunities to exert their constitutional right to political participation 
remain ‘slim to non-existent’ (NAGAAD, 2019, p. 7). Representing women as 
content with their unofficial power positions echoes the concept of a gender 
contract (see Hirdman, 1990), which women support even if it positions them 
as inferior. 
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Whilst Somaliland was discursively constructed as gender equal, examples 
of gender inequality consisted of women assuming ‘men’s’ roles (see above) 
and women being denied the ‘rights’ (roles) assigned to them by Islam. In the 
latter case, gender inequalities or violations against women’s ‘rights’ were 
constructed as individual failures and ascribed to misinterpretations or non-
compliance with Islam. Such complaints primarily centred around women’s 
rights to education, exemplified by parents who encourage their sons to study, 
whilst daughters are married off; and ‘wasted’ husbands who do not allow their 
wives to leave the private sphere: 
Jama: In terms of education, women are usually asked [by their 
parents] to marry when they finish secondary-level education or when 
they finish their Bachelor degree. They are discouraged to continue 
their studies. That is inequality (translated). 
Muuse: Some husbands, you know, they are wasted, and ask their 
wives to stay at home and go nowhere, to stop their education. And 
some of them allow her to study, but when she finishes, she has to stay 
at home. And, there are even, you know, a majority of men do not allow 
their women to go outside. A majority of men in our society do not 
allow her to go outside. 
 
Somewhat contradictory, women were also accused of marginalising 
themselves and just ‘waiting for marriage’, as we see in Muuse’s narrative 
below. Here, he suggests that women enjoy equal opportunities to study and 
work, but they choose to stay at home:  
Muuse: In our society, girls believe that education is not good for 
them. They only go to school and universities to pass time. […] We can 
prove that when the woman gets married, she stops education. For 
example, if she was at the middle of the university and gets married, 
she stops. That shows that she was staying only for marriage. She was 
waiting for marriage. And men believe that they have to lead the 
country and the nation. They have to proceed [with] their education 
even to a PhD level.  
 
‘Blaming the victim’ ideology (Ryan, 1976) places the blame on women for the 
injustice that befalls them. Muuse’s account also echoes what Hopkins’ (2006) 
labels as ‘a form of sexist equality’ amongst young Muslim men of Pakistani 
heritage in Scotland. These men express sexist stereotypes about women’s 
natural place remaining in the home, whereby they attempt to justify that 
Muslim men are expected to work, earn wages, and provide for the family. In 
their view, Muslim women are not victims of an oppressive culture nor 
marginalised by their religion, but responsible for their subordinate position 
because ‘they will not engage in any form of employment’ (Hopkins, 2006, p. 
341).  
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6.2 THE MASCULINE RESPONSIBILITY DISCOURSE
In the masculine responsibility discourse, men’s superiority is justified 
through men’s ‘heavy responsibilities’. Women are characterised as needing 
men’s protection. This discourse is firmly attached to and reproduces the 
idealised ‘Somali manhood’ (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016) geared towards a 
man’s responsibility for his family (see Section 3.5). The interviewed young 
men claimed to possess unique power as anti-FGM/C advocates through their 
impact on marriageability preferences, the content of which they renegotiated 
in the righteousness discourse. However, these men also complained that they 
have insufficient resources for campaigning against FGM/C, and that they lack 
authority and support from other men, particularly those well-positioned to 
fight against FGM/C. 
JUSTIFYING MEN’S SUPERIORITY THROUGH MASCULINE 
PROTECTION
In the hierarchical difference discourse the normative grounds for men’s 
superiority were derived from interpretations of Islam. In the masculine 
responsibility discourse, men’s superiority is derived from a man’s extensive 
responsibilities prescribed by religion and supported by the cultural notion of 
a good man ‘ordained by God as responsible for the family, its leader, manager, 
and shield’ (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016, p. 448). In this discourse, men extend 
the ‘shield’ to protect women from FGM/C, assigning such responsibility to 
each man, whether he is engaged in spheres related to culture, religion, 
politics, or academia: 
Ahmed: The role of young men in this [anti-FGM/C] campaign is to 
first start from themselves, raise awareness, then convince the 
community, make society understand that this is a wrong action and 
came from the wrong place. The men, you know, have more roles as 
cultural leaders, religious leaders, students, you know, as government 
politicians, all this. Every man is responsible for his place, for his 
unique area. 
 
Similar understandings were put forth by Johnsdotter Carlbom (2002, p. 146) 
amongst Somalis in exile in Sweden. Amongst her informants, there were both 
men and women who talked about men’s ‘moral obligation to take part in the 
decision-making concerning daughters [and FGM/C]’ and about men’s 
responsibility to work against the harmful tradition, even if the practice was 
understood as belonging to the ‘sphere of women’.  
Sexist accounts that represent women as in need of protection and special 
treatment—camouflaged as ways to show women ‘respect’—feed masculinist 
protection. Abdi, for instance, explains how handing over one’s chair to a 
woman in a classroom or giving way to women on the street shows respect for 
women, and comprises ‘sacrifices’ not granted to other men: 
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Abdi: If you take a car while you are on the road, if you see some girl 
standing at the corner of the road. If you see a majority of people, they 
can stop. If you are a man or standing like that, they may pass. […] 
When you are in class, if a girl enters the class late and all of the chairs 
were full, you [as a man] may stand and give her your seat. It is a kind 
of respect.  
 
Sexism serves to justify paternalism and masculinist protection by a benign 
and virtuous man who safeguards those in subordinate positions needing 
protection (see Young, 2003). Simultaneously, ‘masculinist protection works 
to elevate the protector to a position of superior authority and to demote the 
rest of us to a position of grateful dependency’ (Young, 2003, p. 13). 
Accordingly, men’s superiority is justified by a man’s substantial responsibility 
for his family. Omar summarises this succinctly: 
Omar: In the family, the man is considered as the top of the ladder. 
Yeah, he is the one who is responsible for the family. And the mother 
comes second. 
 
In addition to physical protection, paternalism and masculinist protection also 
imply economic support. As I showed in the hierarchical difference discourse, 
the norm of male breadwinner remains strong: men alone are expected to 
provide for their families. Sharing responsibility for the subsistence of the 
family does not increase women’s status. Instead, it primarily adds to their 
responsibilities, whilst the husband may be accused of neglecting his family, 
as Abas describes below. 
Abas: If you go to the market, Hargeisa market, you will see some or 
many women working in the market. So, we can assume that their men 
are irresponsible or that they neglect their responsibility [to support 
the family].  
 
The male ‘work norm’ reflects the female ‘purity’ norm, in that the honour of 
the individual man as well his whole family is at stake. Abas posits this here: 
Abas: I think everything that is needed in the family, he [husband] 
must provide as I think or as I believe. […] If the man is not working, 
even his family will not be respected, or they will say you are 
neglecting [your family]. 
 
El-Bushra and Gardner (2016) point out that a man’s economic standing is 
also important, because he must fulfil his clan obligations. They note that men 
and boys embody clan honour and prestige, and if they constantly fail to 
contribute their clan dues or bring about dishonour, their access to clan-based 
resources and security are likely to diminish. Furthermore, a man’s economic 
standing is important, as the male students believed, since that is women’s 
first priority regarding their future husband. 
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Muuse: So, the first thing that most women, not all of them but 90% 
of women now in Somaliland, their first preference is money. The next 
thing is knowledge. They respect a knowledgeable person. The third 
thing is a handsome boy. These three are their preferences. And the 
fourth one is the tribe. 
 
Whilst the female interviewees partially confirmed the importance of a man’s 
economic standing as a marriageability criterium for young women, they also 
presented childcare and household chores as part of the husband’s 
responsibilities. Farah labelled men’s neglect of household chores as a 
violation against women: 
Farah: For example, women do everything in the home. She cooks the 
food and does the housework, but men are a bit too proud to do the 
housework. So that is a violation against them [women] (translated). 
 
In Habiba’s understanding, (some) younger men are beginning to see 
household chores as a shared responsibility between spouses: 
Habiba (woman): In our community, most of the fathers say [to their 
wives]: ‘This is your children, raise them.’ They do not take 
responsibility in raising them [children]. So even when he talks to his 
children, he says go and call for your mother.  
Maria: Are there any changes that you expect now with the younger 
generations or do you think that will remain the same? 
Habiba: No, there is a little change lately, like those parents who have 
young children. I think they have changed their mind about 
responsibility and fathers now raise children with the mothers. But, 
old fathers, they prefer not to interrupt [participate in] their children’s 
life. 
 
Thus, the female interviewees attempted to renegotiate the concept of 
masculine responsibility. Yet, contradictory accounts also existed, whereby, 
for instance, Guled showed no interest in expanding a man’s role, stating that 
‘a man’s role at home is to give money to the wife and check their children’s 
education.’ 
BLAMING ‘OTHER’ MEN FOR IRRESPONSIBILITY
In the masculine responsibility discourse, men represent themselves as highly 
responsible and dutiful, thereby aligning strongly with the idealised ‘Somali 
manhood’ (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016). Ahmed, for instance, described how 
he could not ‘keep silent’ about the harm FGM/C causes society: 
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Ahmed: I am one [member] of society and the community, you know, 
I feel its pain and its problem, and I see how it [FGM/C] affects society 
and the problems it causes. There is no way that I can watch it and not 
say something about it. There is no way that I can keep silent. I must 
do whatever I can to contribute to the fight.  
 
From a practical perspective, men’s public declarations regarding their marital 
preferences—the approach that inspired my thesis (see Chapter 1)—could be 
leveraged to challenge FGM/C. In Somaliland, where women largely depend 
on marriage for their social security and status, and parents thereby aim to 
ensure that their daughters are marriageable (see Luedke, 2018), informing 
the parents that young men no longer expect their brides to be cut can 
contribute to parents rejecting the practice. This opportunity was identified by 
the men I interviewed, who characterised marrying an uncut or sunnah cut 
woman as the ‘responsible choice’. Mahad and Hussein, for instance, declared 
that after receiving information on the health effects of FGM/C, they stopped 
dating girls who had undergone FGM/C. They argued that if parents were 
informed about such preferences, those parents would stop cutting their 
daughters: 
Mahad: Before we attended the training, we used to date some girls 
who had undergone FGM. But since we now understand the problems 
of FGM and we learned new information about FGM, we no longer 
date women who have undergone FGM.  
Hussein: Some people believe that if [they] arrange FGM for their 
daughter, she will marry. So, if now any woman or any young girl 
who undergoes FGM will not be married, they [parents] will stop 
[cutting their daughters].  
 
Muuse goes further by suggesting that the ‘rejected’ girl could herself deliver 
the message to her parents, who would then leave the younger daughters 
uncut: 
Muuse: What I can also do is that when, you know, for example, we 
have a courtship or conversation with girls before marriage. So, we 
always have to ask the woman if she has been circumcised or not. If 
she is circumcised, I stop the conversation with her. So, I always tell 
her that the main reason I have left her is that [she underwent FGM/C]. 
So, when she realises the reason that I left her, she may take the 
information and go back to her house and she may, you know, deliver 
the message. And thus they [the parents] should not perform [FGM/C] 
on her sisters, because the sisters will be left as I left her.  
 
These quotes highlight the unscrupulousness of emphasising young men’s 
preference to marry uncut girls, raising ethical concerns about the double 
victimisation of women who underwent FGM/C. Beyond the eventual lifelong 
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health problems caused by FGM/C, (pharaonically) cut women risk remaining 
unmarried because of the very procedure that was supposed to guarantee their 
marriageability. The quotes above echo Castelino’s (2013) arguments 
regarding men involved in violence prevention who position themselves as 
‘good men’. Such men may place their own relationships with women beyond 
critical assessments and neglect the privileges that men in general receive in 
patriarchal contexts. Similarly, Flood (2015) noted that when men involved in 
violence prevention frame themselves as virtuous (that is, strong, or 
courageous, or bold), that framing may foster anti-patriarchal masculine 
identities. It may also exclude women and discourage critical self-
examination. 
Furthermore, beyond emphasising their ‘unique’ position as anti-FGM/C 
advocates through their impact on the marriageability criteria, men also 
emphasised their responsibility compared to other men who were believed to 
have competence and authority in promoting the eradication of FGM/C. First, 
medical and public health professionals were characterised as well-positioned 
to educate the community about the negative health effects of FGM/C. 
Participating in FGM/C prevention represented not only a masculine, but also 
a professional obligation. Accordingly, the students I interviewed disapproved 
of medical students and medical professionals who promoted their careers 
ahead of community interests: 
Abdi: Our problem really when we are finished with our studies, we 
always place the priority at getting a job with a high salary. […] they 
forget their responsibility for their people and for their country, which 
is why you cannot see any students who make a collective effort as 
volunteers and talk about FGM. 
 
As in Abdi’s account, raising awareness on FGM/C represents an altruistic 
‘responsibility for one’s people and country’ that should be prioritised over 
selfish career pursuits. My informants, however, accused medical 
professionals of avoiding their ‘duty’ to raise awareness: 
Aweys: [Medical] doctors that are present in Hargeisa right now, 
they can do it [advocacy against FGM/C] more easily than any other 
people, but they do not take that into consideration. They just treat 
[their patient] and leave and go and treat people, so they do not engage 
in public awareness. 
 
Second, religious scholars were also accused of ‘not having enough knowledge 
of the religion’ and, thereby, misinterpreting the status of FGM/C in Islam:  
Omar: And some scholars, I think the older sheiks [men with extended 
knowledge of Islamic theology] and religious scholars believe that it 
[FGM/C] is part of the religion, because they do not have enough 
knowledge of the religion. They have only the basics; they do not have 
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extensive knowledge of the religion. So, they may say it [FGM/C] is 
part of the religion, but it is not a part of it.  
 
Here, Omar presumably points at the minority of religious leaders who 
promote pharaonic cutting.40 Religious scholars were also represented as 
lacking the courage to publicly declare their opposition to FGM/C. This is 
reflected in Fadumo’s narrative, where she suggests that religious leaders face 
social pressure to confirm other religious scholars and, thus, provide different 
advice in private consultations compared to their public statements:  
Fadumo (CSO employee/woman): If you go to any religious leader, 
they tell you it is a family decision, to cut or not, but they cannot speak 
it publicly because of the other religious leaders.  
 
Third, traditional leaders and the elderly represented important gatekeepers 
in the prevention of FGM/C in Somaliland: 
Omar: Yeah, they [young activists] may face some difficulties about 
that [FGM/C] issue and people do not respect young people in the same 
way that they respect old people and the elderly in the community. So, 
young leaders, young activists who work on this issue always use 
religious leaders and community elders to open the discussion.  
 
Along a similar vein to health professionals and religious leaders, the parents’ 
generation and the ‘elders’ (the most respected seniors) were accused of 
selfishness and of ‘not giving a hand to the youth’ in their efforts to prevent 
FGM/C, as Ahmed accuses:  
Ahmed: [I]f the generation of this time, the youth, if they get the 
ability or the power or, you know, gain power and share in the fight to 
stop or eradicate FGM, you know, there is an obstacle which they face. 
You know, it is elders or parents, if they are, you know, politicians, 
government officials, traders, you know, every sector of the society, 
you know. They are not lending a hand to the youth regarding how to 
fight it [FGM]. Everybody is thinking about his interest but is not 
giving more attention to this.  
 
Cooney (2014), in a study of family honour, suggests that gerontocracy (elderly 
rule) represents one of the three entrenched forms of stratification in addition 
to patriarchy (male rule) and corporateness (group rule). Aligned with his 
concept of gerontocracy, ‘age is equated with wisdom and power is 
correspondingly placed in the hands of older people’ (Cooney, 2014, p. 95) in 
Somaliland. Young men are expected to accept the authority of older men (El-
40According to Newell–Jones’ (2016, p. 42) investigation, amongst the 18% of religious leaders who 
considered pharaonic cutting as ‘honourable’, most were older men from rural communities. Newell–
Jones’ (p. 43) investigation also revealed that religious leaders are not particularly knowledgeable about 
the current legal status of FGM/C: only 8% were aware that there are no laws on FGM/C in Somaliland. 
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Bushra & Gardner, 2016), illustrating the different (power) position where 
men, too, are located within patriarchies. Likely frustrated about their position 
in relation to older men, NAFIS (2014) found that men and male youth posited 
that ‘intelligent’ and ‘knowledgeable’ people should take the lead in 
challenging FGM/C in Somaliland (in contrast to the majority of respondents 
who called for religious leaders, medical doctors, political leaders, and clan 
leaders/elders to take the lead). 
Fourth, the individuals I interviewed questioned the sincerity of the NGO 
and CSO employees working against FGM/C. These employees were blamed 
for being paid for their efforts. In contrast, volunteering for the same purpose 
signified proof of good will and credibility, as exemplified by Abdi:  
Abdi: Really these people who are talking about FGM, a majority who 
are from NGOs, those who have a large interest in FGM. They get a 
huge benefit, they are working like that, but you cannot see someone 
who is working as a volunteer. The people are surprised if you say you 
are working as a volunteer.  
 
In the eyes of the target communities, (international) NGOs often lack good 
will in the sense of sharing similar interests or sharing descriptive 
characteristics (see Mackie and LeJeune, 2009). However, many communities 
are prepared to welcome collaborative assistance from outsiders who address 
issues that communities themselves consider priorities (see Prazak, 2007). In 
many communities in Somaliland, inadequate access to water and health 
services are considered ‘real’ problems (unlike FGM/C), the mitigation of 
which permits credibility and legitimacy to actors, including NGOs and CSOs, 
who deliver solutions to such problems. Students, however, lack such leverage, 
Abdulle claimed: 
Abdulle: The thing is that they [target audience] will ask you what 
you have, what can you do for them [FGM/C victims] right now. You 
can stand in front of Mansoor [popular conference venue in Hargeisa] 
and then you can take a microphone and say something about the 
girls. Some of them will think about you positively, while others will 
think about you negatively. Then, they say this man is crazy or he is 
getting mad. Some people may think that, while others will come and 
ask, ‘Do you have anything for girls to pursue?’ Then, it will be a 
challenge for you. 
Maria: Do you mean that people ask for concrete improvement 
suggestions? 
Abdulle: Absolutely, and if you do not have any power to give girls 
something, you cannot just continue anything.  
 
Young men advocating against FGM/C also presented themselves as lacking 
respect, even if they find themselves ‘at the height of responsibility.’ They 
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argue that the local community supports and respects people who address 
issues considered ‘real problems’, such as a lack of water, corruption, and 
health problems.  
Hussein: [E]very person who does a good deed or issue will have 
support from the community. Every person who prevents harmful 
issues is respected, not those like this [FGM/C] that are sensitive and 
based on religion and culture, but others like campaigning for water 
or campaigning against bad health and corruption.  
 
Lack of respect towards anti-FGM/C activists reflects Shell–Duncan and 
Hernlund’s (2000, p. 24) notion that anti-FGM/C activists and advocates 
often campaign against a practice that is fully legitimate amongst local people. 
Accordingly, in the masculine responsibility discourse, the students described 
how their good will was questioned and they have been accused of adapting 
Western values whilst they themselves see (pharaonic) FGM/C as a national 
health concern and their activism as an act of responsibility: 
Guled: Many people believe that there is an under the table purpose 
to eradicating FGM. […] like this project is from the West or this project 
has another purpose like supporting women to move far from religion.  
 
The response from the community that Guled describes is quite similar to, for 
example, that illustrated by Hernlund (2000, p. 245), who writes about 
Gambia and argues that campaigns to eradicate FGM/C are often seen by 
proponents as rooted in outside influences, and campaigners accused of trying 
to get money or destroy the local culture. Such questioning—sometimes even 
by their family members—contrasts with the responsibility that anti-FGM/C 
activists themselves attach to their campaigning. Whereas the interviewees 
accused medical professionals, and religious and traditional leaders of 
betraying their ‘duty’ to protect women from FGM/C, the activists themselves 
were accused of betraying their culture or religion or both. 
6.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE 
HIERARCHICAL DIFFERENCE DISCOURSE AND 
THE MASCULINE RESPONSIBILITY DISCOURSE
In my data, prevailing gender norms and hierarchical gender order were 
reproduced in many ways through the hierarchical difference discourse and 
the masculine responsibility discourse. The hierarchical difference discourse 
locates women and men in strictly separate ‘roles’ and spheres: women in the 
private sphere and men in the public sphere, a separation justified through 
Islam, ‘natural’ differences between men and women, and ‘balanced’ gendered 
rights and responsibilities as understood to be prescribed by Islam. 
Interviewees, however, claimed that changes have occurred, particularly 
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regarding women’s expanding economic roles. In addition, some flexibility 
emerged in how they interpreted gender roles. Some of the young men 
accepted women’s increasing economic role, explaining that women are now 
more educated and thus capable of and ‘entitled’ to enter new fields, and since 
women’s participation in the income generation strengthens family resilience. 
Others were hesitant, appealing to the roles prescribed by Islam. There was, 
however, conformity vis-à-vis restricting women’s access to higher positions, 
signifying a transformation from domestic patriarchy to public patriarchy. The 
former relies on exclusionary strategies, whilst the latter uses strategies that 
segregate women in the public sphere into positions with less power and 
influence (see Walby, 2011). Such a transformation—supported by, for 
example, gendered ageism and notions of men as ‘natural’ leaders—persists in 
other parts of the world. In, for example, Finland, which enjoys an 
international reputation for gender equality, many women’s careers stall in 
middle management (see Jyrkinen, 2014; McKie et al., 2013). 
In some of the accounts in my data, Islam and globalisation were 
discursively consolidated to justify the change in gender roles, signalling how 
subjects are ‘capable of acting creatively to make their own connections 
between the diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed’ 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 91). In other accounts, women’s education and economic 
roles were only supported as ‘good for the husband and the family’. Such an 
understanding risks reproducing women’s traditional roles in the private 
sphere, and therefore, dependence on marriage. Yet, employing such 
instrumental arguments can be interpreted to imply that men attempt to 
comply with the righteousness ideal, and thus use religiously acceptable 
arguments when supporting women’s extended rights and roles. 
Representing gender equality as a ‘zero-sum game’ also justifies strict 
gender segregation. In these accounts, improvements in women’s labour 
market status—in particular, through affirmative action enhancing women’s 
careers—appear to discriminate against men. However, affirmative action 
that supports women’s employment is justified in Somaliland, where women 
are at an impasse between two forms of ‘expropriation’ (see Hartmann, 1979, 
1981): within the field of paid work, occupational segregation maintains their 
access to the best-paid jobs; and within the household, women do more labour 
than men, even if they also engage in paid employment. Hartmann argues that 
these two forms of expropriation reinforce each other, since women’s 
disadvantaged position in paid work renders them vulnerable in arranging 
marriage, whilst their position within the family disadvantages them in paid 
work. 
In the hierarchical difference discourse, Somaliland is presented as a 
gender equal society, given the ‘equal’ rights and responsibilities prescribed by 
Islam. Women appear as powerful change agents ‘behind the scenes’, which 
downplays the need to promote women’s formal decision-making power. In 
some accounts, women are blamed for disrupting the ‘gender balance’ through 
claiming rights (or roles) which are not understood to be prescribed to them 
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by Islam. Women are also blamed for marginalising themselves and 
‘preferring to stay at home’ instead of pursuing work outside the home. In 
general, women’s discrimination in education and paid work is, however, 
attributed to ‘ignorant’ parents and husbands instead of structures and 
practices that favour men.  
Hirdman (1990) claims that a gender system based on strict segregation 
and the oppression of women inevitably creates incongruities and provides 
opportunities for agency. Similar to such notions, Glas, Spierings, and 
Scheepers’ (2018) study on patriarchal socialisation in Muslim Middle Eastern 
and North African countries shows that, whilst people are embedded in 
dominantly patriarchal religious structures, they are not solely or uniformly 
passively socialised by religiosity. Instead, people reinterpret their religion 
and, thus, actively deviate from patriarchal interpretations. Often, women and 
highly educated citizens are at the forefront of renegotiating any religiosity–
gender inequality coupling (Glas et al., 2018). In my data, examples of this type 
of renegotiation emerged from women’s accounts, which presented childcare 
and household chores as responsibilities spouses share. 
However, the embeddedness of the ‘gender contract’ and ‘gender ideology’ 
in religion makes them particularly stable in Somaliland, concentrating the 
power to interpret and renegotiate in the hands of those who possess religious 
authority—that is, primarily men. Viewing men’s domination as divinely 
ordained provides men with ‘invisible power’, which is more potent as deeply 
internalised rather than explicit power (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016). 
Therefore, the masculine responsibility ideal at best produces masculinist 
protection instead of supporting women’s increasing decision-making power 
over their own bodies, and over private, nonetheless public affairs. This 
emerged in the other discourse that constructs gender norms and gender order 
in my data, the masculine responsibility discourse, whereby men’s superiority 
was justified through men’s wider responsibilities towards their nation and 
family—especially the masculinist protection and economic support that men 
(are expected to) offer women.  
In the masculine responsibility discourse, men represented their activism 
as fulfilling their responsibility—as men and as professionals—thereby 
strongly aligning with the idealised ‘Somali manhood’ which emphasises 
responsibility, protection, and care for one’s family and country (El-Bushra & 
Gardner, 2016). Men emphasise the ‘leverage’ that nubile men possess in anti-
FGM/C work through their impact on marriageability criteria. They thus 
represent themselves as in a unique role with special responsibility in 
preventing FGM/C. Utilising this leverage, however, entails the risk of double 
victimising (pharaonically) cut women if they are left unmarried and thus 
socially ostracised because of the very procedure aimed at securing their 
marriageability and social status. Furthermore, to only change the content of 
women’s marriageability prerequisites does not challenge women’s socio-
economic subordination and dependency on marriage. 
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In the masculine responsibility discourse, ‘other’ men with power and 
legitimacy (often older men) were characterised as not fulfilling their 
responsibility to challenge FGM/C. In complying with the responsibility ideal 
that for my interviewees implies challenging a practice valued by many older 
men, young men renegotiate the submissiveness ideal that guides young 
Somali men to accept the authority of older men (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016). 
The men I interviewed also identified a controversy between their 
‘responsibility’ to prevent FGM/C and the community that questions their 
motives. Another controversy facing men engaged in FGM/C prevention 
appears to lie between the religious righteousness ideal (Arat & Hasan, 2018), 
which guides men to follow religious prescriptions—or religious scholars’ 
interpretations of them—and the responsibility ideal (El-Bushra & Gardner, 
2016), which guides men to protect women and children. In my data, young 
men seemed to handle the dissonance by categorically labelling any practice 
understood as required or not specifically disapproved/forbidden by religion 
(here, sunnah cutting) as not harmful, as I showed in the righteousness 
discourse. There is also a controversy in that men’s domination is discursively 
reproduced by people aiming to prevent FGM/C, a practice maintained by 
hegemonic power relations. I argue that this is due to the understanding of 
Somaliland as a gender equal society with ‘well-balanced’ gender roles and 
responsibilities, and framing of FGM/C as primarily a health issue—not a 
gender equality issue or an issue related to gendered violence. Furthermore, 
young people’s agency in negotiating gender norms and power relations 
remains quite restricted.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS
My research interest was to gain a deeper understanding and problematising 
of the engagement of young men in the prevention of FGM/C. Focusing on 
discursive practices, this study examined how young men engaged in 
preventing FGM/C in Somaliland discursively negotiate violence against 
women, gender norms, and the gender order. Secondly, I examined whether 
these negotiations are consistent with the goals related to deconstructing the 
patriarchal gender regime, on the one hand, and with the prevailing 
masculinities, on the other. Data were collected through semi-structured 
individual interviews and analysed using critical discourse analysis, 
attempting to illuminate the complex workings of power and ideology in 
discourse sustaining (hierarchically) gendered social arrangements.  
In the first section of this concluding chapter, I summarise the four 
discourses I identified and encapsulate the answer to my research questions: 
How do young men engaged in preventing FGM/C discursively negotiate the 
essence of FGM/C practices, gender norms, and the gender order? How do 
these discourses (re)produce or challenge violence against women, prevailing 
gender norms, and the hierarchical gender order? In Section 7.2, I discuss the 
theoretical and practical contributions of this study. In the final Section 7.3, I 
provide some afterthoughts, discuss the limitations of this study, and outline 
suggestions for further research. 
7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The interviewees produced four partly overlapping discourses which carry 
consequences for the patriarchal gender regime and prevailing masculinities 
in Somaliland since they (re)produce and challenge violence against women, 
prevailing gender norms, and the hierarchical gender order. In the 
righteousness discourse, sunnah cutting appears to be understood as 
primarily ‘not required’ against the dominant view of the local religious 
scholars who find it ‘honourable’ (that is, recommended). Violence against 
women in the form of FGM/C and related health consequences are, however, 
accepted when the violent act is viewed as required or not specifically 
forbidden by Islam—such as the case of sunnah cutting. Whilst renegotiating 
women’s righteousness by challenging the understanding of sunnah cutting as 
‘honourable’, a woman’s religious purity (that is, virginity and abstinence from 
premarital sex) remains a norm in the righteousness discourse. It is, however, 
detached from all types of FGM/C and attached to chastity—that is, 'modest’ 
behaviour and clothing, as though ‘veiling’ oneself physically and figuratively.  
Within the health discourse, pharaonic cutting is understood as a harmful 
cultural practice and as a violation against women’s rights to health—not as a 
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violent act or an act of force. Pharaonic cutting is, thus, constructed as the 
primary target of FGM/C activism. In addition to women’s rights to (physical) 
health, pharaonic cutting represents a violation against women’s ‘right to 
marry’ because it ‘disadvantages’ them compared to uncut or sunnah cut 
women who do not suffer similar physical and psychological problems. 
Furthermore, not being cut (at least not pharaonically), and therefore, 
suffering fewer health problems and being sexually willing to engage in and 
‘sensitive’ during the marital sex, constitute part of the idealised womanhood 
in the health discourse. Besides the right to health, and the ‘right to marry’, a 
nascent emphasis exists on women’s rights to bodily integrity and self-
determination. ‘Ignorant’ mothers are identified as the primary perpetrators, 
whereas women appear to possess a ‘competitive edge’ as anti-FGM/C 
campaigners given their subjective experiences undergoing FGM/C. Men, 
however, represent ‘self-evident’ anti-FGM/C campaigners as ‘natural 
leaders’. Young men, specifically, represent themselves as well-positioned 
through power over marriageability preferences. 
Within the hierarchical difference discourse, rigid gender segregation and 
men’s superiority are justified through Islam and ‘natural’ gender difference. 
The interviewees comply with the Islamic righteousness ideal and reproduce 
Islam as the dominant ‘gender ideology’, which they believe produces equality. 
Somaliland is, thus, represented as a gender equal society, characterised by 
the different yet equal and ‘balanced’ gendered rights and responsibilities as 
understood to be prescribed by Islam. However, rigid Islamic interpretations 
are also renegotiated, thereby justifying women’s education and expanding 
roles in paid work given various economic realities and modernisation, and as 
something ‘good for the family’. Women’s access to higher positions within 
society is, however, unanimously excluded. Furthermore, gender equality 
represents a zero-sum game, where men lose if women are recruited to ‘men’s’ 
(higher-ranked and better-paid) jobs. That women’s labour market 
participation remains low even amongst lower status jobs places blame on the 
parents and husbands, who are presented as discouraging women from such 
participation. But, also, women are blamed, because they ‘marginalise 
themselves’ by ‘choosing’ not to work. Women are also characterised as 
powerful change agents working ‘behind the scenes’. 
In the masculine responsibility discourse, men’s superiority is justified 
through masculinist protection, which entails representing women as in need 
of protection from men. This discourse strongly complies with the culturally 
idealised manhood that emphasises men’s responsibility towards their family 
and nation. Furthermore, within this discourse, young men represent 
themselves as well-positioned in preventing FGM/C through their power over 
marriageability preferences. Marrying an uncut or sunnah cut woman is 
considered a ‘responsible choice’. Whilst ‘other’ (older) men are characterised 
as not fulfilling their responsibilities in preventing FGM/C, ‘responsible’ 
young men engaged in FGM/C prevention appear to lack sufficient resources, 
support from elders, and respect from the community.  
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Table 4 summarises how the identified discourses construct ‘social 
identities’ and ‘subject positions’ (‘identity’ function); social relationships 
between people (‘relational’ function); and, systems of knowledge and beliefs 
(‘ideational’ function) (see Fairclough, 1992). The table also summarises the 
consequences of these discursive constructions for the patriarchal gender 
regime and prevailing masculinities in Somaliland. In terms of violence 
against women, the interviewees construct sunnah cutting as ‘just pricking’ or 
a ‘mild invasion’, which undermines women’s rights to bodily integrity. The 
health approach to pharaonic cutting, in turn, frames violence as a contributor 
to women’s poor health instead of a symptom of gender inequality. 
Furthermore, not framing pharaonic cutting as violence but as a violation of 
women’s (right to) health remains problematic, because not labelling 
something as violence is a way of legitimating it. ‘Ignorant’ mothers are 
presented as the primary perpetrators of pharaonic cutting, which downplays 
fathers’ responsibilities in the continuation of FGM/C and ignores how the 
cultural understanding of gendered responsibilities assigns women the role of 
preparing daughters for adulthood and marriage. 
The nascent emphasis on women’s rights to bodily integrity, however, 
opens up the possibility of emphasising women’s individual rights enabling 
opposition to all FGM/C practices regardless of the health problems they 
cause. Furthermore, decoupling women’s religious purity (that is, virginity 
and abstinence from premarital sex) from all types of FGM/C and coupling it 
instead to covering the body, behaving ‘modestly’, and keeping away from men 
serves as a justification for efforts against FGM/C. On the other hand, the 
persistent emphasis on women’s virginity and chastity risks upholding 
FGM/C, a traditional means of safeguarding these virtues.
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Table 4. Constructive elements of the identified discourses and the consequences to the
patriarchal gender regime and prevailing masculinities.
Constructions of subject positions, 
social relationships and knowledge 
Consequences to the patriarchal 
gender regime and prevailing 
masculinities
R
ig
ht
eo
us
ne
ss
 d
is
co
ur
se
- Sunnah cutting is ‘not required’ by 
Islam
- Sunnah cutting is, however, 
accepted since it is not specifically 
forbidden or disapproved by religion, 
and it is ‘not harmful’ 
- Women’ religious purity (that is, 
virginity and abstinence from 
premarital sex) is indicated by 
modest behaviour and clothing 
instead of genital cutting
- Challenging dominant religious 
interpretations on sunnah cutting as 
‘honourable’ (recommended) 
renegotiates women’s righteousness 
- Accepting what is understood as 
‘just pricking’ or a ‘mild invasion’ 
undermines women’s rights to bodily 
integrity 
- Recognising women’s capability to 
control their premarital sexuality and 
virginity renegotiates women’s 
agency over their own bodies
- Continued emphasis on women’s 
virginity and chastity risks 
perpetuating FGM/C, a traditional 
means of safeguarding these virtues
H
ea
lth
 d
is
co
ur
se
- Pharaonic cutting is a harmful 
cultural practice with several medical 
consequences for women
- Pharaonic cutting violates women’s 
right to health, ‘right to marry’, and 
right to bodily integrity
- Pharaonic cutting complicates men’s 
sexual ‘performance’ and restricts 
women’s willingness, ‘sensitivity’, 
and pleasure in marital sex 
- ‘Ignorant’ mothers are the main 
perpetrators of pharaonic cutting
- Women’s subjective experience of 
FGM/C grants them credibility as 
anti-FGM/C campaigners, whilst 
men’s role is important as ‘natural’ 
leaders
- Framing pharaonic cutting as a 
contributor to poor health and a 
threat to marriageability instead of a 
symptom of gender inequality 
upholds inequality
- The nascent human rights discourse 
provides a possibility of emphasising 
women’s individual rights and 
opposition to all types of FGM/C
- Objecting to pharaonic cutting 
reproduces the responsibility ideal 
inherent to ‘Somali manhood’
- Recognising the effects on marital 
sex challenges FGM/C as a 
‘women’s issue’, but risks granting 
women’s sexual health and pleasure 
an instrumental value
- Blaming mothers for the 
perpetuation of pharaonic cutting 
ignores highly gendered roles, 
whereby women are socialised to 
prepare daughters for adulthood and 
safeguard their marriageability 
- Recognising women’s roles as
campaigners renegotiates their 
public agency
- Representing men as ‘natural 
leaders’ reproduces men’s 
domination
Conclusions 
130 
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l d
iff
er
en
ce
 d
is
co
ur
se
- Men and women are different and 
have segregated but ‘balanced’ roles 
as determined by Islam; no gender 
inequality exists in Somaliland
- Women jeopardise the ‘gender 
balance’ if taking ‘men’s’ jobs on one 
hand, but marginalise themselves’ if 
not engaging in paid work on the 
other
- Women’s education is ‘good for the 
family’, and women’s primary tasks 
remain in the private sphere
- Women cannot be accepted as 
leaders 
- Women have power ‘behind the 
scenes’ in public affairs
- Complying with the strict gender 
segregation reproduces the 
righteousness ideal inherent to 
Muslim masculinities
- Emphasising women’s traditional 
roles in the private sphere 
reproduces women’s economic 
subordination
- Restricting women’s access to 
higher positions (instead of access 
to paid work in general) represents a 
transfer from private to public 
patriarchy
- Denying gender equality, blaming 
women for inequality, and appealing 
to women’s ‘informal’ power 
maintain women’s subordination
M
as
cu
lin
e 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
di
sc
ou
rs
e
- Men are ‘natural leaders’ and 
primary breadwinners 
- Women need protection and support 
from men 
- Young men are uniquely positioned 
as anti-FGM/C advocates: to marry 
an uncut or sunnah cut woman is a 
‘responsible choice’
- Young ‘responsible’ men lack older 
men’s support and community 
respect in their efforts to prevent 
FGM/C
- Emphasising men’s protection over 
women reproduces the responsibility 
ideal inherent to ‘Somali manhood’
- Advocating against FGM/C through 
the marriageability criteria does not 
challenge women’s dependency 
upon marriage
- Not marrying pharaonically cut 
women risks double victimising them
- Criticising older men renegotiates 
the submissiveness to the older men 
ideal inherent to ‘Somali manhood’
 
In terms of the consequences of the identified discourses on the rigid gender 
norms and prevailing masculinities in Somaliland, the ‘heroic position’ 
(Wetherell & Edley, 1999) to the religious righteousness ideal upholds a strict 
gender segregation. In addition, a strict gender segregation is presented as 
natural and fair by paralleling it with a ‘balance’ between gendered rights and 
responsibilities, and by emphasising ‘natural’ gender difference—defining 
feminine and masculine as dichotomous and in opposition to one another. 
Emphasising men’s primary role as the family breadwinners and constructing 
men as ‘natural leaders’ also reproduces the responsibility ideal central to 
‘Somali manhood’ (El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016). Compliance with the 
responsibility ideal—together with awareness of the health risks related to 
pharaonic cutting—entails that men feel ‘obliged’ to protect women from the 
practice. They handle the discrepancy between the responsibility and 
righteousness ideals regarding the unclear religious status of sunnah cutting 
by categorically labelling sunnah cutting as not harmful, even if in reality, 
sunnah cutting can approximate or mirror pharaonic cutting. By openly 
criticising older men’s ‘irresponsibility’ regarding efforts to prevent pharaonic 
cutting, the young men renegotiate the submissiveness norm that guides 
young Somali men to accept the authority of older men. 
Challenging the dominant religious interpretations of sunnah cutting as 
‘honourable’ renegotiates women’s righteousness. The heavily gendered norm 
of religious purity (that is, virginity and abstinence from premarital sex) is 
reproduced, whereas the means to achieve it are renegotiated. Religious purity 
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is decoupled from all types of FGM/C and attached to chastity—modest 
behaviour and clothing, ‘veiling’ oneself physically and figuratively. In other 
words, women appear capable of controlling their sexuality and refraining 
from premarital relationships without undergoing FGM/C, which expands 
their agency over their bodies. Furthermore, being not pharaonically cut, and, 
hence being sexually willing and ‘sensitive’ after marriage, represent 
components of idealised womanhood. Education, too, emerges as part of 
idealised womanhood, but it mostly carries an instrumental (‘good for the 
family and the husband’) rather than intrinsic value. Women’s primary role is 
designated in the private sphere, even when she engages in paid labour.  
In terms of the hierarchical gender order, the discursive constructions 
above which (re)produce or challenge rigid gender norms also negotiate the 
hierarchical gender order. Women’s inferiority is also reproduced by 
constructing pharaonic cutting as a violation against women’s ‘right to marry’, 
without challenging women’s socio-economic subordination and their 
dependency on marriage. Similarly, ‘protecting’ women from FGM/C by 
affecting the marriageability criteria—the unique power that young men assign 
themselves—does not challenge women’s dependency on marriage. 
Furthermore, being ‘responsible’ by not marrying pharaonically cut women 
risks double-victimising them—resulting in their ostracism because of the very 
procedure presumed to guarantee their marriageability and socio-economic 
status. Connecting women’s FGM/C-related health problems to challenges in 
marital sex, in turn, allows for the transformation of FGM/C from a women’s 
issue to an issue affecting everyone. However, if recognition of FGM/C-related 
marital sex problems mainly focuses on men’ psychosexual problems, it risks 
attributing women’s sexual health and pleasure primarily an instrumental 
value, that is, representing the wife as an investment whose ‘payback’ FGM/C 
endangers. 
Emphasising women’s traditional roles in the private sphere (as well as 
promoting women’s education and economic role as ‘good for the family’), 
whilst describing men as primary breadwinners and ‘natural leaders’ maintain 
women’s economic subordination. The opposition to women’s entry into 
higher (political) positions—justified through Islam—signifies men’s concern 
for losing their privilege, and (partial) transfer from private to public 
patriarchy. Representing men’s superiority as ‘divinely ordained’ renders it 
particularly stable, especially since the attached rigid gender segregation 
concentrates the power to renegotiate the gender norms and gender order in 
the hands of male religious scholars.  
Describing Somaliland as gender equal and blaming women for ‘choosing 
to stay at home’ and, thus, marginalising themselves implies a denial and, 
hence, maintains structural factors restricting women’s access to paid labour. 
Moreover, characterising women as powerful change agents who work ‘behind 
the scenes’ also downplays the need to promote women’s formal decision-
making power. Recognising that women have strong legitimacy as anti-
FGM/C campaigners due to their subjective experiences renegotiates women’s 
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public agency. Yet, women are also characterised as the weaker sex requiring 
men’s protection, which serves to justify men’s superiority and domination.  
This section summarised the empirical findings and answered the research 
questions. Next, I discuss the theoretical and practical contributions of the 
study. 
7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY
The theoretical contributions of my study concern theorising on gender-based 
violence—particularly FGM/C as patriarchal violence—and feminist 
theorising related to the subtle workings of power and ideology within 
discourse. By exposing men’s discursive practices that justify violence against 
women, rigid gender norms, and the hierarchical gender order, I contribute to 
critical studies on men and masculinities. The practical contribution concerns 
the design of programmes to prevent FGM/C and the engagement of young 
men in such programmes. In what follows, I expand upon these contributions. 
My study contributes to understanding what is gendered in gender-based 
violence, and responds to requests (by, for example, Bumiller, 2010; 
Ronkainen, 2017; Stark, 2010) that call for a focus on the meaning and 
purpose of violent acts and their relationship to the performance of gender. 
Building on Walby’s (1990) theorising on patriarchy and the six ‘fields’ (paid 
work, housework, sexuality, culture, violence, and the state) she identified, I 
elaborate on the notion that patriarchy does not cause FGM/C, but represents 
a supporting condition of the practice (Mackie & LeJeune, 2009). I argue that 
FGM/C is patriarchal violence, and, hence, comprises a materialist practice 
which sustains and is sustained by other materialist and discursive patriarchal 
practices, which—separately and together—reproduce the hegemony of men. 
Crosscutting the ‘fields’ of sexuality and culture, FGM/C represents a valued 
tradition often assumed to be mandated by a religious doctrine and linked to 
understandings of honour, thereby justifying the use of violence to control 
women’s virginity and fidelity. In the fields of paid work and housework, 
women’s socio-economic subordination upholds women’s dependency upon 
marriage and, thereby, FGM/C, which is often perceived as a prerequisite to 
marriage in practicing communities. Health problems and child marriages, 
which often follow FGM/C, further limit women’s possibilities to educate 
themselves and participate in working life. Furthermore, in the field of the 
state—often dominated by men—the refusal or reluctance to intervene in 
FGM/C through specific legislation and policy contributes to the perpetuation 
of the practice.  
In addition to showing the many ways that FGM/C, intertwined with other 
patriarchal practices and structures, maintains the patriarchal gender regime 
(see Figure 1), and thus represents a gendering practice, I argue that FGM/C 
is a practice of gender. That is, when organising their daughters’ FGM/C, 
mothers and grandmothers perform their gendered role into which they were 
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socialised. This role includes perpetuating traditional practices and preparing 
children, especially girls, for adulthood. FGM/C is not directly a practice of 
masculinity, since cutting is almost always organised and performed by 
women. In Somaliland, I argue, support for the practice is, however, an 
enactment of masculinity since it demonstrates compliance with the 
religiously and culturally idealised masculinities under circumstances where 
(some types of) FGM/C are understood as a religious prescription and a 
protection against premarital sex, rape, stigma, and ostracising. 
Moreover, my critical discourse analysis, which draws from Fairclough 
(1992, 1995, 2001) and Lazar (2007), exemplifies the workings of power and 
ideology in discourse. Fundamentally, this study illustrates the complex and 
subtle ways in which taken-for-granted gendered assumptions and hegemonic 
power relations are discursively (re)produced and sustained as 
commonsensical and natural, also by people aiming to prevent FGM/C, which 
is in many ways maintained by hegemonic power relations. This study shows 
how the patriarchal gender regime—and, thus, men’s domination—is upheld 
and legitimated by patriarchal interpretations of ideologies, such as religion. 
Drawing upon medical ‘facts’, pharaonic cutting represents a harmful and 
unnecessary cultural practice, which is against Islam, but is not framed as 
violence. Sunnah cutting, in turn, is understood as neither required nor 
forbidden by Islam, and (hence) as harmless—'just pricking’ and ‘not a big 
deal’. Tradition and culture, in other words, represent illegitimate 
justifications for FGM/C in my data, whereas acts understood as required or 
not specifically forbidden by Islam are represented as acceptable. Despite the 
decoupling of virginity from FGM/C and emphasising women’s agency in 
safeguarding their virginity, control over women’s sexuality is perpetuated by 
emphasising the importance of their premarital virginity and abstinence from 
premarital sex. Taken together with gender stereotypes (for instance, ‘women 
prefer to stay at home’), religion is used to justify not only sunnah cutting, but 
also strict gender segregation, relegating women to the domestic sphere and 
privileging men in the fields of paid work and political decision-making.  
Figure 1 summarises the interrelationship between FGM/C, other 
materialist practices that uphold patriarchal gender regime, and the ways such 
materialist practices and hegemonic power relations are discursively 
reproduced in my data. Review of the literature 
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Figure 1 Interrelationship between FGM/C and other materialist and discursive practices that 
uphold patriarchal gender regime.
In terms of critical studies on men and masculinities (CSMM), my theoretical 
framework follows Beasley’s (2015) suggestion of making connections which 
bridge the disjunctions between feminist and CSMM theorising. In doing so, I 
emphasise the multiplicity of masculinities, allow the subject in as a subject to 
materialist–discursive power regimes, and show how the interpretations of 
ideologies and belief systems are reproduced but also challenged. I also make 
connections between alternative approaches in CSMM by demonstrating 
masculinities as constituting both norms and practices, and, moreover, both 
discursive and materialist practices.  
Building upon Wetherell and Edley (1999), this study illustrates how men 
take ‘heroic positions’ to culturally and religiously idealised masculinities (as 
opposed to ‘ordinary’ or ‘rebellious’ positions). Yet, men are also torn between 
competing discourses in ways that they cannot fully know or control, as 
suggested by Stoltenberg (2000). For instance, the righteousness norm, which 
is central to Muslim masculinities (see Arat & Hasan, 2018), guides men to 
follow religious prescriptions—or religious scholars’ interpretations of them. 
The responsibility norm, central to the ‘Somali manhood’ (El-Bushra & 
Gardner, 2016), in turn, guides men to protect their family and nation from 
various harms and risks.  
My study also illuminates Muslim masculinities as situated at the 
crossroads of ‘exemplary’ masculinities found in sacred texts, the culturally 
idealised masculinities, and the socio-economic and political realities where 
they are negotiated and performed. My study, therefore, supplements the 
studies (see, for example, Aslam, 2012; DeSondy, 2013; Hopkins, 2006; 
Ouzgane, 2006; Samuel, 2011) that render Muslim men visible as gendered 
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subjects. It contributes to an intersectional understanding of men, who are 
privileged by gender, but disadvantaged by their age and global inequality (see 
Peretz, 2017) by showing how young educated men negotiate prevailing 
masculinities and struggle between Islamic interpretations and gender ideals, 
deep-rooted cultural norms and gerontocracy, scientific knowledge and global 
influences. I suggest, however, that the core ideals of ‘Somali manhood’—
responsibility, self-discipline, courage, humanity, and generosity (El-Bushra 
& Gardner, 2016)—are to a large extent compatible with salient character traits 
conveyed in Qur’an—submissiveness, combativeness, altruism, righteousness, 
steadfastness, and combativeness (Arat & Hasan, 2018). Drawing on Connell’s 
(1995, p. 77) theorising on hegemonic masculinity, I suggest that these core 
virtues embody ‘the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy 
of patriarchy’. Yet, some of these ideals (especially, the responsibility ideal) 
remain largely unachievable in the current economic and political climates in 
Somaliland. 
My contribution to the theoretical framework for men’s engagement in the 
prevention of violence against women—as well as towards the practical design 
of programmes to prevent FGM/C—concerns problematising the role of men 
in preventing FGM/C, a form of gender-based violence, whereby women 
comprise both victims and the primary perpetrators. The pro-feminist 
rationale ('men must be involved because they are the primary perpetrators', 
see Flood, 2004, 2011) is hence not directly applicable. Since FGM/C is a social 
norm upheld by biased empirical and normative expectations (Bicchieri, 
2006), the social norms approach to engaging men (see Berkowitz, 2002) 
remains valid in the prevention of FGM/C. In terms of FGM/C prevention, 
such an approach should focus on people’s conceptions of moral norms 
(aiming to identify and mobilise progressive moral authorities to speak against 
FGM/C), and on parents’ conceptions of men’s preferences regarding the 
cutting of their future wives (aiming to identify and mobilise progressive 
young men to express their preference for uncut wives, however, without 
stigmatising and, thereby, double-victimising cut women). 
The practical contributions of this study concern the design of programmes 
to prevent FGM/C and the engagement of young men in such programmes, 
which is increasingly called for (Abdalla et al., 2012; Gele et al., 2013; Ismail 
et al., 2016; Kaplan et al., 2013; Lunde & Sagbakken, 2014; Mölsä, 2008; 
Newell-Jones, 2016, 2017; Shell–Duncan et al., 2016; Varol et al., 2015). 
Beginning with programme design, both men and women engaged in FGM/C 
prevention must understand the interrelations between, and be willing to 
challenge the patriarchal structures and practices that perpetuate FGM/C. 
FGM/C should be seen as a symptom of gender inequality and oppression, not 
as a contributor to women’s poor health. In other words, efforts to prevent 
FGM/C must dismantle the building blocks of FGM/C. Working with both 
men and women to deconstruct the hegemony of men can proceed, for 
instance, with a ‘gender analysis on a discursive and reflective journey’ 
(Jewkes et al., 2015). By doing so, participants can develop critical 
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consciousness of the structures that uphold men’s superiority—including the 
monopoly to interpret constructions of reality regarding what is ‘natural’ and 
‘normal’ (Jokinen, 2010)—as well as their individual role in reproducing them. 
Moreover, interventions should not draw on ideas associated with hegemonic 
masculinity, such as strength, warrior, or leader, potentially reinforcing the 
gender-inequitable masculine ideals (Jewkes et al., 2015). Thus, to engage 
men in preventing FGM/C in Somaliland, one should not appeal to men’s 
responsibility as ‘fathers of the country’ and ‘protectors of women and 
children’, notions that align with the hegemonic masculinity ideals. In 
addition to reproducing women’s exclusion from leadership positions, such a 
strategy represents women primarily as victims of FGM/C. However, men 
must feel welcomed and view it as an issue relevant to their lives (see also 
Casey et al., 2017).  
Because most previous studies and reports (for example Berg & Denison, 
2012, 2013; UNFPA; UNICEF, 2015; WHO, 2008) emphasise the involvement 
of male religious scholars, clan leaders, and village elders in preventing 
FGM/C, a major practical contribution of my study concerns the engagement 
of young men. In my data, the rationale that interviewees—young men 
themselves—used for engaging young men in anti-FGM/C efforts stemmed 
from their ‘unique’ power over marriageability preferences, as well as situating 
young men as the future leaders of the nation. The latter strategy implies that 
the hegemony of men is discursively reproduced by characterising men’s 
superiority in leadership positions as natural and commonsensical, which 
works against transforming the patriarchal gender order. It is worth noting, 
however, that in gerontocratic Somaliland, where young men possess very 
little power in relation to older men, and marriage is a doorstep to social 
adulthood, compliance with the prevailing masculinities and the hegemony of 
men reveals more (or at least as much) about the socio-economic position of 
young unmarried men than about their efforts to reproduce men’s domination. 
Peretz (2018, p. 26) argues that the key accountability issue when engaging 
men in the promotion of gender equality ‘is not men’s inability to see [their] 
privilege, but their inability to address privilege effectively, because it is 
operating on a macro-level and, thus, limiting their individual ability to 
respond effectively.’ Therefore, individualistic approaches tend to ‘blame 
individuals who receive privilege for both the privilege that they reproduce and 
for that which they are unable to prevent’, Peretz (p. 26) claims. This very 
much applies to young men in Somaliland, who are not only marginalised by 
uneven global and local income distribution but also because of their age. That 
is, young men are seen as immature and volatile, lacking leadership skills and 
knowledge, and, hence, excluded from positions of power. Young men’s 
reluctance to deconstruct men’s domination must also be understood against 
the harsh economic situation in Somaliland, where young men find it nearly 
impossible to fulfil prevailing masculinity ideals.  
Simultaneously, the role and potential of women in FGM/C prevention 
must be fully supported and utilised. Prominent local anti-FGM/C advocate 
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women like Edna Adan Ismail41 with whom young women may identify are 
necessary. Jewkes et al. (2015) note that working with women in 
deconstructing the hegemony of men needs to proceed so that women can 
develop a critical consciousness of their right to live without subjugation. 
Furthermore, women should be supported to scrutinize their role in 
reproducing their subordinate position through gender socialisation and 
through social sanctioning and marginalisation of certain femininities and 
masculinities (Jewkes et al., 2015).  
Finally, my data suggest that, in efforts aimed at eradicating FGM/C in 
practicing communities, international actors should remain in the background 
to safeguard local ownership of the efforts. Otherwise, they risk diminishing 
the legitimacy of such actions, because their good will and competence in 
questions attached to morality are often questioned by the local community. 
Furthermore, it is important to use local vocabulary rather than English-
language terms and acronyms, such as FGM or FGM/C, which, for example, in 
Somaliland, are often understood as referring to pharaonic cutting only, and 
are associated with international campaigns. On the other hand, the use of 
terms such as ‘sunnah’ to name the practice risks reinforcing the 
misconception of FGM/C as a requirement of Islam. When recruiting and 
training anti-FGM/C activists, arrangements with mixed-sex sessions often 
help men to view women as their equal counterparts instead of victims needing 
protection, and convince women of men’s increasing opposition to FGM/C. 
This agrees with Flood’s (2015) notion that mixed-sex groups are effective in 
preventing violence against women, especially if the session seeks to create a 
gender dialogue or opportunities for men to listen to women. Jewkes et al. 
(2014) claim that the most effective interventions to prevent violence against 
women involve women and men with combined single-sex and mixed-group 
delivery and which feature a lengthy participant engagement time. During 
joint sessions, attention must, however, focus on not stigmatising cut girls, and 
not raising concerns about their marriageability. Female participants should 
be consulted regarding the content of sessions and encouraged to take the lead 
in activities.  
7.3 AFTERTHOUGHTS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this final section, I provide some afterthoughts, discuss the limitations of 
this study, and suggest directions for further research.  
Whereas the international NGO and the local CSO with which I cooperated 
in many ways enabled this study, their role also set some limitations and 
41Edna Adan Ismail is the founder and director of the Maternity and Teaching Hospital in Hargeisa, 
and a pioneer in the effort to end FGM/C in Somaliland. She made the first public declaration on 
stopping FGM/C at a governmental meeting in March 1977, and continued to lobby until 1991, when the 
government was overthrown and campaigns against FGM/C collapsed. In 1997, as a WHO representative 
in Djibouti, Ismail was asked to return to Somaliland to denounce FGM/C at the first seminar to 
revitalise efforts to eliminate FGM/C (Ismail, 2009; UNFPA & UNICEF, 2015). 
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eventually affected the data. My reliance on the support of these 
organisations—which was enhanced by the challenging security situation in 
Somaliland—to access the field and to recruit research participants implied 
above all that I was sometimes misinterpreted as a representative of the 
international NGO (and therefore a potential employer to the student 
interviewees). In my view, some of the interviewees thus considered the 
interview as a test of their knowledge about FGM/C. This produced a certain 
bias in the data. For example, I assume that listing numerous health 
consequences was (over)emphasised as well as young men’s responsibility, 
capability, and unique position in preventing FGM/C. Furthermore, the 
nascent human rights discourse and sexuality discourse may not emerge in 
other settings, where students discuss FGM/C. On the other hand, this can be 
seen as my position as a complete outsider (a Western and non-Muslim 
woman) empowering the interviewees to speak more freely. It must be noted, 
however, that the semi-structured interview scheme also affected the 
accounts. For example, interviewees were guided to elaborate upon the effects 
of FGM/C on men, which contributed to some ‘new’ elements in the health 
discourse (such as representing pharaonic cutting as a hindrance to marital 
sex). Without specifically asking them to elaborate upon the negative effects to 
men, they probably would have concentrated on the effects to women.  
As an afterthought, focus group discussions in addition to individual 
interviews might have produced interesting contradictions, thereby revealing 
something about the prevailing norms. For example, Newell–Jones (2017, p. 
29) found in her investigation about FGM/C attitudes in Somaliland a 
contradiction in the opinions expressed by young men during focus group 
discussions compared to responses during confidential interviews. When 
interviewed individually, 29% of young men said that they would prefer that 
their daughters remained uncut, whilst during focus group discussions the 
overwhelming opinion was that being uncut was completely unacceptable in 
their community. Considering that the individual interviews in my data 
produced different views on, for example, the religious status of sunnah 
cutting and on the loosening of gender segregation (women’s increasing 
economic involvement), it would be interesting to explore how they negotiate 
their views in a group setting.  
Based on this study, little can be said about the views of Somali men in 
general on FGM/C, violence against women, gender norms, or the gender 
order, since the interviewees consisted of a select group of young, educated 
men from the capital city. Yet, the fact that these progressive men discursively 
reproduced rigid gender norms and men’s superiority—in an interview setting 
that some interpreted as a ‘test’ of their knowledge—suggests that the revealed 
power asymmetries and structural inequalities revealed are both naturalised 
and legitimate. In terms of future research, observing young anti-FGM/C 
activists’ encounters and discourses with other community members could 
shed light on the role of the context in constructing discourses on FGM/C and 
gender. Specifically, it would be interesting to explore the discourses on 
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FGM/C and gender that young people employ in their peer-to-peer 
encounters. Social media would provide one arena for such research, as well 
as to illuminate the impact of new technologies on discourses. Whereas this 
study focused on the discourses employed by young male activists, an 
equivalent study focusing on the female activists would serve the purpose of, 
for example, exploring the eventual gendered differences in the discourses, 
that, in light of this study (with only four female interviewees), were 
surprisingly few. 
Based on my study, little can be said about men’s motives and pathways to 
anti-FGM/C activism. The students who participated in the anti-FGM/C 
training were primarily nominated by the university management and did not, 
thus, strictly volunteer. In general, their motives drew from both relational 
interests (solidarity for women and girls) and community interests (public 
health) (see Flood, 2011). Understanding the variety and severity of the health 
risks related to pharaonic cutting appeared to ‘activate’ men’s ‘protective 
shield’ over women (see El-Bushra & Gardner, 2016), and thus ‘fuel’ their 
activism. In particular, men studying public health or social work viewed it 
their masculine as well as their professional duty to advocate against FGM/C. 
In line with UNICEF’s (2010) findings, the reasons men cited for abandoning 
pharaonic cutting also stemmed from an understanding that religion does not 
mandate it and that it may negatively impact sexual relationships. Since the 
interviewees in this study had barely begun actual campaigning against 
FGM/C when I interviewed them, it would be interesting to conduct follow-up 
interviews to, for instance, determine which factors promote or hinder long-
term engagement in FGM/C prevention, and if there are gendered differences 
in this regard. Whilst the students seemed quite engaged in preventing FGM/C 
during the actual research interviews in 2016, the follow-up meeting two years 
later left me with the impression that only a few remained genuinely engaged, 
some of whom were even employed in FGM/C projects run by local CSOs42.  
The role of the diaspora in preventing FGM/C was not mentioned by my 
student interviewees. In the background interviews with CSO employees, 
however, the diaspora was touched upon with both optimism and ‘a grain of 
salt’. Somali girls in the diaspora who remain uncut but who are considered 
respectable and getting married, were perceived as serving as role models, 
aligned with the views amongst nurses, returning Somali exiles, and 
development workers interviewed by Vestbøstad and Blystad (2014) in 
Hargeisa. On the other hand, the impact of the diaspora appears to depend 
upon how the general public views the diaspora. If individuals are perceived 
as Westernized (which is often the case if they live in or return from the West), 
42Following the meeting, I talked with one participant about the challenges in keeping young 
activists motivated. He suggested that when mobilising students, those from the fields of social work and 
public health should be prioritised since they have enough prior knowledge, are keen to address social 
problems like FGM/C, and are thus more comfortable publicly challenging FGM/C. He insisted that 
trained students must be supported throughout, offered repetitive training, and provided with a 
‘platform’ on which to work (for example, regular follow-up meetings, a magazine, public debates, or 
mentoring by more experienced activists). Students who remain engaged could receive certificates, 
recommendation letters or volunteer vacancies to enhance their employability. 
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they can at worst jeopardise the efforts to eradicate FGM/C. But, if such 
individuals are seen as somebody from the same community (which is often 
the case if they live in or return from, for example, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, or other Islamic countries), they can be viewed as role models. 
This issue should be explored in greater detail.  
Furthermore, to understand the interplay of the discourses identified in 
this study with the construction of the prevailing FGM/C and gender 
discourses in Somaliland, discourses employed by, for instance, religious 
scholars, political leaders, clan elders, health professionals and media should 
be explored. During my follow-up visit to Hargeisa in October 2018, I met with 
some of the local CSO employees I interviewed in 2016. They informed me that 
the Sexual Offences Bill to criminalise rape, forced marriage, trafficking for 
sexual slavery, and sexual harassment—passed by the Parliament’s upper 
house in April 2018 (see also Bhalla, 2018) and ratified by the President of 
Somaliland in October 2018—was subsequently pulled back due to ‘Western 
influence’ and accusations of legitimating adultery. CSO employees thought 
that the ‘scandal’ also negatively impacted the promotion of the anti-FGM bill, 
since political leaders were now quite cautious regarding anything related to 
the gender–Islam nexus.  
Another concern voiced by CSO employees was the religious fatwa issued 
by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in February 2018. CSOs advocating for a 
zero tolerance of all types of FGM/C required rephrasing of the fatwa because 
it legitimises sunnah cutting. According to the fatwa, ‘[i]t’s forbidden to 
perform any circumcision that is contrary to the religion which involves 
cutting and sewing up, like pharaoh [pharaonic] circumcision’ (Ahmed, Maruf, 
& Hassan, 2018). In SIHA’s (2018) interpretation, the fatwa is problematic 
because it also frames FGM/C as a religious matter. Furthermore, the fatwa 
vows to punish violators and allows victims to receive compensation, but it 
does not describe the type or severity of punishment nor indicate whether 
compensation is paid by the government or by those who violate the ban 
(Ahmed, Maruf, & Hassan, 2018). The students with whom I met in October 
2018 noted, however, that regardless of the problematic wording, the fatwa 
implies to Somalilanders that opposition to the practice comes from within the 
country not from outside.  
The Sexual Offences Bill and the religious fatwa ‘cases’ illustrate the norm-
setting power of religious scholars in Somaliland, as well as the sometimes 
unexpected and undesirable consequences of external intervention. In 
addition to open lobbying for legislation and policies, more subtle intervention 
such as ‘importing’ discourses can appear as external influence, as is the case 
with framing FGM/C as a matter of human rights violation and gender 
discrimination. The ‘case’ I studied also serves as an example of external 
influence. The international community (via the international NGO) 
supported the local CSO to eradicate FGM/C by mobilising local students to 
advocate via social media and amongst their peers and family members. As my 
data illustrates, trained students did not automatically adopt all of the 
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meanings delivered during the training. The human rights perspective did 
emerge in some accounts, thereby de-emphasising the health consequences 
and claiming more principal opposition to FGM/C as a violation not only of 
the right to health, but to bodily integrity. However, the interviewees were 
unanimous that the human rights approach is not legitimate and applicable 
amongst their target audiences, who equate it as a foreign intrusion. 
Furthermore, women’s rights are understood as granted by Islam and thus, 
violated primarily if something is imposed upon a woman, which is forbidden 
by religion or if the rights entitled by the Qur’an remain unfulfilled.  
To address the difficulty of applying human rights arguments in FGM/C 
prevention work, Mackie and LeJeune (2009, p. 28) argue that ‘transformative 
human rights deliberation should not be conceived of as the imperious 
transmission of informed and legitimated international norms to less 
informed and less legitimate local communities.’ Instead, they suggest, human 
rights ideas must be translated into local terms by making community values 
explicit and stimulating discussions of how these are better upheld. With 
regards to FGM/C practices, Mackie and LeJeune (p. 26) suggest that making 
the fundamental moral of ‘doing the best for one’s daughter’ explicit could 
justify why a social norm (FGM/C) should be amended so that ‘individuals are 
not rejecting the bad but are embracing the good’. In a similar vein, the men I 
interviewed revised the social norm (FGM/C, especially the pharaonic type) by 
making explicit the fundamental moral norm perpetuating FGM/C in 
Somaliland, women’s religious purity (that is, virginity and abstinence from 
premarital sex), and characterised women as capable of safeguarding their 
purity without undergoing FGM/C. This revision not only contributes to 
FGM/C prevention, but also to women’s agency.  
When I specified my research aim in late 2013, my underlying belief was 
that if more men are encouraged to stand against FGM/C publicly, the 
pluralistic ignorance around the practice can be diminished. That is, FGM/C 
can be transformed from a ‘women’s issue’ to everybody’s issue; parents’ trust 
in the marriageability of uncut girls can be enhanced, and the stigma attached 
to uncut girls can be reduced. Following my analysis, I continue to believe that 
more men should be engaged in efforts to prevent FGM/C. However, it is 
unsustainable to engage people (men or women, from the grassroots level to 
political leaders) in FGM/C prevention without highlighting the patriarchal 
structures and practices that sustain FGM/C.
 142 
REFERENCES
Abdalla, M., Omer, A., & Elmusharaf, K. (2012). Female genital mutilation 
(FGM) in Sudan: what do men think? Contraception, 85(3), 317. Retrieved 
from http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010782411006822? 
showall=true 
Abdullahi, M. D. (2001). Culture and Customs of Somalia. Greenwood Press. 
Abu-Sahlieh, S. A. A. (1994). To Mutilate in the Name of Jehovah or Allah: 
Legitimization of Male and Female Circumcision. Medicine and Law, 13(7–
8), 575–622. Retrieved from http://pubmed.gov/7731348 
Abusharaf, R. M. (2000). Revisiting Feminist Discourses on Infibulation: 
Responses from Sudanese Feminists. In B. Shell-Duncan & Y. Hernlund 
(Eds.), Female “Circumcision” in Africa: Culture, Controversy and Change 
(pp. 151–166). Boulder: Lynne Rienne Publ. 
Adams, M., & Coltrane, S. (2004). Boys and Men in Families: The Domestic 
Production of Gender, Power, and Privilege. In M. S. Kimmel, J. Hearn, & 
R. W. Connell (Eds.), Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities (pp. 
230–248). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Ahmadu, F. (1995). Rites and Wrongs. Pride, (April/May). 
Ahmadu, F. (2000). Rites and Wrongs: An Insider/Outsider Reflects on Power 
and Excision. In B. Shell-Duncan & Y. Hernlund (Eds.), Female 
“Circumcision” in Africa: Culture, Controversy and Change (pp. 283–312). 
Boulder: Lynne Rienne Publ. 
Ahmed, I. I. (1999). The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and 
Somaliland: local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction. 
Third World Quarterly, 20(1), 113–127. Retrieved from 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436599913947 
Ahmed, S. A., Maruf, H., & Hassan, S. M. (2018, February 6). Somaliland 
Fatwa Forbids FGM. Voice of America. Retrieved from 
https://www.voanews.com/a/somaliland-fatwa-forbids-
fgm/4241641.html 
Akar, S., & Tiilikainen, M. (2009). Katsaus islamilaiseen maailmaan. Naiset, 
perhe ja seksuaaliterveys. In Väestötietosarja. Helsinki. Retrieved from 
https://www.vaestoliitto.fi/@Bin/373235/Islam09_LR.pdf 
Almroth, L., Almroth-Berggren, V., Hassanein, O., Al-Said, S., Hasan, S., & 
Lithell, U.-B. (2001). Male complications of female genital mutilation. 
Social Science and Medicine, 53(11), 1455–1460. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11710420 
Anderson, K. L. (2009). Gendering coercive control. Violence Against Women, 
15, 1444–1457. 
Anees, M. A. (1989). Genital Mutilations: Moral or Misgynous? Islamic 
Quarterly, 33(2), 101–117. 
APD. (2002). Women’s Rights in Islam and Somali Culture. Hargeisa: United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Retrieved from 
https://www.unicef.org/somalia/SOM_WomenInIslam.pdf 
Arat, Z. F. K., & Hasan, A. (2018). Muslim masculinities: what is the 
prescription of the Qur’an? Journal of Gender Studies, 27(7), 788–801. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09589236.2017.1316246 
BBC News. (2017). Somaliland profile. Retrieved January 11, 2018, from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14115069 
 143 
Beasley, C. (2012). Problematizing contemporary Men/Masculinities 
theorizing: The contribution of Raewyn Connell and conceptual-
terminological tensions today. British Journal of Sociology, 63(4), 747–
765. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2012.01435.x 
Beasley, C. (2013). Mind the Gap? Masculinity Studies and Contemporary 
Gender/Sexuality Thinking. Australian Feminist Studies, 28(75), 108–124. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2013.761949 
Beasley, C. (2015). Caution! Hazards ahead: Considering the potential gap 
between feminist thinking and men/masculinities theory and practice. 
Journal of Sociology, 51(3), 566–581. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1440783314553317 
Belotti, E. G., Appignanesi, L., & Wordsworth, J. (1975). Little Girls: Social 
Conditioning and Its Effects on the Stereotyped Role of Women During 
Infancy. Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative. 
Bendana, A., & Chopra, T. (2013). Women’s rights, state-centric rule of law, 
and legal pluralism in Somaliland. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 5, 
44–73. 
Berg, R. C., & Denison, E. (2012). Interventions to reduce the prevalence of 
female genital mutilation/cutting in African countries. Campbell 
Systematic Reviews, 9. https://doi.org/10.4073/csr.2012.9 
Berg, R. C., & Denison, E. (2013). A tradition in transition: factors 
perpetuating and hindering the continuance of female genital 
mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) summarized in a systematic review. Health 
Care for Women International, 34(10), 837–859. https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/07399332.2012.721417 
Berg, R. C., Denison, E., & Fretheim, A. (2010). Psychological, social and 
sexual consequences of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C): a 
systematic review of quantitative studies. Oslo: Nasjonalt kunnskapssenter 
for helsetjenesten. 
Berggren, K. (2014). Sticky Masculinity: Post-structuralism, Phenomenology 
and Subjectivity in Critical Studies on Men. Men and Masculinities, 17(3), 
231–252. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X14539510 
Berggren, K. (2018). Is Everything Compatible? A Feminist Critique of Hearn’s 
Composite Approach to Men and Masculinity. Australian Feminist Studies, 
33(97), 331–344. https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2018.1542590 
Berggren, V., Ahmed, S., Hernlund, Y., Johansson, E., Habbani, B., & Edberg, 
A.-K. (2006). Being victims or beneficiaries? Perspectives on female genital 
cutting and reinfibulation in Sudan. African Journal of Reproductive 
Health, 10(2), 24–36. 
Berkowitz, A. D. (2002). The Social Norms Approach: Theory, Research, and 
Annotated Bibliography. Social Norms Theory and Research. Retrieved 
from www.alanberkowitz.com 
Bhalla, N. (2018, April 9). Somaliland elders approve “historic” law 
criminalising rape. Thomson Reuters Foundation. Retrieved from 
http://news.trust.org/item/20180409172414-jt17f/ 
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of 
Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.ling.ohio-state.edu/~davidson/Texts/bicchieri_2005_ 
grammar _of_society.pdf 
Billig, M. (1991). Ideology and opinions: Studies in rhetorical psychology. 
London: SAGE Publications. 
 144 
Blommaert, J., & Bucean, C. (2000). Critical Discourse Analysis. Annual 
Review of Anthropology, 29(1), 447–466. https://doi.org/10.1146/ 
annurev.anthro.29.1.447. 
Boddy, J. (1986). Body Politics: Continuing the Anticircumcision Crusade. 
Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 5(1), 15–17. 
Boddy, J. (1998). Violence embodied? Female circumcision, gender politics, 
and cultural aesthetics. In R. Dobash & R. Dobash (Eds.), Rethinking 
Violence Against Women (pp. 77–110). California: Thousand Oaks. 
Boddy, J. (2016). The normal and the aberrant in female genital cutting. HAU: 
Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 6(2), 41–69. 
Boulware-Miller, K. (1985). Female Circumcision: Challenges to the Practice 
as a Human Rights Violation. Harward Women’s Law Journal, 8, 155–177. 
Retrieved from https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/ 
10822/807894 
Boyden, J., Pankhurst, A., & Tafere, Y. (2012). Child protection and harmful 
traditional practices: female early marriage and genital modification in 
Ethiopia. Development in Practice, 22(4), 510–522. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2012.672957 
Bradbury, M., Abokor, Y. A., & Yusuf, H. A. (2005). Somaliland: Choosing 
Politics Over Violence. Review of African Political Economy, 30(97), 455–
478. 
Breitung, B. (1996). Interpretation and Eradication: National and 
International Responses to Female Circumcision. Emory International 
Law Review, 10(2), 657–693. 
Brittan, A. (1989). Masculinity and Power. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Brownmiller, S. (1976). Against Our Will: men, women and rape. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Bruchhaus, E.-M. (2013). Report on the Situation of FGM/C in Somaliland. 
Hargeisa: Network against FGM/C in Somaliland (NAFIS). 
Bufacchi, V. (2005). Two Concepts of Violence. Political Studies Review, 3(2), 
193–204. 
Bumiller, K. (2010). The nexus of domestic violence reform and social science: 
From instrument of social change to institutionalized surveillance. Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science, 6, 173–193. 
Carlson, J., Casey, E. A., Edleson, J. L., Tolman, R. M., Walsh, T. B., & Kimball, 
E. (2015). Strategies to Engage Men and Boys in Violence Prevention: A 
Global Organizational Perspective. Violence Against Women, 21(11), 1406–
1425. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801215594888 
Carrigan, T., Connell, B., & Lee, J. (1987). Hard and heavy: toward a new 
sociology of masculinity. In M. Kaufman (Ed.), Beyond Patriarchy: Essays 
by Men on Pleasure, Powern and Change. Toronto: Oxford University 
Press. 
Carrigan, T., Connell, R., & Lee, J. (1985). Toward a New Sociology of 
Masculinity. Theory and Society, 14(5), 551–604. 
Casey, E. A., & Smith, T. (2010). “How Can I Not?”: Men’s Pathways to 
Involvement in Anti-Violence Against Women Work. Violence Against 
Women, 16(8), 953–973. 
Casey, E. A., Tolman, R. M., Carlson, J., Allen, C. T., & Storer, H. L. (2017). 
What Motivates Men’s Involvement in Gender-based Violence Prevention? 
Latent Class Profiles and Correlates in an International Sample of Men. 
Men and Masculinities, 20(3), 294–316. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X16634801 
 145 
Castelino, T. (2013). A Feminist Critique of Men’s Violence Against Women 
Efforts. No To Violence Journal (Melbourne: No To Violence – Male Family 
Violence Prevention Association), (Autumn). 
Chodorow, N. (1979). The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the 
Sociology of Gender. University of California Press. 
Christensen, A.-D., & Jensen, S. Q. (2014). Combining hegemonic masculinity 
and intersectionality. NORMA: International Journal for Masculinity 
Studies, 9(1), 60–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/18902138.2014.892289 
Citizens’ initiative to ban FGM set for parliamentary consideration. (2018, 
August 18). Yle. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/ 
citizens_initiative_to_ban_fgm_set_for_parliamentary_consideration/1
0359602 
Comer, L. (1974). Wedlocked women. Feminist Books. 
Connell, R. (1987). Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics. 
Palo Alto, California: University of California Press. 
Connell, R. (1995). Masculinities. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Connell, R. (2003). The Role of Men and Boys in Achieving Gender Equality. 
Brazil: United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW). 
Retrieved from http://www.ashanet.org/focusgroups/sanctuary/articles/ 
Connell-bp.pdf 
Connell, R. (2005a). Change among the Gatekeepers: Men, Masculinities, and 
Gender Equality in the Global Arena. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 
and Society, 30(3), 1801–1825. Retrieved from 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=16670
719&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
Connell, R. (2005b). Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities. In M. 
Kimmel, J. Hearn, & R. Connell (Eds.), Handbook of Studies on Men and 
Masculinities (pp. 71–89). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Connell, R. (2014). Margin becoming centre: for a world-centred rethinking of 
masculinities. NORMA: International Journal for Masculinity Studies, 
9(4), 217–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/18902138.2014.934078 
Connell, R., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Hegemonic Masculinity: 
Rethinking the Concept. Gender & Society, 19(6), 829–859. Retrieved from 
http://gas.sagepub.com/ 
Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland [English] (2001). Retrieved from 
http://somalilandgov.com/new/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ 
Somaliland-Constitution-Text-only-Eng-IJ.pdf 
Cooney, M. (2014). Family honour and social time. The Sociological Review, 
62(S2), 87–106. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.12193 
Crawford, S., & Ali, S. (2015). Situational Analysis of FGM/C stakeholders and 
interventions in Somalia. UNFPA-UNICEF. Retrieved from 
http://orchidproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Situational-
Analysis-of-FGMC-Stakeholders-and-Interventions-in-Somalia1.pdf 
Crooks, C. V., Goodall, G. R., Hughes, R., Jaffe, P. G., & Baker, L. L. (2007). 
Engaging Men and Boys in Preventing Violence Against Women: Applying 
a Cognitive-Behavioral Model. Violence Against Women, 13(3), 217–239. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801206297336 
Daly, M. (1978). Gyn/ecology: the metaethics of radical feminism. London: 
Women’s Press. 
David, D. S., & Brannon, D. (1976). The Forty-nine Percent Majority: The Male 
Sex Role. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
De Miguel, A. (2015). Neoliberalismo sexual. Madrid: Cátedra. 
 146 
Derrida, J. (1976). De la grammatologie. Johns Hopkins University Press. 
DeSondy, A. (2013). The crisis of Islamic masculinities. New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
Diop, N. J., Helmore, K., Moneti, F., Donahue, C., Toure, A., & Haug, W. 
(2012). UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting: Accelerating Change. Annual Report 2011. New York. 
Dirie, M. A., & Lindmark, G. (1991). Female Circumcision in Somalia and 
Women’s Motives. Acta Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica, 70, 581–
585. 
Donnelly, J. (2007). The Relative Universality of Human Rights. Human 
Rights Quarterly, 29(2), 281–306. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2007.0016 
Dorkenoo, E. (1994). Cutting the Rose - Female Genital Mutilation: The 
Practice and Its Prevention. London: Minority Rights Group. 
Ejizu, C. I. (2007). African Traditional Religions and the Promotion of 
Community (Kiabala Readings on Religion and Culture in Africa). Kiabala 
Publications. Retrieved from http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/ 
community.htm 
El-Bushra, J., & Gardner, J. (2016). The impact of war on Somali men: 
feminist analysis of masculinities and gender relations in a fragile context. 
Gender & Development, 24(3), 443–458. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
13552074.2016.1233668 
El Feki, S., Heilman, B., & Barker, G. (2017). Understanding Masculinities: 
Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) 
– Middle East and North Africa. Cairo, Washington D.C. Retrieved from 
http://imagesmena.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/05/ 
IMAGESMENA-2017-FULL-Final-10May2017.pdf 
Eliah, E. (1996). REACHing for a Healthier Future. Populi, May, 12–16. 
Ellsberg, M., & Heise, L. (2005). Researching Violence Against Women: A 
Practical Guide for Researchers and Activists. Washington DC: World 
Health Organization, Program for Appropriate Technology in Health 
(PATH). 
Elshtain, J. B. (1981). Public Man, Private Woman. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Fabiano, P., Perkins, H. W., Berkowitz, A. B., Linkenbach, J., & Stark, C. 
(2004). Engaging men as social justice allies in ending violence against 
women: Evidence for a social norms approach. Journal of American 
College Health, 52(3), 105–112. 
Fahmy, A., El-Mouelhy, M., & Ragab, A. (2010). Female genital 
mutilation/cutting and issues of sexuality in Egypt. Reproductive Health 
Matters, 18(36), 181–190. 
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of 
language. Harlow: Longman. 
Fairclough, N. (2001). Language and Power. Harlow: Longman. 
Fatwa. (n.d.). In Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa. 
Retrieved from https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-
religion/islam/islam/fatwa#3403500156 
Felski, R. (1997). The doxa of difference. Signs, 23(1), 1–22. 
Flood, M. (2004). Men’s Collective Struggles for Gender Justice. The Case of 
Antiviolence Activism. In M. S. Kimmel, J. Hearn, & R. W. Connell (Eds.), 
Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities (pp. 458–466). Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
 147 
Flood, M. (2011). Involving Men in Efforts to End Violence Against Women. 
Men and Masculinities, 14(3), 358–377. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/1097184X10363995 
Flood, M. (2015). Work with men to end violence against women: a critical 
stocktake. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 17(sup2), 159–176. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13691058.2015.1070435 
Foucault, M. (1981). The History of Sexuality, vol. 1: An Introduction. 
Harmondsworth: Pelican. 
Foucault, M. (1987). The History of Sexuality, vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Foucault, M., & Gordon, C. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 
and Other Writings, 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Fusaschi, M. (2017). The status of women excisors. In A. Kaplan, L. Nuño 
Gómez, M. Thill, & V. Vitale (Eds.), Multisectoral academic training guide 
on female genital mutilation/cutting (pp. 158–159). Madrid: Multisectoral 
academic programme to prevent & combat female genital 
mutilation/cutting (MAP-FGM). 
Gage, A. J., & Van Rossem, R. (2006). Attitudes toward the discontinuation of 
female genital cutting among men and women in Guinea. International 
Journal of Gynecology and Obstetric, 92(1), 92–96. Retrieved from 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S002072920500531X?showa
ll=true 
Gardner, J., & El Bushra, J. (2004). Somalia the Untold Story. The war 
through the eyes of Somali women. London: Sterling & Virginia: CIIR & 
Pluto Press. 
Gee, J. P. (1999). An Introduction to Discourse Analysis. Theory and Method. 
London: Routledge. 
Gele, A. A., Bø, B. P., & Sundby, J. (2013). Have we made progress in Somalia 
after 30 years of interventions? Attitudes toward female circumcision 
among people in the Hargeisa district. BMC Research Notes, 6(122). 
Retrieved from https://bmcresnotes.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/ 
1756-0500-6-122 
Gele, A. A., Johansen, E. B., & Sundby, J. (2012). When female circumcision 
comes to the West: attitudes toward the practice among Somali Immigrants 
in Oslo. BMC Public Health, 12(698), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-
2458-12-697 
Gele, A. A., Kumar, B., Hjelde, K. H., & Sundby, J. (2012). Attitudes towards 
female circumcision among Somali immigrants in Oslo: a qualitative study. 
International Journal of Women’s Health, 4, 1–11. Retrieved from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3271810/ 
Gerami, S. (2005). Islamist Masculinity and Muslim Masculinities. In M. 
Kimmel, J. Hearn, & R. Connell (Eds.), Handbook of Studies on Men and 
Masculinities (pp. 448–457). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Giladi, A. (1997). Normative Islam Versus Local Tradition: Some Observations 
on Female Circumcision With Special Reference to Egypt. Arabica, 
XLIV(2), 254–267. 
Glas, S., Spierings, N., & Scheepers, P. (2018). Re-Understanding Religion and 
Support for Gender Equality in Arab Countries. Gender & Society, 32(5), 
686–712. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243218783670 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
 148 
Groes-Green, C. (2011). Philogynous masculinities: Contextualizing 
alternative manhood in Mozambique. Men and Masculinities, 15(2), 91–
111. 
Gruenbaum, E. (2001). The Female Circumcision Controversy: An 
Anthropological Perspective. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
Gruenbaum, E. (2006). Sexuality issues in the Movement to Abolish Female 
Genital Cutting in Sudan. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 20(1), 121–138. 
Gundel, J. (2006). The predicament of the ‘Oday’: The role of traditional 
structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia. Nairobi: 
Danish Refugee Council & Novib/Oxfam. 
Gutmann, M. C. (1996). The meanings of macho: being a man in Mexico City. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Hansen, P. (2008). Circumcising Migration: Gendering Return Migration 
among Somalilanders. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34(7), 
1109–1125. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830802230422 
Harris, D., & Foresti, M. (2011). Somaliland’s progress on governance: A case 
of blending the old and the new. Retrieved from https://www. 
odi.org/publications/5482-somalilands-progress-governance-case-
blending-old-and-new 
Hartmann, H. I. (1979). Capitalism, patriarchy and job segregation by sex. In 
Z. R. Eisenstein (Ed.), Capitalist Patriarchy. New York: Monthly Review 
Press. 
Hartmann, H. I. (1981). The family as the locus of gender, class and political 
struggle: the example of housework. Signs, 6(3), 366–394. 
Hearn, J. (1987). The Gender of Oppression: Men, Masculinity, and the 
Critique of Marxism. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Hearn, J. (1992). Men in the Public Eye: The Construction and Deconstruction 
of Public Men and Public Patriarchies. London: Routledge. 
Hearn, J. (1996a). Deconstructing the Dominant: Making the One(s) the 
Other(s). Organization, 3(4), 611–626. 
Hearn, J. (1996b). Is masculinity dead? A critique of the concept of 
masculinity/masculinities. In M. Mac and Ghaill (Ed.), Understanding 
masculinities. Social relations and cultural arenas (pp. 202–217). 
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Hearn, J. (2001). Men and Gender Equality: Resistance, Responsibilities and 
Reaching Out. In Conference Men and Gender Equality. Örebro. 
Hearn, J. (2004). From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men. 
Feminist Theory, 5(1), 49–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1464700104040813 
Hearn, J. (2014). Men, masculinities and the material(-)discursive. NORMA, 
9(1), 5–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/18902138.2014.892281 
Hearn, J., & McKie, L. (2008). Gendered policy and policy on gender: The case 
of “domestic violence.” Policy and Politics, 36(1), 75–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1332/030557308783431634 
Hearn, J., Novikova, I., Pringle, K., Smidova, I., Jyrkinen, M., Iovanni, L., … 
Wojtaszek, M. M. (2013). Studying Men’s Violences: Some Key 
Methodological Principles in Developing a European Research Framework. 
Masculinities and Social Change, 2(1), 82–115. 
https://doi.org/10.4471/MCS.2013.22 
Helander, B. (1987). Gender and Gender Characteristics as a Folk Model in 
Southern Somali Social Classification and Symbolism. Uppsala: African 
 149 
Studies Programme, Dept. of Cultural Anthropology, University of 
Uppsala. 
Hernlund, Y. (2000). Cutting Without Ritual and Ritual Without Cutting: 
Female “Circumcision” and the Re-ritualization of Initiation in Gambia. In 
B. Shell-Duncan & Y. Hernlund (Eds.), Female “Circumcision” in Africa: 
Culture, Controversy and Change (pp. 235–252). Boulder: Lynne Rienne 
Publ. 
Hirdman, Y. (1990). The Gender System. Theoretical Reflections on the Social 
Subordination of Women. In The Study of Power and Democracy in 
Sweden, English Series. Report nr. 40. Stockholm. 
Hogan, J. (2009). Gender, Race and National Identity. Nations of Flesh and 
Blood. New York: Routledge. 
Holmgren, L. E., & Hearn, J. (2009). Framing “men in feminism”: Theoretical 
locations, local contexts and practical passings in men’s gender-conscious 
positionings on gender equality and feminism. Journal of Gender Studies, 
18(4), 403–418. 
Honig, B. (1999). “My Culture Made Me Do It.” In J. Cohen, M. Howard, & M. 
C. Nussbaum (Eds.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (pp. 31–34). 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
hooks, b. (2000). Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. Cambridge: South 
End Press. 
Hopkins, P. E. (2006). Youthful Muslim masculinities: Gender and 
generational relations. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 31(3), 337–352. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-
5661.2006.00206.x 
Human Rights Watch. (2009). Hostages to Peace: Threats to Human Rights 
and Democracy in Somaliland. Retrieved from https://www. 
hrw.org/report/2009/07/13/hostages-peace/threats-human-rights-and-
democracy-somaliland 
Hunnicutt, G. (2009). Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: 
Resurrecting “Patriarchy” as a Theoretical Tool. Violence Against Women, 
15(5), 553–573. 
Irigaray, L., & Gill, G. C. (1985). Speculum of the Other Woman. Cornell 
University Press. 
Irigaray, L., Porter, C., Burke, C., & Burke, P. C. (1985). This Sex which is Not 
One. Cornell University Press. 
Ismail, E. A. (2009). Female genital mutilation survey in Somaliland. 
Hargeisa: Edna Adan Maternity and Teaching Hospital. 
Ismail, E. A., Ali, A. A., Mohamed, A. S., Kraemer, T., & Winfield, S. (2016). 
Female Genital Mutilation Survey in Somaliland. Second Cohort. Hargeisa: 
Edna Adan University Hospital. Retrieved from 
https://www.orchidproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/fgm-
survey-in-somaliland-edna-adan-hospital-1.pdf 
Jakobsen, H. (2014). What’s Gendered about Gender-Based Violence? An 
Empirically Grounded Theoretical Exploration from Tanzania. Gender & 
Society, 28(4), 1–25. Retrieved from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ 
abs/10.1177/0891243214532311 
Jewkes, R., Flood, M., & Lang, J. (2014). From work with men and boys to 
changes of social norms and reduction of inequities in gender relations: a 
conceptual shift in prevention of violence against women and girls. The 
Lancet, 385, 1580–1589. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)61683-4 
 150 
Jewkes, R., Morrell, R., Hearn, J., Lundqvist, E., Blackbeard, D., Lindegger, 
G., … Gottzén, L. (2015). Hegemonic masculinity: combining theory and 
practice in gender interventions. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 17(S2), 112–
127. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691058.2015.1085094 
Johnsdotter Carlbom, S. (2002). Created by God: How Somalis in Swedish 
Exile Reassess the Practice of Female Circumcision. Lund University. 
Retrieved from https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/files/4821162/ 
1693227.pdf 
Johnsdotter, S., Carlbom, A., Geesdiir, A. O., & Elmi, A. (2000). Som Gud 
skapade oss: Förhållningssätt till kvinnlig omskärelse bland somalier i 
Malmö. Malmö: Program Sexuell hälsa. Retrieved from 
http://kunskapsbanken.nck.uu.se/nckkb/nck/publik/fil/visa/194/Som_
Gud_skapade_oss.pdf 
Johsdotter, S., & Essén, B. (2015). Cultural change after migration: 
circumcision of girls in Western migrant communities. Best Practice & 
Research Clinical Obstetrics & Gynaecology, 32, 15–25. 
Jokinen, A. (2010). Kriittinen mies- ja maskuliinisuustutkimus. In T. Saresma, 
L.-M. Rossi, & T. Juvonen (Eds.), Käsikirja sukupuoleen (pp. 128–139). 
Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Jokinen, A. (2017). Maskuliinisuus ja väkivalta. In J. Niemi, H. Kainulainen, 
& P. Honkatukia (Eds.), Sukupuolistunut väkivalta: Oikeudellinen ja 
sosiaalinen ongelma (pp. 36–50). Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Julkunen, R. (2010). Sukupuolen järjestykset ja tasa-arvon paradoksit. 
Tallinn: Vastapaino. 
Jyrkinen, M. (2014). Women managers, careers and gendered ageism. 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 30(2), 175–185. Retrieved from 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956522113000651 
Jyrkinen., M, Väkiparta, M., & Lämsä A-M. (forthcoming 2019/2020). Care 
and Gendered Work in Reception Centers in Finland. Equality, diversity 
and inclusion: An international journal. 
Kaplan, A., Cham, B., Njie, L. A., Seixas, A., Blanco, S., & Utzet, M. (2013). 
Female genital mutilation/cutting: the secret world of women as seen by 
men. Obstetrics and Gynecology International, 2013. 
https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/643780 
Kaplan, A., Nuño Gómez, L., Thill, M., & Vitale, V. (2017). Multisectoral 
academic training guide on female genital mutilation/cutting. Madrid: 
Multisectoral academic programme to prevent & combat female genital 
mutilation/cutting (MAP-FGM). Retrieved from https://www. 
researchgate.net/publication/316667620_Multisectoral_Academic_Train
ing_Guide_on_Female_Genital_MutilationCutting 
Kaufman, M. (2003). The AIM framework: Addressing and Involving Men and 
Boys To Promote Gender Equality and End Gender Discrimination and 
Violence. Uniten Nations Children’s Organization (UNICEF). 
Kellner, N. (1993). Under the Knife: Female Genital Mutilations as Child 
Abuse. Journal of Juvenile Law, 14, 118–132. Retrieved from 
https://www.popline.org/node/340452 
Keskinen, S. (2010). Sukupuolistunut väkivalta. In T. Saresma, L.-M. Rossi, & 
T. Juvonen (Eds.), Käsikirja sukupuoleen (pp. 243–253). Tampere: 
Vastapaino. 
Keskinen, S. (2017). Erojen näkökulma ylirajaisiin muuttoliikkeisiin. In J. 
Niemi, H. Kainulainen, & P. Honkatukia (Eds.), Sukupuolistunut väkivalta: 
Oikeudellinen ja sosiaalinen ongelma (pp. 269–285). Tampere: 
Vastapaino. 
 151 
Kleist, N. (2010). Negotiating Respectable Masculinity: Gender and 
Recognition in the Somali Diaspora. African Diaspora, 3(2), 185–206. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/187254610X526913 
Koomen, J. (2014). Global governance and the politics of culture: campaigns 
against female circumcision in East Africa. Gender, Place & Culture, 21(2), 
244–261. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/ 
10.1080/0966369X.2013.769428 
Kvale, S. (1996). InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Labour force survey Somaliland 2012. Report on Borama, Hargeisa & Burao. 
(2013). Hargeisa: Somaliland Ministry of Planning & Development and 
Ministry of Labour and social Development. Retrieved from 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@africa/@ro-addis_ababa/ 
@sro-addis_ababa/documents/publication/wcms_234412.pdf 
Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (2001). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
Landsberg, M. (2000). Canadian feminists’ uneasy alliance with men 
challenging violence. Voice Mail. 
Lazar, M. M. (2007). Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis: Articulating a 
Feminist Discourse Praxis. Critical Discourse Studies, 4(2), 141–164. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17405900701464816 
Le Sage, A. (2005). Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of 
Law. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Report. 
Legal Action Worldwide. (2018). Retrieved November 20, 2018, from 
http://www.legalactionworldwide.org/somalia-2/cedaw/ 
Lerner, G. (1986). The Creation of Patriarchy. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Levtov, R. G., Barker, G., Contreras-Urbina, M., Heilman, B., & Verma, R. 
(2014). Pathways to Gender-equitable Men: Findings from the 
International Men and Gender Equality Survey in Eight Countries. Men 
and Masculinities, 17(5), 467–501. Retrieved from https://journals. 
sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1097184X14558234 
Lewis, B. (1994). Legal and Historical Reflections on the Position of Muslim 
Populations Under Non-Muslim Rule. In B. Lewis & D. Schnapper (Eds.), 
Muslims in Europe (pp. 1–18). London: Pinter Publishers. 
Lewis, H. (1995). Between irua and ‘female genital mutilation’: Feminist 
human rights discourse and the cultural divide. Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, 8(1), 1–55. 
Lewis, I. M., & Sundström, L. (2014). Somalia ja Somalimaa. Kulttuuri, 
historia ja yhteiskunta. Tallinn: Gaudeamus. 
Lightfoot-Klein, H. (1989). Prisoners of Ritual: An Odyssey into Female 
Genital Circumcision on Africa. New York: Harrington Park Press. 
Luedke, A. (2015). The Other War. Gang Rape in Somaliland. Hargeisa: 
Strategic Initiative for women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA). Retrieved from 
https://sihanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/The-Other-War-
Gangrape-in-Somalialand-SIHA-Network.pdf 
Luedke, A. (2018). Women do not Belong Under Acasia Tree. The Conditions 
Experienced by Women Street Vendors in Somaliland. Strategic Initiative 
for women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA). Retrieved from 
http://sihanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/report-acacia-tree.pdf 
Lunde, I. B. (2012). Eradicating female genital cutting: Understanding reality 
conceptions: a study on perceptions of female genital cutting in Hargeisa, 
 152 
Somaliland (Somalia). Universitetet i Oslo. Retrieved from 
https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/34101?locale-attribute=en 
Lunde, I. B., & Sagbakken, M. (2014). Female genital cutting in Hargeisa, 
Somaliland: is there a move towards less severe forms? Reproductive 
Health Matters, 22(43), 169–177. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0968-
8080(14)43759-5 
Luxton, M. (1993). Dreams and dilemmas: Feminist musings on the ‘man 
question.’ In T. Haddad (Ed.), Men and masculinities: a critical anthology 
(pp. 347–374). Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press. 
Mackie, G. (1996). Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A convention 
account. American Sociological Review, 61(6), 999–1017. 
Mackie, G., & LeJeune, J. (2009). Social Dynamics of Abandonment of 
Harmful Practices: A New Look At the Theory. Florence: UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre. 
MacKinnon, C. A. (1989). Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Macomber, K. C. (2012). Men as Allies: Mobilizing Men to End Violence 
Against Women. North Carolina State University. 
McIntosh, P. (1989). White privilege: Unpacking the invisible knapsack. Peace 
and Freedom. 
McKie, L., Biese, I., & Jyrkinen, M. (2013). “The Best Time is Now!”: The 
Temporal and Spatial Dynamics of Women Opting in to Self-Employment. 
Gender Work and Organisation, 20(2), 184–196. 
Messner, M. A. (1997). Politics of Masculinities: Men in Movements. 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 
Messner, M. A., Greenberg, M. A., & Peretz, T. (2015). Some Men: Feminist 
Allies and the Movement to End Violence against Women. Oxford 
University Press. 
Metz, H. C. (1993). Somalia: a country study. Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Research Division, Library of Congress. Retrieved from 
https://www.loc.gov/item/93016246/ 
Millett, K. (1970). Sexual Politics. Garden City: Doubleday. 
Minister: Finland should consider ban on female genital mutilation. (2017, 
August 1). Yle. Retrieved from https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/minister 
_finland_should_consider_ban_on_female_genital_mutilation/9751261 
Mitchell, J. (1975). Psychoanalysis and Feminism. Penguin Books. 
Mitike, G., & Deressa, W. (2009). Prevalence and associated factors of female 
genital mutilation among Somali refugees in eastern Ethiopia: a cross-
sectional study. BMC Public Health, 9(264). 
Mohanty, C. T. (1984). Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses. On Humanism and the University I: The Discourse of 
Humanism, 12(3), 333–358. Retrieved from https://www-jstor-
org.libproxy.helsinki.fi/stable/pdf/302821.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5a7
44d2fc7959082ef35d54f284ffc7a 
Mölsä, M. (2008). Tyttöjen ja naisten ympärileikkausperinne. In P. Brusila 
(Ed.), Seksuaalisuus eri kulttuureissa. Helsinki: Duodecim, 19. 
Murnen, S. K., Wright, C., & Kaluzny, G. (2002). If “boys will be boys,” then 
girls will be victims? A meta-analytic review of the research that relates 
masculine ideology to sexual aggression. Sex Roles, 46(11), 359–375. 
NAFIS. (2014). Assessment of the Prevalence, Perception & Attitude of Female 
Genital Mutilation in Somaliland. Hargeisa: Network against FGM/C in 
 153 
Somaliland (NAFIS). Retrieved from http://www.nafisnetwork.net/ 
images/reports/FGM-Research-Report 2014.pdf 
NAGAAD. (2019). Somaliland Gender Gap Assessment. Hargeisa: NAGAAD 
Network. Retrieved from https://cng-cdn.oxfam.org/heca.oxfam.org/s3fs-
public/file_attachments/NAGAAD Somaliland Gender Gap Assessment 
FINAL.pdf 
Nagel, J. (1998). Masculinity and nationalism: Gender and sexuality in the 
making of nations. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(2), 242–269. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/014198798330007 
Narayan, U. (2009). Essence of culture and a sense of history: A feminist 
critique of cultural essentialism. Hypatia - A Journal of Feminist 
Philosophy, 13(2), 86–106. 
Näre, L. (2010). Sri Lankan Men as Cleaners and Carers – Negotiating 
Masculinity in Naples. Men and Masculinities, 13(1), 65–86. 
Näre, L. (2013). Migrancy, Gender and Social Class in Domestic and Social 
Care Labour in Italy - an Intersectional Analysis of Demand. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39(4), 601–623. 
Newell-Jones, K. (2016). Empowering communities to collectively abandon 
FGM/C in Somaliland: Baseline Research Report. ActionAid, SOWDA and 
WAAPO. 
Newell-Jones, K. (2017). Female genital cutting in Somaliland: Baseline 
assessment. Nairobi: Population Council. 
Nimo-Ilhan, A. (2016). Going on Tahriib: The causes and consequences of 
Somali youth migration to Europe. London: Rift Valley Institution. 
Retrieved from http://riftvalley.net/publication/going-tahriib#. 
WldP16hl9PZ 
Niskala, S. (2015). Hiljaisuuden noidankehä – tyttöjen ja naisten 
ympärileikkausperinne maahanmuuttajamiesten haastatteluissa. 
Tampereen yliopisto. 
Nousiainen, A. (2014, January 5). Hetki ennen silpomista – suomalaiskuvaaja 
todisti kahden tytön ympärileikkausta Keniassa. Helsingin Sanomat. 
Retrieved from https://www.hs.fi/datajournalismi/art-2000002699345. 
html 
Nousiainen, K., & Pentikäinen, M. (2017). Naisiin kohdistuva väkivalta 
ihmisoikeuskysymyksenä. Suomi alisuorittajana. In J. Niemi, H. 
Kainulainen, & P. Honkatukia (Eds.), Sukupuolistunut väkivalta: 
Oikeudellinen ja sosiaalinen ongelma (pp. 51–67). Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1999). Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital 
Mutilation. In M. C. Nussbaum (Ed.), Sex and Social Justice (pp. 118–129). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
O’Kane, M. (2016, February 6). Ban Ki-moon calls on men across the world to 
campaign to end FGM. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/feb/06/ban-ki-moon-end-
female-genital-mutilation-fgm-guardian-campaign 
Obermeyer, C. M. (1999). Female genital surgeries: The Known, the Unknown, 
and the Unknowable. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 13(1), 79–106. 
Okin, S. M. (1999). Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? In J. Cohen, M. 
Howard, & M. C. Nussbaum (Eds.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? 
(pp. 7–26). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Opoku, R. (2017). Gendered Violence: Patterns and Causes of Women-to-
Women Violence in the Lake Zone Regions of Tanzania, East Africa. 
 154 
Tampere University Press. Retrieved from 
https://tampub.uta.fi/handle/10024/100624 
Ouzgane, L. (2006). Islamic Masculinities. Zed Books. 
Parsons, T., & Bales, R. F. (1956). Family, socialization and interaction 
process. London: Routledge. 
Pascoe, C. J. (2007). Dude, You’re a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High 
School. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Peretz, T. (2017). Engaging Diverse Men: An Intersectional Analysis of Men’s 
Pathways to Antiviolence Activism. Gender & Society, 31(4), 526–548. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243217717181 
Peretz, T. (2018a). Seeing the Invisible Knapsack: Feminist Men’s Strategic 
Responses to the Continuation of Male Privilege in Feminist Spaces. Men 
and Masculinities, OnlineFirst. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184 
X18784990 
Peretz, T. (2018b). “We’re Not Equipped”: The Paradox of Intersectional 
Failures in the Formation of Men’s Gender Justice Groups. Journal of 
Men’s Studies, 26(3), 284–304. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1060826518773489 
Pollitt, K. (1999). Whose Culture? In J. Cohen, M. Howard, & M. C. Nussbaum 
(Eds.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (pp. 27–30). Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1998). Discourse and Social Psychology. London: 
SAGE Publications. 
Prazak, M. (2007). Introducing Alternative Rites of Passage. Africa Today, 
53(4), 19–40. 
Prochaska, James O., R. A. C., & Kerry, E. E. (2002). The Transtheoretical 
Model and Stages of Change. In K. Glanz, B. K. Rimer, & F. M. Lewis (Eds.), 
Health Behavior and Health Education: Theory, Research and Practice (3rd 
ed., pp. 99–120). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Puleo, A. (1995). Patriarcado. In C. Amorós (Ed.), Diez Palabras Clave Sobre 
Mujer (pp. 21–54). Estella: Verbo Divino. 
Renteln, A. D. (1988). Relativism and the Search for Human Rights. American 
Anthropologist, 90(1), 56–72. 
Rich, A. (1976). Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution. 
Norton. 
Ronkainen, S. (2017). Mitä väkivalta on? Erontekojen tärkeydestä, yhteyksien 
näkemisestä. In J. Niemi, H. Kainulainen, & P. Honkatukia (Eds.), 
Sukupuolistunut väkivalta: Oikeudellinen ja sosiaalinen ongelma (pp. 19–
35). Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Ruxton, S., & van der Gaag, N. (2013). Men’s involvement in gender equality 
– European perspectives. Gender & Development, 21(1), 161–175. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2013.767522 
Ryan, W. (1976). Blaming the Victim. Vintage Books. 
Sagna, M. L. (2014). Gender differences in support for the discontinuation of 
female genital cutting in Sierra Leone. Culture, Health & Sexuality, 16(6), 
603–619. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691058.2014.896474 
Sakeah, E., Beke, A., Doctor, H. V., & Hodgson, A. V. (2006). Males’ Preference 
for Circumcised Women in Northern Ghana. African Journal of 
Reproductive Health, 10(2), 37–47. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/30032457?uid=3737976&uid=2
&uid=4&sid=21103614329673 
 155 
Samuel, G. (2011). Islamic piety and masculinity. Contemporary Islam, 5(3), 
309–322. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-011-0163-x 
Sayer, A. (2000). System, life-world, and gender: Associational versus 
counterfactual thinking. Sociology, 34, 707–725. 
Seis Silpomiselle. (2018). Retrieved January 3, 2019, from 
https://www.finlayson.fi/pages/seissilpomiselle 
Sharpe, S. (1976). “Just like a girl”: how girls learn to be women. Penguin. 
Shell-Duncan, B., & Hernlund, Y. (2000). Female “Circumcision” in Africa: 
Dimensions of the Practice and Debates. In B. Shell-Duncan & Y. Hernlund 
(Eds.), Female “Circumcision” in Africa: Culture, Controversy and Change 
(pp. 1–40). Boulder: Lynne Rienne Publ. 
Shell-Duncan, B., Hernlund, Y., Wander, K., & Moreau, A. (2010). 
Contingency and Change in the Practice of Female Genital Cutting: 
Dynamics of Decision Making in Senegambia. Summary Report. Seattle. 
Retrieved from https://csde.washington.edu/~bsd/FGC/Contingency and 
Change in the Practice of Female Genital Cutting.pdf 
Shell-Duncan, B., Naik, R., & Feldman-Jacobs, C. (2016). A State-of-the-Art 
Synthesis on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting. What Do We Know Now? 
New York: Population Council. Retrieved from 
http://www.popcouncil.org/ EvidencetoEndFGM-C 
SIHA. (2013). Towards Developing a Methodology to Work With Men Against 
Violence of Women in the Horn of Africa. Strategic Initiative for Women in 
the Horn of Africa (SIHA). Retrieved from 
http://sihanet.org/sites/default/files/resource-download/Workshop 
Report_Men Against VAW.pdf 
SIHA. (2018). Somaliland Religious Affairs Fatwa on Female Genital 
Mutilation/ Cutting – NOT TO BE MISLED. Retrieved from 
http://www.sihanet.org/news/press-statement-somaliland-religious-
affairs-fatwa-on-female-genital-mutilation-cutting-not-to-be-misled/ 
Silberschmidt, M. (2011). What Would Make Men Interested in Gender 
Equality? Reflections from East Africa. In Men and Development: 
Politizicing Masculinities (pp. 98–110). London: Zed Books. 
Somaliland Household Survey 2012-2013. (2014). World Bank Group. 
Retrieved from http://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/4771/study-
description 
Somaliland in Figures 2016. (2018). Hargeisa: Ministry of National Planning 
and Development. 
SONYO. (2016). Somaliland Youth Status Survey Report. Hargeisa: 
Somaliland National Youth Umbrella Organization (SONYO). Retrieved 
from https://sonyo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/YSS.pdf 
SORADI. (2011). Reflections and Lessons of Somaliland’s Two Decades of 
Sustained Peace, Statebuilding and Democratization (Somaliland 
Development Series). Social Research and Development Institute 
(SORADI). 
Spivak, G. C. (1990). Criticism, Feminism and the institution (interview with 
Elizabeth Grosz). In G. C. Spivak & S. Harasym (Eds.), The Post-Colonial 
Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues (pp. 1–16). New York: Routledge. 
Stark, E. (2010). Do violent acts equal abuse? Resolving the gender parity/ 
asymmetry dilemma. Sex Roles, 62(3–4), 201–211. 
Stoltenberg, J. (2000). The End of Manhood: Parables on Sex and Selfhood. 
London: UCL Press. 
 156 
Sweetman, C. (2013). Introduction: Working with men on gender equality. 
Gender & Development, 21(1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074. 
2013 779445 
Talle, A. (1993). Transforming women into ‘“pure”’ agnates: aspects of female 
infibulation in Somalia. In V. Broch-Due, I. Rudie, & T. Bleie (Eds.), Carved 
Flesh Cast Selves. Gendered Symbols and Social Practices (pp. 83–106). 
Oxford: Berg. 
Talle, A. (2010). Kulturens makt: Kvinnelig omskjæring som tradisjon og tabu. 
Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget AS. 
Tamir, Y. (1999). Siding with the Underdogs. In J. Cohen, M. Howard, & M. C. 
Nussbaum (Eds.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (pp. 47–52). 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
TENK. (2009). Ethical principles of research in the humanities and social and 
behavioural sciences and proposals for ethical review. Helsinki. Retrieved 
from https://www.tenk.fi/sites/tenk.fi/files/ethicalprinciples.pdf 
Thomas, L. (2000). “Ngaitana (I Will Circumcise Myself)”: Lessons from 
Colonial Campaigns to Ban Excision in Meru, Kenya. In B. Shell-Duncan & 
Y. Hernlund (Eds.), Female “Circumcision” in Africa: Culture, Controversy 
and Change (pp. 129–150). Boulder: Lynne Rienne Publ. 
Toubia, N., & Sharief, E. H. (2003). Female genital mutilation: Have we made 
progress? International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetric, 82(3), 251–
261. 
Twum-Danso Imoh, A. (2012). Rites vs rights: Female genital cutting at the 
crossroads of local values and global norms. International Social Work, 
56(1), 37–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872812459068 
UN Women. (2019). Global Database on Violence against Women: Somalia. 
Retrieved November 2, 2019, from http://evaw-global-
database.unwomen.org/en/countries/africa/somalia#2 
UNDP. (2014). Somalia Gender-Based Violence Working Group, 2014-2016 
Strategy. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
UNFPA. (2015). General Overview of Gender-Based Violence in Somalia. 
United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), Somalia. Retrieved from 
https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-
pdf/GBVSubClusterBulletin_1Finalnewupdated.pdf 
UNFPA. (2017). UNFPA Somalia Gender Annual Report 2016. Nairobi: 
UNFPA Somalia. Retrieved from https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/ 
files/pub-pdf/GBV Annual report %281%29.pdf 
UNFPA, & UNICEF. (2015). Metrics of Progress, Moments of Change. New 
York: United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA); United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
UNICEF. (2010). The Dynamics of Social Change. Towards the Abandonment 
of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Five African Countries. Florence: 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 
UNICEF. (2013). Female genital mutilation/cutting: A statistical overview and 
exploration of the dynamics of change. New York: United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Retrieved from 
https://www.unicef.org/publications/index_69875.html 
UNICEF. (2016). Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A global concern. New 
York: United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Retrieved from 
http://www.unicef.org/media/files/FGMC_2016_brochure_final_UNIC
EF_SPREAD.pdf 
 157 
United Nations General Assembly. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, Pub. L. No. A/RES/48/104 (1993). Geneva, Switzerland. 
Retrieved from http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm 
van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse & 
Society, 4(2), 249–283. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926593004002001 
Vandello, J. a., & Bosson, J. K. (2013). Hard won and easily lost: A review and 
synthesis of theory and research on precarious manhood. Psychology of 
Men & Masculinity, 14(2), 101–113. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029826 
Varol, N., Turkmani, S., Black, K., Hall, J., & Dawson, A. (2015). The role of 
men in abandonment of female genital mutilation: a systematic review. 
BMC Public Health, 15(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-015-
2373-2 
Venter, E. (2004). The Notion of Ubuntu and Communalism in African 
Educational Discourse. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 23(2–3), 
149–160. 
Vestbøstad, E., & Blystad, A. (2014). Reflections on female circumcision 
discourse in Hargeysa, Somaliland: purified or mutilated? African Journal 
of Reproductive Health, 18(2), 22–35. 
Wade, L. (2011). Learning from “Female Genital Mutilation”: Lessons from 30 
Years of Academic Discourse. Ethnicities, 12(1), 26–49. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796811419603 
Walby, S. (1990). Theorizing patriarchy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Walby, S. (2009). Globalization and Inequalities: Complexity and Contested 
Modernities. SAGE Publications. 
Walby, S. (2011). The Future of Feminism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Walby, S., Armstrong, J., & Strid, S. (2012). Intersectionality: Multiple 
Inequalities in Social Theory. Sociology, 46(2), 224–240. Retrieved from 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0038038511416164 
Walby, S., Towers, J., Balderston, S., Corradi, C., Francis, B., Heiskanen, M., 
… Strid, S. (2017). The concept and measurement of violence against 
women and men. Bristol: Policy Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.oapen.org/record/623150 
Waldenfels, B. (2005). Levinas on the Saying and the Said. In A. P. Tuyizere 
(Ed.), Gender and Development: The Role of Religion and Culture. 
Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd. 
Warsame, A., & Talle, A. (2011). Female Genital Cutting: the Transition from 
Infibulation to Smaller Cutting in Somaliland. Hargeisa: SOWRAG. 
West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing Gender. Gender & Society, 1(2), 
125–151. 
West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (2009). Accounting for doing gender. Gender 
& Society, 23(1), 112–122. 
Wetherell, M., & Edley, N. (1999). Negotiating Hegemonic Masculinity: 
Imaginary Positions and Psycho-Discursive Practices. Feminism & 
 Psychology, 9(3), 335–356. https://doi.org/10.1177/095935359900 
9003012 
Wetherell, M., & Edley, N. (2014). A Discursive Psychological Framework for 
Analyzing Men and Masculinities. Psychology of Men & Masculinity, 15(4), 
355–364. 
Whitehead, S. (2002). Men and Masculinities: Key Themes and New 
Directions. Malden, MA: Polity. Young. 
WHO. (2008). Eliminating Female genital mutilation. An interagency 
statement. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO). 
 158 
WHO. (2017). FGM Fact Sheet. Retrieved January 9, 2018, from 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ 
Widstrand, C. G. (1964). Female Infibulation. Studia Etnografica Upsaliensia, 
20, 95–124. 
Williams, C. L. (1995). Still a Man’s World: Men Who Do Women’s Work. 
Berkeley & London: University of California Press. 
Wilson, T. D. (2002). Pharaonic Circumcision Under Patriarchy and Breast 
Augmentation Under Phallocentric Capitalism: Similarities and 
Differences. Violence Against Women, 8(4), 495–521. 
Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2001). Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. 
London. https://doi.org/10.4135/9780857028020 
Young, I. M. (2003). The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the 
Current Security State. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 
29(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1086/375708 
 159 
APPENDIX 1: LETTER OF REQUEST
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs  
Republic of Somaliland 
 
To whom it may concern: 
 
I hereby request a permit to conduct qualitative research in the city of Hargeisa 
during the period 22 September through 12 October 2016.  
I am a doctoral student at the University of Helsinki, in the Gender, 
Culture, and Society doctoral programme. In my thesis, I focus on men's 
advocacy against female circumcision in Somaliland. My primary research 
interests are men's motives and the challenges they face when advocating 
against the practice. 
In Hargeisa, I will conduct individual semi-structured interviews with 
approximately 20 men who participated in discussion groups organised by 
[international NGO]. I have recruited a local research assistant, Mr. 
[assistant], who will help me in recruiting the interviewees together with [local 
CSO]. Mr. [assistant] will also assist with interpretation during the interviews 
if necessary. 
The primary interview themes consist of: 1) the nature of the activities in 
which the interviewee has participated; 2) gender equality and human rights 
perspectives related to the activities; and 3) gender ideals in Somali culture. 
In order to confirm informed consent, each interviewee will receive an 
information letter in Somali and in English, summarising the purpose of the 
study and including the contact information of the researcher. Interviews will 
be carried out anonymously and confidentially with a high regard for the 
privacy of interviewees.  
After the research, the data will be stored securely and will only be used for 
academic purposes—not for commercial or media purposes. The research 
report document will be a public document in Finland and in Somaliland. 
During my stay, I will reside at the [Hotel], and [international NGO] will 
assist with practicalities in Somaliland. My fieldwork period is partly funded 
by the Nordic Africa Institute at the University of Uppsala, Sweden.  
 
18 August 2016 
With warmest respect, 
Ms. Maria Väkiparta, doctoral student, University of Helsinki 
maria.vakiparta@helsinki.fi, t. +358 50 467 1565 (Finland) 
 
Attachments: 
Detailed work plan & Letter of invitation from the [international NGO] 
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APPENDIX 2: LETTER OF INVITATION FROM 
THE INTERNATIONAL NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION
Dear Sir/Madam:  
 
[international NGO], established in [xxxx], has worked in Somaliland since 
2000. [international NGO] has solid networks and long-term partnerships 
with local development organisations.  
[international NGO] and its two local partner organisations, [local CSO1] 
and [local CSO2] share a common goal, related to the eradication of female 
genital mutilation (FGM). For the last 10 years, [local CSO2] and 
[international NGO] have collaborated on the implementation of FGM 
projects. Cooperation between [international NGO] and [local CSO2] began in 
2015. These partners have years of experience in making women’s voices and 
choices heard, improving their possibilities to achieve sustainable livelihoods, 
and advancing their physical integrity through community- and national-level 
development interventions  
[international NGO] is willing and ready to assist Ms. Maria Väkiparta 
during her field work in Somaliland. 
 
Any assistance accorded to her is highly welcomed.  
  
Yours sincerely,  
 
 
[Forename Family name] 
Programme Director  
[international NGO] 
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APPENDIX 3: DETAILED WORK PLAN 
(ATTACHMENT TO THE LETTER OF 
REQUEST)
Detailed work plan of Ms. Maria Väkiparta 
 
Duration 
22 September through 12 October 2016 
 
Place  
Hargeisa, Somaliland 
 
People in charge:  
Researcher: Ms Maria Väkiparta, doctoral student, University of Helsinki 
(email maria.vakiparta@helsinki.fi, tel. +358 50 467 1565) 
Assistant: Mr. [Forname] [Familyname], Hargeisa [email], [tel] 
Driver: Mr. [Forname] [Familyname], Hargeisa 
 
Cooperation partners: 
[Forname] [Familyname], [title], [international NGO], [email], [tel] 
[Forname] [Familyname], [title], [local CSO], [email], [tel] 
 
Supervisors: 
Ms. Marjut Jyrkinen, Associate Professor in Work-life Equality and Gender 
Studies, University of Helsinki [telephone number], [email address] 
Ms. Lena Näre, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of Social 
Research, University of Helsinki [telephone number], [email address] 
 
Purpose:  
The field work is related to Ms. Väkiparta’s doctoral thesis on men's advocacy 
against female circumcision in Somaliland.  
 
Preparations: 
Mr. [assistant] and [local CSO] will recruit approximately 20 male (and some 
female) interviewees from amongst participants of anti-circumcision 
discussion groups organised by [international NGO] together with [local CSO].  
 
Interviews: 
Approximately two interviews per day will be conducted between 24 
September and 10 October. Mr. [assistant] will assist with and interpret during 
the interviews when necessary. The individual semi-structured interviews 
should last between one to two hours each, and they will be conducted on [local 
 162 
CSO] premises or at the [Hotel]. When necessary, Mr. [driver] will assist in 
driving the researcher and/or the interviewees to the premises in question. 
In order to confirm informed consent, each interviewee will receive an 
information letter in Somali and in English, summarising the purpose of the 
study and containing the contact information of the researcher. 
The primary interview themes consist of: 1) the nature of the activities in 
which the interviewee has participated; 2) gender equality and human rights 
perspectives related to the activities; and 3) gender ideals in the Somali 
culture. 
All interviews will be conducted anonymously and confidentially with a 
high regard for the privacy of the interviewees. Following the research, data 
will be stored securely and will only be used for academic purposes—not for 
commercial or media purposes. 
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APPENDIX 4: MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN [INTERNATIONAL 
NGO] AND MARIA VÄKIPARTA 
 
This MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MoU) is hereby made and 
entered into by and between Maria Väkiparta and the [international NGO].   
 
PURPOSE: 
The purpose of this MoU is to conduct field work for a research study on young 
men’s conceptions of female genital mutilation (FGM) in Somaliland. 
 
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THIS MOU 
2.1. [international NGO] SHALL: 
? support Maria Väkiparta in mapping out and selecting interviewees 
(approximately 20 young men) for the field study. 
 
2.2. [international NGO] is not liable for: 
? indemnifying any third party with respect of any claim, debt, damage 
or demand arising from the implementation of this MoU.  
? compensation for injury, death and/or any other hazard, which may be 
suffered by Maria Väkiparta as a result implementing this MoU. 
 
2.3. MARIA VÄKIPARTA SHALL:  
? secure travel insurance valid for the conflict area during her journey to 
Somaliland. 
? follow the safety regulations of the [local CSO] and [international NGO] 
whilst in Somaliland. 
? select and hire research assistants for the field work. 
? arrange transportation for the field work. 
? cover the costs for her own accommodation, food, and other travel-
related costs. 
? carry out the field work.  
? guarantee respondent confidentiality.  
? assume responsibility for research ethics during the field work and in 
writing the research report. 
 
IT IS MUTUALLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED BY AND BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES THAT: 
 
3.1. MODIFICATION. Modifications to this agreement shall be made by 
mutual consent of the parties, through the issuance of the written 
 164 
modification, and signed and dated by authorised officials, prior to any 
changes being performed.  
 
3.2. DURATION. This MoU shall become effective upon signature and will 
remain in effect until modified or terminated by any one of the partners by 
mutual consent.  
 
3.3. LIABILITIES.  It is understood that neither party to this MoU is the agent 
of the other and neither is liable for wrongful acts or negligence of the other. 
Each party shall be responsible for its negligent acts or omissions and those of 
its officers, employees, agents, or students (if applicable), howsoever caused, 
to the extent allowed by their respective state laws. [international NGO] 
reserves the right to use data and information produced under this MoU, with 
the mutual consent of the signed parties.  
 
3.4. PROPIETARY RIGHTS. Maria Väkiparta owns the right to the research 
data and shall ensure internal and external respondent confidentiality. The 
research document will be a public document in Finland and in Somaliland.  
 
FUNDING 
 
This MoU does not include the reimbursement of funds between the two 
parties. 
This agreement is neither a fiscal nor a funds obligation document.  Any 
endeavour or transfer of anything of value involving reimbursement or the 
contribution of funds between the parties to this agreement will be handled in 
accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and procedures.  Such 
endeavours will be outlined in separate agreements that shall be made in 
writing by representatives of the parties and shall be independently authorised 
by the appropriate statutory authority.  This agreement does not provide such 
authority. Each party shall be fiscally responsible for their own portion of work 
performed under this MoU. 
 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised there to, have on 
behalf of the parties signed this MoU at the place and on the day indicated 
below. 
 
For: 
Maria Väkiparta / [international NGO] 
 
_______________________ _______________________ 
Mrs Maria Väkiparta  [Executive Director] 
31 August 2016  31 August 2016 
 165 
APPENDIX 5: SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
BACKGROUND VARIABLES TEMPLATE
GENDER 
Male / Female 
 
YEAR OF BIRTH ________________________________ 
 
PLACE OF BIRTH ________________________________ 
 
RELIGION ________________________________ 
 
MARITAL STATUS (choose one) 
Single / Married / Divorced / Widowed 
 
PARENTAL STATUS (choose one) 
No children / Only sons / Only daughters / Daughters and sons 
 
HAVE YOU LIVED ABROAD AT SOME POINT DURING YOUR LIFE? 
No  
Yes, at the age of _______ in ________________________________ 
 
FGC STATUS IN THE FAMILY i.e., respondent, his/her mother/sisters 
(choose one) 
All female family members cut /  
Some female family members cut 
No female family members cut /  
I do not know / no answer 
 
I CAN BE CONTACTED VIA EMAIL BY THE RESEARCHER IF SHE NEEDS 
TO CHECK SOME DETAILS OF THIS INTERVIEW 
Yes / No 
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APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW SCHEME WITH 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATION 
EMPLOYEES
What is the main goal and focus of the recent anti-FGC projects your CSO has 
been involved in?  
 
What is your view or strategy on eradicating pharaonic vs. sunnah cutting? 
 
What are the recruitment strategies for involving community-level project 
participants? 
 
What is the role of gender in participant recruitment? 
 
What are the major challenges in recruiting participants? What are the 
primary reasons for participant dropout? 
 
What experiences (challenges) do participants report when advocating against 
FGC? 
 
What are the biggest challenges to preventing FGC? 
 
(How) does your organisation relate FGC to women’s rights and gender 
equality? 
 
What are the biggest challenges in promoting women’s rights and gender 
equality? 
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APPENDIX 7: INDIVIDUAL INFORMED 
CONSENT (ENGLISH)
Consent letter for participating in an academic research interview 
 
My name is Maria Väkiparta. I am a doctoral student at the University of 
Helsinki, Finland.  
I am independent from [local CSO] and [international NGO]. They 
provided me with the contact information of project participants, but I am not 
monitoring nor working for their projects. 
I am conducting a doctoral dissertation on men’s advocacy against female 
genital cutting (FGC) in Somaliland. FGC here refers to all forms of cutting 
from sunnah to pharaonic. I am especially interested in the challenges that 
young men (and women) face in the eradication of FGC.  
I want to assure you that your answers cannot be later identified as 
belonging to you. I will not keep a record of your name or address. I am 
recording the interview; but after I transcribe it, I will delete the recording. 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw 
from the interview at any time, or to skip any questions that you do not want 
to answer. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Mr. [assistant] is available to assist in translating if necessary. He has 
signed a declaration of confidentiality, promising never to identify the 
research participants nor the opinions they shared.  
If there is anything you want to add or ask later on, you hereby receive the 
researcher’s contact information. 
The interview will take approximately 60 to 90 minutes.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
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APPENDIX 8: INDIVIDUAL CONSENT 
(SOMALI)
Aniga magacaygu waa Maria Vakiparta. Waxaan ahay ardayad darajada PHD 
ka wada jaamacadda Helsinki ee ku taalla wadanka Finland. Anigoo ka madax 
banaan hay’adaha [organisation], waxay laakiin igu caawiyeen xiririka dadka 
ka faa’iidaystay mashaariicdooda si aan u waraysto. waxaan cilmi baadhis ka 
diyaarinayaa taageeridda raga ee ladagaalanka gudniinka firconiga ah 
qaybihiisa kala duwan (nooca sunaha iyo fircooniga). 
Hay’adda [organisation] ee gacansaarka la leh [organisation] ayaa kuu 
dooratay inaad ka qayb qaadato diraasaddan, sababtoo ah waxaad ka qayb 
gashay ololihii ay qaadeen [organisation] iyo [organisation] si ay u cidhib 
tiraan caadadan. Waxaan danaynayaa ka qayb qaadashada ragga iyo 
Dumarkuba ee Cilmi Baadhista. 
Waxaan kuu ballan qaadayaa in dhammaan jawaabahaagu ay sir ahaan 
doonaan. Ma diiwaan gashan doono magacaaga iyo ciwaankaaga toona. 
Waxad xaq u leedahay inaad markaad doonto waraysiga iska joojin kartid 
amma aad iska dhaafi kartid suaalaha aanad rabin inaad ka jawaabto. Ma 
jiraan jawaabo sax ah amma khalad ahi. 
Ka qayb-galkaagu waa tabarruc laakin khibradaadu waxay wax u taraysaa 
ragga kale ee ka shaqaynaya ladagaallanka gudninka fircooniga ah.  
Waraysigu wuxuu qaadanayaa 60–90 daqiiqo. 
Miyaad ogoshay in lagu waraysto? 
 
Miyaad ku hadli kartaa English mise [name] baa ku caawiya oo kuu turjuma 
suaalaha iyo jawaabaha? Wuxuu saxeexay warqada ilaalinta xuquuqda cilmi 
baadhista oo ah inaanu cid kale la wadaagin xogta ama fikradaha la is 
waydaarsaday. Wuxuu ilaalin doonaa magacaaga iyo xogta kale oo dhanba. 
Haddiiba uu qofka ku waraysanayaa u baahdo xog dheeraada amma 
fasiraad ma leeday cinwaan email oo lagaala soo xidhiidhi karo? Haddii ay jirto 
waxaa aad ku dari karto ama su’aal aad qabto waxaa lagu siin ciwaanka iyo 
numberka cilmi baadhaha si aad ugala xidhiidho. 
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APPENDIX 9: INTERVIEW SCHEME WITH 
STUDENTS
Introduction 
? Present myself and describe the project 
? Explain and secure individual informed consent  
? Explain the structure of the interview 
 
Warm-up 
? Have you participated in activities against FGC before? Please 
elaborate. 
? How were you recruited to participate in this project? 
? Did you hesitate to participate? (Why or why not?) 
? Can you identify reasons why someone would hesitate to engage in a 
project addressing FGC? 
? Has your knowledge increased or have your attitudes changed about 
FGC during the training you just finished?  
 
Topic: FGC practices and consequences 
? What is your opinion regarding the different types of FGC? 
? How do you feel about women who have not been cut at all (uncut)? 
? Do you know girls or women who have experienced problems related to 
FGC? Please elaborate. 
? Does FGC affect men’s lives? How? 
 
Topic: FGC prevention 
? What kinds of activities against FGC have you engaged in? 
? You are expected to raise awareness about FGC in your community. 
How do you feel about that awareness raising?  
? How do you think people will react?  
? How have your family and friends reacted to your participation in the 
project or in efforts against FGC? 
? Do you think men have a special role to play in preventing FGC? Please 
elaborate. 
? Do you have a personal mission related to the eradication of FGC? 
Please elaborate. 
? In your view, when will FGC be abandoned in Somaliland? 
? What are the biggest challenges to eradicating FGC in Somaliland? 
? What keeps you motivated (despite the challenges)? 
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Topic: Gender roles, ideals, and gender equality 
? Are there specific roles for men and women in Somaliland society? 
Please elaborate. 
? Have these roles always been the same or have they changed? How? 
? What kinds of women are respected in Somaliland?  
? What kinds of men are respected in Somaliland?  
? What are important criteria for young women in terms of their future 
husband? 
? What are important criteria for young men in terms of their future wife? 
? Do you see gender inequality in your society? Please elaborate. 
? Is there a relationship between FGC and gender equality or women’s 
rights? Please elaborate.  
? How do you and people in general feel about advocating for gender 
equality or women’s rights? 
? Do you have anything else you want to add? 
 
APPENDIX 10: CODES AND SUBCODES 
IDENTIFIED AND APPLIED IN THE DATA 
ANALYSIS 
Diaspora 
Effect on men: agony related to her 
pain 
Effect on men: giving birth 
Effect on men: health / extra costs  
Effect on men: psychology / feelings 
Effect on men: sexual intercourse / 
reopening 
Effect on men: sexuality / 
sensitiveness 
Effect on women 
Effective education / campaign 
strategies 
FGM/C prevalence 
FGM/C root causes / upholding 
factors 
FGM/C stance: no clear stance 
FGM/C stance: prefers sunnah 
FGM/C stance: zero tolerance 
Gender equality 
Gender ideals / female 
Gender ideals / male 
Gender norms / female: flexible 
Gender norms / female: rigid 
Gender norms / male: flexible 
Gender norms / male: rigid 
Marital preferences: husbands 
Marital preferences: wives 
Marriageability criteria 
Men’s role: brothers 
Men’s role: community mobiliser 
Men’s role: encouraging women to 
speak up 
Men’s role: fathers 
Men’s role: leaders 
Men’s role: marriage preferences 
Men’s role: professionals 
Mothers in the key role 
Motive: altruistic 
Motive: professional 
Motive: selfish 
NEG exper/expec*: challenging 
culture 
NEG exper/expec: challenging 
religion 
NEG exper/expec: confusing / 
irritating people 
NEG exper/expec: foreign values 
NEG exper/expec: lack of authority 
NEG exper/expec: no effect 
NEG exper/expec: sensitive issue 
NEG exper/expec: women’s issue 
POS exper/expec: future role 
POS exper/expec: optimistic plans 
POS exper/expec: others’ success 
POS exper/expec: personal success 
POS exper/expec: positive feedback 
Sunnah: as harmful as pharaonic 
Sunnah: harmless 
Sunnah: less harmful than pharaonic 
Untouched girls 
Women & FGM/C advocacy 
Women’s rights violations: economic 
& social rights 
Women’s rights violations: political 
& civil rights 
Women’s rights violations: 
reproductive & integrity rights 
Women’s rights vs Qur’an 
Women’s / human rights: appeal to 
arguments 
 
 
 
*NEG/POS exper/expec = negative or 
positive experiences or expectations 
regarding the anti-FGM/C advocacy 
 
 APPENDIX 11: ISSUES AND RELATED 
CODES IDENTIFIED DURING THE 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
FGM/C PRACTICES 
Solidarity  
Effect on men: agony related to her pain 
Motive: altruistic 
Sexuality  
Effect on men: sexuality / sensitiveness 
Untouched girls 
Marriage(ability) 
Marital preferences: wives 
Marriageability criteria 
Sunnah vs pharaonic 
cutting 
Sunnah: as harmful as pharaonic 
Sunnah: less harmful than pharaonic 
Sunnah: harmless 
Violence / violation  Women’s rights violation: reproductive & integrity rights 
Health effects Effect on women 
FGM/C PREVENTION 
Competence 
Effective education / campaign strategies 
FGM/C root causes / factors upholding it 
Men’s role: community mobiliser 
Motive: responsibility / educated professional 
Positive experience / expectation: future role 
Positive experience / expectation: optimistic plans 
Positive experience / expectation: others’ success 
Positive experience / expectation: personal success 
Positive experience / expectation: positive feedback 
Roles and motives 
Effect on men: health / extra costs 
Gender norms: male / rigid 
Men’s role: brothers 
Men’s role: fathers 
Men’s role: leaders 
Men’s role: marriage preferences 
Men’s role: professionals 
Mothers in the key role 
Motive: altruistic 
Motive: responsibility / educated professional 
Women & FGM/C advocacy 
Challenges  
Negative experience / expectation: challenging culture 
Negative experience / expectation: challenging religion 
Negative experience / expectation: confusing / irritating people 
Negative experience / expectation: foreign values 
Negative experience / expectation: lack of authority 
Negative experience / expectation: no effect 
Negative experience / expectation: sensitive issue 
Negative experience / expectation: women’s issue 
Women’s / human rights: appeal to arguments 
Negative experience / expectation: lack of authority 
Effective education / campaign strategies 
GENDER ROLES, IDEALS, & EQUALITY 
Gender norms and 
ideals 
Gender norms: female / flexible 
Gender norms: female / rigid  
Gender norms: male / flexible 
Gender norms: male / rigid 
Gender ideals: female 
Gender ideals: male 
Women’s rights and 
status 
Gender equality 
Women’s rights violations: economic & social rights 
Women’s rights violations: political & civil rights 
Women’s rights violations: reproductive & integrity rights 
Women’s rights vs Qur’an 
 
 APPENDIX 12: DECLARATION OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
To all research assistants engaged in Maria Väkiparta’s doctoral thesis 
research on men's advocacy against female genital cutting in Somaliland 
 
I have been given and have understand the aim of this research project and its 
ethical challenges. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have had 
them answered. 
 
YES________ NO________ 
 
I understand that I can never identify the research participants or share their 
opinions. 
 
YES________ NO________ 
 
I understand that if I know any of the research participants, I must inform the 
researcher, Maria Väkiparta. 
 
YES________ NO________ 
 
I understand that the personal data provided to me will remain confidential 
and will not be used for any purpose other than assisting in the research 
project. 
 
YES________ NO________ 
 
 
Place / Date / Signature 
 
 
 
 
Print name 
 
